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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
During the first two decades following the Second
World War the United States intelligence community operated
for the most part out of the sight and mind of the American
public. While subject to periodic investigations and
Congressional inquiries, intelligence activities were
conducted with a minimum of public knowledge or
accountability. The manner in which the United States
intelligence community conducted its activities would
change in the early 1970 's when it became the subject of
numerous public and Congressional exposes and
investigations. The decade of the 1970 ' s was one of the
most turbulent in the history of the intelligence
community and brought to the forefront a basic issue: how
to balance the secret activities of the intelligence
community with the values, rights, and concerns of
citizens in a free and open society.
This paper examines changes made in the activities of
the United States intelligence community in response to
public and Congressional concerns over constitutional and
administrative issues related to intelligence activities.
The paper focuses on the responsiveness to criticism
by the United States intelligence community as implemented
through Presidential Executive Orders on United States
Foreign Intelligence Activities and involves a
comparative examination of President Ford's Executive Order
11905, President Carter's Executive Order 12036 and
President Reagan's Executive Order 12333. These three
Executive Orders cover a period of time from February 1976
through December 1981 and are compared with public and
Congressional criticism of intelligence activities raised
during the period in question. Such an examination provides
for an increased understanding of the responsiveness (or
nonresponsiveness) of the intelligence community to
constitutional and administrative issues related to
intelligence activities.
Chapter 2
NATIONAL SECURITY
The National Security Act of 1947 established the
overall direction of United States national security and
intelligence policies and laid the foundation for the
postwar United States intelligence community. Under the
National Security Act the National Security Council was
established to advise the President with respect to the
integration of domestic , foreign and military policies
1
relating to national security. The Council allowed for the
coordination and cooperation of the various Government
agencies involved in security and security related issues
and allowed the President to monitor all security
activities. The Act also established the Central
Intelligence Agency for the purposes of:
coordinating the intelligence activities
of the Government departments and agencies
in the interest of national security. 2
As established by the National Security Act of 1947,
the CIA, along with other agencies such as the National
Security Agency, the State Department, the Department
of Defense and the Defense Intelligence Agency, make up
what is known as the United States intelligence community.
Individually and combined, these agencies contribute to the
collection and processing of intelligence and national
security related information.
National security has been and continues to be a
major concern for most if not all nations in the world
community. The need for a viable defense is a continuing
problem involving commitment of both manpower and
resources. Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel Sam
Sarkesian defines national security as:
that policy designed to protect the
nation from external threat and to project
the nation's power into areas of the world
in order to create an environment enhancing
the nation's capability to carry out these
policies. 3
As described in Sarkesian 's definition, the United
States as a world power maintains a national security
policy designed to deal effectively with external threats
and project US power into various regions of the world.
One aspect of the pursuit of national security following
World War II was the enactment of the National Security
Act of 1947. The Act was to:
provide a comprehensive program for
the future security of the United States;
to provide for the establishment of inte-
grated policies and procedures for the
departments, agencies, and functions of the
Government relating to national security. 4
Both Sarkesian and the National Security Act of
1947 define national security in terms of the process and
policies required to establish and maintain national
security. However, national security may also be defined as
a dynamic popular expectation of relative constitutional
4
integrity. Under this definition national security involves
a general popular feeling that despite occasional problems
and uncertainties, an acceptable level of control and
security is being maintained. Such a definition may be
more appropriate in terms of national security and
intelligence activities. While the National Security Act
of 1947 and Executive Orders on intelligence provide
detailed guidelines on the conduct of such activities, the
complex and often classified nature of intelligence work
does not lend itself to a strict and comprehensive public
accounting. Such a public accounting is further
complicated by interagency disagreements and bureaucratic
in-fighting within the intelligence community itself. The
result is the public acceptance of a condition of national
security based upon an often vague understanding of the
activities which maintain such a condition.
In A Season of Inquiry
,
Loch K. Johnson writes that
such a vague understanding or hands off approach has
helped establish a belief that the "leaders of the
intelligence agencies were honorable men who could be
5
relied on to do the right thing."
Public acceptance of such a condition of national
security creates a cycle. Intelligence activities are
conducted with little public knowledge or interest. As
a result periodic exposures and investigations are
sensational in nature with the motives and decisions
5
of even the most honorable men becoming the subject of
intense controversy and debate.
During the decade of the 1970 's such a cycle spanned
three Presidential administrations and involved almost
every aspect of intelligence gathering activities
performed by the United States intelligence community.
Chapter 3
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE: THE DEBATE
The role of intelligence in United States foreign
policy and the control of intelligence activities has been
the subject of intense and prolonged debate including
almost every aspect of intelligence activities, from the
criticism of former intelligence officers to the study of
the "protective and informative role" of intelligence as
discussed in former Director of Central Intelligence Allen
6
Dulles' The Craft of Intelligence.
During the period 1974 through 1981 the US
intelligence community and its activities came under
prolonged and intense scrutiny by the mass media, the
House, and Senate, and former intelligence operatives.
The public questions and criticism raised by the
various factions can be divided into two categories:
1) Constitutional: criticisms, examinations
of executive accountability, prohibitions on
certain activities such as political assassination,
violations of civil and human rights, oversight,
and other considerations inspired and informed by
U.S. constitutional and statute law.
2) Administrative: organizational problems,
structure of the intelligence community, internal
management and personnel issues based on procedural
and operational requirements less concerned with
constitutional issues.
While constitutional issues provided a main focus
of investigation during the 1970 's, previous studies
7
on intelligence activities address the issues as well.
In 1964 in The Invisible Government
,
David Wise and
Thomas B. Ross present a critical examination of the US
intelligence community and the dangers of maintaining such
a community. The discussion focuses on what is described
as an "invisible government" as compared with the more
public and visible functions of the everyday business of
running the country. This second, more invisible
government serves to gather intelligence, conduct
espionage and plans and executes secret operations all
over the globe. Such intelligence activities are hidden
or invisible and operate outside normal constitutional
checks and balances and pose a threat to the very system
7
the activities are designed to protect.
The authors conclude that the secret activities
of the government in the area of intelligence can never be
totally reconciled with the traditions of a free society
and call for more increased control of intelligence and
8
intelligence gathering activities.
The operation of intelligence activities in a free
society was questioned in December 1974 in an article
published in The New York Times by investigative reporter
Seymour Hersch
.
The allegations stated in the hotly
debated article included Information that the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) had violated its charter and had
conducted illegal domestic intelligence operations during
8
the Nixon administration against antiwar groups. Other
CIA activities included domestic break-ins, wiretapping
9
and the opening of mail.
The Hersch article sparked both controversy and
debate and was followed by other mass media studies.
Newsweek continued the investigation and published their
findings which decribed President Nixon as "obsessed" with
fears that foreign elements were inciting domestic radicals
to riot. Further evidence listed one CIA source as acknow-
ledging that the Agency had conducted investigations of
campus disorders in the late sixties and early seventies
10
in clear violation of its charter.
The public pressure brought to bear by media
attention on the issue of intelligence activities can be
seen in the fact that CIA Director William Colby gave at
least thirty public speeches between the months of January
and May 1975 to portray a more open CIA and to gain public
11
support
.
In addition to media interest in constitutional
and administrative issues related to intelligence
activities, the Congress became involved as well.
In Congress during 1976 the House Select Intelligence
Committee (the Pike Committee) developed a set of
recommendations following its examination of the US
intelligence community. The recommendations of the Pike
Committee included a prohibition on attempts to
!«
assassinate any individual except during war. Pike
Committee administrative reform involved:
- the creation of the position of Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) for the
coordination and oversight of the entire
foreign intelligence community;
- enpowering of the General Accounting Office
(GAO) to conduct full and complete management
and finaclal audits of all intelligence
activities
;
- establishment of an independent office of the
Inspector General for intelligence. 12
As did the House during 1976, the Senate also publish-
ed its report, the Senate Committee Report on Foreign and
Military Intelligence (the Church Committee Report).
The Church Committee Report recommended the position of a
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and prohibition on
assassinations. The other recommendations included:
- establishment of a Committee on Foreign
Intelligence (CFI);
- General Accounting Office (GAO) auditing
of the intelligence community for
management and compliance purposes. 13
During the investigations of intelligence activities
by the media and Congress, former intelligence operatives
also came forth with allegations and exposures of various
intelligence operations at home and abroad. Phillip Agee
,
ex-intelligence officer, and Louis Wolf present a highly
critical examination of CIA activities in their book
10
entitled Dirty Work. Their study and expose of CIA secret
operations in several regions of the world presents a
negative picture of such activities and calls for the
establishment of an international "CIA watch" to monitor
CIA activities and operations, "demystify" the CIA and
expose the secrecy and illegality of intelligence oper-
14
ations around the world.
The extent to which the activities of the CIA and the
intelligence community have aroused controversy, distrust
and debate may be illustrated by Agee ' s inclusion in
Dirty Work of "Official Biographies", a section which
consists of an alphabetical listing of actual or apparent
United States intelligence operatives at stations around
the world. By the publication of such a listing the authors
hope to expose secret or possibly illegal activities to the
public and bring controversy, criticism and control to the
area of intelligence gathering by CIA and the US
15
intelligence community.
Former intelligence official John Oseth discusses the
problems of intelligence and information gathering activi-
ties in Regulating US Intelligence Operations. Oseth
sees the control of intelligence functions as important
but not excessively public in nature. In this, Oseth means
that as a republic, the people's voice is expressed through
their elected officials. Excessive access to classified
information or the abuse of the Freedom of Information
11
Act may result in a compromise of intelligence operations.
Oseth writes that elected officials must be trusted to
perform in the best interests of the public in the control
16
and direction of the intelligence community.
Where Oseth 's analysis favors a condition of national
security wherein elected officials are trusted to conduct
intelligence activities with a minimum of regulation,
other studies outline the apparent abuse of such a low
level of interest and monitoring.
In The Puzzle Palace
,
James Bamford presents
a rare and detailed expose of the activities of one of the
most secret agencies of the US intelligence community, the
National Security Agency (NSA). Bamford describes the NSA
as an all powerful, eavesdropping, highly organized and
capable government agency which collects masses of data
on US citizens at home and abroad. The super-secret NSA
is further described by Bamford as having a free hand in
the United States for gathering information and on all US
17
citizens leaving the country.
While the majority of criticism of intelligence
gathering activities addresses constitutional issues, some
studies stressed the need for structural and administrative
type changes. As discussed earlier, both the House and
Senate investigations of 1976 examined constitutional
issues but also recommended administrative reforms,
recommendations which included the position of Director of
12
Central Intelligence (DCI) to oversee the administration
18
of the US intelligence community.
In Intelligence Requirements for the 1980
'
s
,
Roy Godson examines conclusions reached by a panel of
experts in the field of intelligence and security. The
recommendations of the panel include the need for an
improved clandestine collection capability, improvement in
analysis and estimates, and overall shortening of lead
time for intelligence requirements. The panel discussion
did not favor increased legislation for the control of
intelligence activities and in fact determined that
legal or legislative actions could be more detrimental
19
to intelligence activities than beneficial.
The conclusions reached in Godson's panel study can
be seen as administrative in nature, in-house functions
which may be remedied or improved by existing or addition-
al regulations and procedures which impact on day to day
operations
.
Another study approaches adminstrative problems in
the intelligence community from another direction, down-
playing the need for bureaucratic control and regulation.
In US Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy Mark M.
Lowenthal observes that reorganizations seldom change
intelligence agencies or their method of operation.
Lowenthal sees the unique and varied procedures of the
intelligence community as being at odds with the regular
13
and scheduled procedures of normal bureaucratic activity.
Attempts at forcing the intelligence community into such
stable behavior, according to Lowenthal, may not be success-
ful. Further, the author describes the role of the intell-
gence community as open-ended in nature, there being no
final answers (as situations are subject to sudden change).
Lowenthal concludes that given such a unique activity and
community, there may be no best organizational model with
20
which to control intelligence gathering activities.
Since its creation by the National Security Act of
1947 the US intelligence community and its activities have
been subjected to periodic investigations and controversy
involving both constitutional and administrative issues.
Such periodic events, culminating in the turbulent decade
of the seventies, give an indication of the problems
inherent in the operation of secret information gather-
ing agencies in a free and open society and the control
and accountability of such organizations.
14
Chapter 4
EXECUTIVE ORDERS: MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
As the United States intelligence community falls
under the direction of the Executive branch of Government,
the main responsibility for guiding and controlling
intelligence activities is with the President. The
intelligence community performs its assigned tasks
and responds to directives and guidelines as issued by the
President or other department heads responsible to the
President. Each new President may bring changes or new
guidelines for conduct of intelligence activities and each
21
has done so since the National security Act of 1947. The
structure and control of the US intelligence community may
be accomplished in three ways; Executive orders,
Presidential directives, and agency or department
22
regulations. Of the three the Executive Order can be one
of the most useful means for providing guidance to the
intelligence community as well in addressing public
concern and criticism. President Ford used Executive
Order 11905 to address both intelligence problems and
public concerns. In his message to Congress on February
1976 President Ford said the Executive Order (E. 0.11905)
establishes "Government-wide direction for the foreign
intelligence agencies and places responsibility and
23
accountability on individuals, not institutions".
15
The use of Presidential Executive Orders has not been
limited to the area of intelligence. Each US president has
used the Executive Order to implement policy and
administrative actions with limited Congressional debate
or delay.
In 1951 President Truman used Executive Order 10210
to provide authorization for the Department of Defense to
expedite procurement activities in the interests
of the national defense. Executive Order 10210 waived
competitive bidding requirements and directed a clause
be inserted in all contracts authorizing the Comptroller
General of the United States to have access to, and the
right to examine, any information held by a defense
24
contractor in the performance of a Government contract.
The use of an Executive Order enabled President Truman
to implement administrative changes in the field of
Government procurement without prolonged debate and
delay.
President Kennedy made use of the Executive Order in
1961 to direct the Secretary of State to establish the
Peace Corps as part of his approach to foreign policy.
Executive Order 10924 established the Peace Corps which
was described as being responsible for the training and
service abroad of men and women of the United States in
the then new programs of assistance to nations and areas
of the world. 25
16
President Kennedy made further use of the Executive
Order in terms of constitutional issues in 1961 with the
signing of Executive Order 10925 which established the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.
E.O. 10925 established the Committee which was responsible
for the study of employment practices in the Government
and the recommendation of affirmative steps to be taken
to realize more fully the goals of the national policy of
26
nondescrimination
.
Other Executive Orders addressed both constitutional
and administrative issues and had a greater impact on
Government agencies. In May 1965 President Johnson signed
Executive Order 11222 Prescribing Standards of Ethical
Conduct for Government Officers and Employees. Executive
Order 11222, which remains in effect for all Government
employees, outlines ethical standards and behavior for
federal employees. The E.O. provides detailed guidance
in terms of actual and apparent misconduct, conflict of
27
interest and unethical behavior. In signing Executive
Order 11222, President Johnson stated the purpose as being
to codify, clarify and strengthen ethical conduct and
demonstrate that conflicts of interest, or favoritism,
or even the appearance that such actions were occurring,
28
would not be tolerated.
Each Executive Order issued by a President, while not
a product of legislation or judicial decision, serves as an
17
administrative directive which is to be implemented and
obeyed in each applicable agency. Noncompliance with an
Executive Order such as President Johnson's E.O. 11222 on
ethical conduct can result in punitive actions taken
against the offending agency or the dismissal of an
employee or number of employees from Government service.
The Presidential Executive Order on Foreign Intelli-
gence Activities addresses both constitutional and admini-
strative issues of intelligence. The public debate
during the early 1970 's accompanied by House and Senate
investigations is an indication of the need for Executive
Orders on intelligence activities. The E.O. serves as a
public affirmation of Presidential control and
accountability of the intelligence community while dealing
directly with the problems of oversight and restrictions on
intelligence gathering activities. As such the Executive
Order can be seen as responsive to the criticisms and
investigations and a positive means for the direction of
intelligence activities.
18
Chapter 5
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11905: CALMING THE WATERS
In January of 1974 Gerald Ford assumed Presidential
control of an intelligence community under seige.
The revelations of Watergate and continued investigations
of intelligence activities resulted in the erosion of
public confidence and trust in the intelligence community
and a reduction in the morale and effectiveness of the
community itself. Finally, in February 1976 President Ford
signed Executive Order 11905, a document described by John
Oseth as
:
truly unprecedented in scope ...[It] was
clearly intended to be the open, public charter
that many critics had been advocating for some
time. 29
Signing Executive Order 11905 Foreign Intelligence
Activities February 1976, President Ford in his message to
the Congress described the document as one that estab-
lished clear accountability for the nation's foreign
intelligence community and set forth strict controls on
activities in which those agencies could become involved
30
or participate.
In the public and Congressional criticisms and
investigations of intelligence activities much of the
focus had been on the moral, legal and constitutional
issues raised by covert and other activities. E.O. 11905
10
addressed such concerns and does include restrictions and
increased guidance.
One of the most controversial constitutional issues
brought to light in the investigation of intelligence
activities is in the area of political assassination.
While not specifically prohibited by the Constitution, the
use of political assassination by a Government agency
involves not only political considerations, but raises
ethical and moral issues stemming from well established
American Constitutional and cultural values concerning the
sanctity of human life.
While a number of the prohibitions on intelligence
activities may be subject to other laws or exemptions, the
prohibition on assassination is stated in a direct and
concise manner:
No employee of the United States
Government may engage in, or conspire
to engage in, political assassination. 31
Such a direct prohibition reflects the President Ford's
stated concern over the control of "abuses and
questionable activities" on the part of the intelligence
32
community.
In addition to the prohibition on assassination, E.O.
11905 specifically prohibits the US intelligence community
from engaging in the physical surveillance of a United
States person, unconsented physical searches, the opening
20
of mail, the collection of information on domestic
activities and infiltration of any organization within the
United States for the purposes of reporting on or
influencing members. The above prohibitions of E.O. 11905
provide clear guidance for restrictions on certain
activities, although subject to some exemptions or other
33
current US law.
Another aspect of E.O. 11905 responsive to
criticism is Section 5 (d) which addressed the
issue of experimentation on human subjects by placing a
direct prohibition on such activities unless conducted
34
under established guidelines.
Executive Order 11905 addressed constitutional
issues but also included administrative concerns by
providing guidance designed to improve intelligence
information gathering activities and encourage a more
responsive intelligence community.
Section 3, Para.(b) 1-5 emphasized individual
responsibility and accountability by describing the
duties of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI)
which is composed of the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI), Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and
the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs. The CFI reports to the National Security Council
and its duties include budget control and establishment of
policy for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and
2]
continuing guidance to the intelligence community to
ensure compliance with the policy directives of the
35
National Security Council.
Executive Order 11905 discussed the role of the
CFI and further expands the responsibilities of the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), a position
established by the National Security Act of 1947.
Under E.O. 11905 the DCI chairs the Committee on
Foreign Intelligence (CFI) and is responsible to the
President and National Security Council as primary
advisor on foreign intelligence. Further DCI duties
include development of intelligence programs, ensuring
strong Inspector General capabilities and serving as
the principal spokesman to Congress for the intelligence
36
community
.
E.O. 11905 also provided for additional
administrative oversight of intelligence organizations in
Section 6, Paragraphs a through d by the establishment of
an Intelligence Oversight Board which consists of three
members from outside the Government, appointed by the
President. The Oversight Board receives and considers
reports by the Inspector General and General Counsels of
the intelligence community concerning activities that
raise questions of legality or propriety. The Oversight
Board also reviews the practices and procedures of the
Inspector General and General Councils, the internal
•1-2.
guidelines of the intelligence community; it reports to
the President and Attorney General on questions of
37
legality or propriety in a timely manner.
Section 6 (b) of Executive Order 11905 outlined
the responsibilities of the Inspector General and General
Councils within the intelligence community. Both offices
are required to report to the Oversight Board those
activities which raise questions of legality or
propriety. More importantly, they are required to report
any occasion on which they are directed by their agency or
department heads not to submit a report involving
38
questionable activities to the Oversight Board.
Taken as a whole President Ford's Executive Order
11905 on Foreign Intelligence Activities signed in
February 1976 can be seen as a document which addressed
constitutional and administrative issues of the
intelligence community brought to light by public concern
media examination and Congressional investigation.
Prohibitions on surveillance, human experimentation,
and political assassination, and the implementation of
oversight bodies served to make Executive Order 11905 a
responsive measure for the control and accountability of
intelligence activities. It further served as a public
affirmation of the desire for control of past abuses and
the prevention of continued illegal or improper activities
on the part of the US intelligence community.
23
Chapter 6
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12036: A NARROW COURSE
The election of Jimmy Carter as President in January
1976 was accompanied by the establishment of an
administration which favored open government, an
aggressive human rights policy and increased control of
imtelligence activities. In order to establish such
control President Carter signed Executive Order 12036, the
most lengthy and comprehensive of the Executive Orders
examined. In signing E.O. 12036 in January 1976 President
Carter stated that the order demonstrates:
we can fully protect our Nation and do so
within the law, and not only do it better
than under a circumstance which permits us to
resort to illegality. 39
Both President Carter's remarks and the content
of E.O. 12036 make it the most responsive to public
criticism and concern. The E.O. continued the restrictions
on experimentation and assassination established under
Executive Order 11905 and increased controls on
intelligence activities in general. The Executive Order
12036 also established oversight committees which were
accountable to the President and responsible for monitor-
ing intelligence activities.
Under E.O. 12036 the duties of the Director of
Central Intelligence were reexamined. The DCI continued
24
to serve as the spokesperson to Congress, making for
continued public accountability. The responsive nature
of President Carter's E.O. may be reflected in his choice
for the position of DCI . Concerned with the need for
intelligence while controlling past abuses, the President
designated Admiral Stansfield Turner as DCI. Turner wrote
of his duties as DCI:
one of my first and most urgent concerns
was to put CIA's much criticized past behind
us. Neither the CIA nor I wanted to push
problems under the rug, so I resolved to
address them directly, make whatever changes
were needed to prevent reoccurrance
, and move
on to the work we were being paid to do. 40
President Carter's E.O. 12036 addressed many of the
same constitutional and administrative issues, in some
cases building on to what was established under E.O. 11905.
In order to ensure that foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence activities are conducted in full
accordance with the law, E.O. 12036 went further in terms
of restrictions than Ford's Executive Order 11905.
Restrictions on both human experimentation and assassinat-
ion are expressed in stronger terms than previously. The
intelligence community is specifically prohibited from
sponsoring, contracting for, or conducting research on
human subjects except under Department of Health,
Education and Welfare guidelines. E.O. 12036 also requires
41
the documented consent of the subject.
25
In the controversial area of political assassination
E.O. 12036 prohibits persons employed by the US Government
to engage in such activities and went even further than
the previous E.O. by including persons acting on behalf of
42
the US Government
.
Further expanding on Executive Order 11905, E.O.
12036 places restrictions on special activities and
indirect participation in prohibited activities by US
Government personnel. The conduct of special activities
(activities conducted abroad in support of national
foreign policy objectives where the role of the United
States is not apparent or acknowledged) is limited
to the Central Intelligence Agency or the military in the
event of war, as directed by the President. In addition
the intelligence community is prohibited from requesting
or encouraging persons, organizations or governments to
43
undertake prohibited activities.
In E.O. 11905 foreign intelligence agencies are
prohibited from conducting electronic surveillance in the
United States and against US citizens abroad except under
certain conditions and guidelines. In President Carter's
E.O. 12036, Section 2, Paragraph 2-202 strengthens the past
prohibition by directly prohibiting the Central Intelli-
gence Agency from conducting such activity in the United
States. Further limitations apply on the testing of sur-
al
veillance and electronic equipment, the scope of such
44
testing and the use of the results of such tests.
Whereas E.O. 11905 presented guidelines for the
collection of information on the domestic activities of
US citizens, E.O. 12036 presents a more direct and
detailed prohibition on such collection activities. Section
2, Paragraph 2-208 of E.O. 12036 prohibits any agency from
the US intelligence community from collecting what is
described as nonpublicly available information without
the consent of the persons investigated or as proscribed
by law. The collection, storage and dissemination of such
information is limited under E.O. 12036 to certain types,
such as overhead reconnaissance, necessary to fulfill
45
lawful investigations. The more clearly defined limits
for intelligence agencies in the collection of information
under E.O. 12036 provided for a more controlled and
responsible use of such information.
Administratively, E.O. 12036 continued the
Intelligence Oversight Board as established under E.O.
11905. While maintaining essentially the same role for
the Oversight Board, E.O. 12036 expands the duties of
the Attorney General. In addition to receiving and
considering reports and reporting to the President, the
Attorney General under E.O. 12036 establishes and/or
approves procedures for the conduct of intelligence
activities and ensures such activities are in compliance
27
with law, and protect constitutional rights and privacy.
The Attorney General ensures intelligence activities
directed against a United States person are by the least
46
intrusive means possible.
Under E.O. 12036 the role of the Director of Central
Intelligence was expanded also. The E.O. includes new
directives for the DCI and heads of agencies and
departments in terms of accountability. Whereas E.O. 11905
required the DCI to act as principal spokesman to the
Congress, E.O. 12036 elaborates on such reporting. Under
E.O. 12036 the DCI and heads of the agencies as directed by
the President and in accordance with applicable authorities
and duties, shall keep the Permanent Select Committees of
the House and Senate on Intelligence fully and currently
informed with regard to intelligence activities. They may
further be directed to provide any information or document
at the request of Congressional committees and report in a
timely fashion information relating to intelligence
activities that are illegal or improper and the corrective
47
actions taken or planned.
To coordinate and control the activities of the US
intelligence community further and to provide additional
guidance to the President on intelligence activities, E.O.
12036 redefined the role of the National Security Council.
Under E.O. 12036 the NSC includes two committees, the
Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special Coordinating
28
Committee (SCC). As described by President Carter and in
the E.O. the PRC is chaired by the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) and is charged with defining and esta-
blishing priorities for consumer requirements for intell-
igence, monitoring budget decisions and evaluating analy-
tical products. Such duties are to serve to ensure that
the needs of the most important intelligence users guide
48
the entire process.
The Special Coordinating Committee is chaired by the
Assistant to the President for National security Affairs
and reviews and makes recommendations to the President on
the most sensitive intelligence activities. The SCC is
also concerned with the development and coordination of
49
all counterintelligence activities.
Other oversight aspects of E.O. 12036 included a
National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) and the
National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC). The NFIB
serves to advise the Director of Central Intelligence
concerning collection, processing and coordinating
national foreign intelligence budget issues, intra-agency
exchanges of information and other matters of common
50
concern
.
The NITC under the direction of the DCI has the
responsibility for the coordinating and tasking national
foreign intelligence collection activities. The NITC also
51has the authority to resolve conflicts of priority.
29
Overall, Executive Order 12036 reflects the
open approach toward government activities and increased
public accountability taken during the Carter
administration. E.O. 12036 built on the previous Executive
Order and further defined and addressed constitutional
issues. The roles of the various agencies and agency heads
are expanded and the duties made clear thus allowing for
better understanding of responsibilities and performance.
E.O. 12036 also provided for more oversight capability to
lessen the incidence of illegal or improper activities by
the intelligence community. Such increased control and
accountability allows for a more responsive approach to
the abuses and illegal activities of the past and provides
the President with clear and well defined guidelines for
directing the US intelligence community while providing
reassurance to the public in terms of the proper use of
intelligence capabilities.
30
Chapter 7
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333: CHANGE OF DIRECTION
With the signing of Executive Order 12333, United
States Foreign Intelligence Activities, December 4, 1981
President Reagan promulgated an Executive document which
he hoped would "provide America's intelligence community
with clearer, more positive guidance and to remove the
aura of suspicion and mistrust that can hobble our nation's
52
intelligence efforts.
Executive Order 12333 addresses both constitutional
and administrative issues involving the US intelligence
community. E.O. 12333 reflects the "Reagan revolution"
approach which involves a strong military capability and
aggressive foreign policy. Such an approach also includes
the rebuilding of intelligence capabilities alleged to have
been weakened during the crisis plagued seventies and the
Carter administration.
Where President Carter's E.O. stressed control and
accountability, President Reagan's E.O. 12333 seems to
stress an aggressive collection effort guided by stream-
lined if not specific regulations. As President Reagan
stated upon signing the E.O.:
As we move into the 1980 's, we need
to free ourselves from the negative
attitudes of the past and look to
meeting the needs of the country. 53
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In order to meet those needs the President changed
many of the aspects of E.O. 12036, deleting and
restructuring the oversight capabilities. The
prohibitions on some activities remain, but the overall
approach is one of simplified procedures. In E.O. 12333
the President takes the responsibility for the activities
of the intelligence community and implies the need for a
public reliance on the President and the intelligence
community to "do the right thing". If not totally
nonresponsive to public concerns, E.O. 12333 seems a
document more open to ambiguity and interpretation.
Under E.O. 12333 the prohibitions established by previous
E.O.s in terms of human experimentation and political
assassination remain essentially unchanged.
A comparison of E.O. 12333 and President Carter's
E.O. 12036 helps to illustrate the difference in approaches
taken by the Presidents in the area of intelligence
activities :
E.O. 12333 - 2.12 Indirect Participation. No agency of
the Intelligence Community shall participate in or request
any person to undertake activities forbidden by this
Order. 54
E.O. 12036 - 2-307 Restrictions on Indirect Participation
in Prohibited Activities. No agency of the Intelligence
Community shall request or otherwise encourage, directly
or indirectly, any person, organization or government
agency to undertake activities prohibited by this Order
or applicable law. 55
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While at first examination a simplified and clearer
approach to prohibiting certain activities, E.O. 12333
may allow for a more ambiguous interpretation as it has
deleted all other phrasing which in E.O. 12036 clearly
established restrictions on participation in illegal
activities by any Government agency.
The emphasis on increased capabilities under E.O.
12333 is evident in Part 2, Para. 2.1. The collection
of information is to be pursued in a "vigorous, innovative
and responsible manner" while remaining consistent with
the Constitution and principles upon which the United
States was founded. Executive Order 12333 thus takes a
more aggressive approach to the collection of information
than previous E.O.'s. Concerns over such collection
activities are addressed under general Constitutional
principles, open to interpretation and less than
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regulatory in nature.
Under Part 2 Para. 2.5 of E.O. 12333 the Attorney
General is delegated the power to approve the use for
intelligence purposes of any technique for which a warrant
would be required. Such authority may be used within the
US or against US persons abroad, expanding the role
and power of the Attorney General and reducing the duties
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outlined under the previous E.O. 12036.
In terms of oversight under E.O. 12333,
accountability is reduced from previously established
33
guidelines. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and
the heads of agencies are to cooperate with Congress in
the oversight of intelligence activities. Such coordina-
tion is to be conducted not in accordance with E.O. 12333
per se, but in terms of general procedures established by
United States Code 413, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
58
and the National Security Act of 1947.
As a supplement to E.O. 12333 President Reagan also
signed E.O. 12334 President's Intelligence Oversight
Board on December 4, 1981, to address the issue of the
oversight and accountability of the intelligence community
and as a reassurance of continued responsibility and
accountability. Members of the board are appointed by the
President and the board consists of three members. The
responsibilities of the board include informing the
President of activities believed by the board to be in
violation of the law, and review internal guidelines of
the intelligence community in terms of lawfulness and
conducting investigations. The Board reports directly to
the President and may reveal classified information
obtained under its duties only to the President or persons
59
designated by the President.
While the President's Intelligence Oversight Board
may investigate and provide information to the President,
Congressional involvement in such a board and throughout
Executive Order 12333 appears to be held to a minimum.
34
E.O. 12333 involves a less aggressive approach to the
constitutional issues and presents a more streamlined
approach to the administrative issues.
Such approaches place total direction and controls
as well as accountability in the office of the President.
While the document is clearer and more direct in parts,
the simplified wording and deletions from the previous
Executive Order may allow for a more ambiguous document,
less responsive in nature to public concerns and more
open to interpretation and debate.
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSION
Executive Orders on foreign intelligence activities
as discussed in this paper have provided control and
accountability of the US intelligence community partly
in response to public and Congressional concern over the
conduct of intelligence activities. Publicly signed and
issued by the President of each new administration, the
Executive Orders provide a means of setting guidelines for
the intelligence community which is responsible to the
President and for reassuring the public that intelligence
activities are conducted under law and in the public
interest
.
Presidential executive orders on foreign intelligence
activities are similar in that each addresses both
constitutional and administrative issues. These include:
Assassination/experimentation: All three E.O.s
prohibit such activities and can be seen as
responsive to public concerns.
Oversight: Each E.O. addresses the problem of
oversight of intelligence activities. Oversight
boards, committees and separate offices respond
to the problems of legality and propriety.
Organization: The E.O.s examined all address in
specific terms the duties, responsibilities and
titles of each agency of the intelligence
community.
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In addition to addressing public concerns over the
conduct of intelligence activities, the Executive Orders
were written with a larger audience in mind. All three
serve as operational documents for the control of the
intelligence community and are further designed to
retain the control of the intelligence community within
the Office of the President. All oversight committees and
agency heads report to the President, the President remain-
ing solely responsible for accounting to the public and to
the Congress. While each E.O. varies somewhat, reflecting
the policies of the President who signs it, the Executive
Order as a policy tool serves to retain the intelligence
community, including the CIA, as the "...quiet intelli-
60
gence arm of the President."
An examination of Executive Orders on Foreign Intell-
gence Activities brings to light the same apparent
paradox present in the existence of a secret information
gathering organization in a free and open society. On
one hand is the valid need for continuous and factual
information on the intentions and capabilities of both
friendly and hostile nations. On the other hand are the
values, concerns and rights of free citizens in a
democratic society, citizens with a vested in interest in
the actions and foreign policy decisions made by their
government
.
37
The Executive Order serves both purposes by provid-
ing for control and accountability of intelligence
activities while addressing public concerns and publicly
committing the President to the guidelines and
restrictions stated therein.
No single document can provide all the answers,
particularly in the complex and controversial field of
intelligence. At best, the Executive Order provides a
framework, a public agreement on control and account-
ability of the intelligence community. It provides the
public with a rare means for holding its elected
officials responsible for the secret and often
controversial activities conducted in its name.
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nmOHHW OOCUMINIi: GdMD FOIO.
Stalc-i support for and encouragement of the important
evolution which has hegun in Spain and to which the
Spanish Government renewed its commitment in POntWC-
ti.m with the signing ol the Twtay. Tke Treaty reflects
the mutual conviction o( Spain and the United Slate-;
that the prn|xr course of this evolution should include,
as major objectives, the integration of -Spain into the
; of Europe and the No.th Allanlic
--'
and should inrludc a broadly based nmiieialis
of inutu;
system
relationship with the United Stales In all area
interest. The "treaty should contribute positively to the
achievement of these coals.
In the area of western security, the agircninii
provides
for a continuation of the important coniribiii'nn made l.v
Spain through facilities and related military rights
accorded United Stales forces on Spanish territory. The
agreement reflects a careful balancing of Spanish concerns
with the changing requirements of Unilcil Slates military
deployment. As a new development of (he United Stairs-
Spanish defense relationship, ihe Treaty establishes nicih-
anLsms and guidelines, such as those reflected in ihe
provisions dealing with military planning and coordina-
tion, to help develop an active Spanish contribution to
western security, a contribution which complements and is
coordinated with existing arrangements. The Treaty does
not expand the existing United Stales defense commit-
ment in Ihe North Allanlic Treaty area north*
1* it ilTillr
an additional bilateral one. Finally, the Treaty pledges
military assistance lo the Spanish armed forres in their
program of upgrading and modernization. The major
|Hiriion of that assistance is in the limit of loan repayment
guarantee. The I al « osl lo ihe United Slates taxpayer
is exacted lo lie far lower than ihe ligurcs listed in the
agreement.
I recommend that lite Senate give prompt consideration
lo the Treaty and consent to its ratification.
Gf.rald R. Ford
Ihe While House,
February 111, 197G.
May 2.r>. P'73, six exchanges of interpretative letters of
Ihe same date, and an exchange of interpretative letters
daird December 2\ 107r>. I tirge that ihe Senate advise
and consent to latilicaliou of the Ticaty and related
matters.
The Treaty is ihe lirsl major international agreement
bv the United Stales aimed at obtaining information and
evidence needed for criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions. Conpeiati.m of this kind with Swilzc.land is
uniquely militant liccansc rrf its iNtsilimi as an iulnna-
tioual financial renter, Despite the general .mfieinlion
of Swiss aulhoiilies in criminal cases, the piocrdurcs for
obtaining needed information have 1»th generally pnn-
detous and inadequate. Dc-spitc this . onpcrali.m. United
States taw enforcement and invest igativc agencies have
frcqucnllv encountered severe difficulties in obtaining
needed information I Swiss banks liccai.se of hanking
The Itcw Treaty, as iniplemeuied by Swiw legislation,
should open up new avenues of cooperation in Switzer-
land and greatly facHil.il-- ihe work of the United Stales
taw ciifoi.cment and prosecutive agencies, .-specially in
dealing with cases invoking organized crime. Assistance
will extend to as, rrlamh... Hit whneaU.Hs of persons,
taking leslimony, piodn.ii.g ami pioervit.g judi.ial and
other documents, rccoids and evidence, and serving and
authciitirating judicial and administrative doc cuts.
1 he Treaty isexpc.lcd lo piovide :i usrllil an<l siguifi-
riml Hull it. couib-iling -rime anil bunging ollemlns lo
justice 1 .commend that the Senate give the Treaty
and related lellcrs prompt consideiaiion and consent to
their rat ification,
Gerald R. Ford
The While House.
FcbiiMiy Ml, I'I7I..
U.S.-Swiss Ticaty on Muuial
Assistance in Criminal Matters
The 1'reiidrnt'i Menace lo the Senate Immtnittinc
the Treaty for Advice and Consent to Ratification.
February 18, 1976
To the Smote of the United Stain:
I transmit herewith ihe Treaty between the Unilcd--
Staies of America and the Swiss Confederation on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mailers, signed at Bern on
United Slates Foreign
Intelligence Activities
Kxecutive Order I IMS. Tebru 1R, 1976
By virtue of the authority vested ill me by the Constitu-
tion anil Statutes of the United Stales, including the
National Senility Acl of 1*347, as amended, and U
President of the United States of America, it is hereby
ordered as follows:
'+8
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENT]
Table or Content*
Section Deitriplian Kumbr'l '
i. Purposf. |:r.)
2. DEFINITION!. -— . |33*>|
3. Control and Dihection or Intelligence Ohoani-
(a) Naii.m.ii Security Omnril " |23fe]
(b) Ck IhT -I, IWri„ irllir;.-,,..- |J.",|
(f) OprvMfaHM Advi."iy fir I'-MI.)
(d) Director ..[ Onlral liilrfli«,-nrr j'H.|
f REsroNxinit.mr.* and Durir.it or tut. INTPJ i fiCWE
COMMUNITY „ [33T|
() Senior Officr-il -I Earn Offtaatrailnfl ..f thr
Iniellieei.ce CwHflttflitf |2 17|
(b) Central lnlrlUt-ri.rr Agency
_ (Jrlflf
(e) Dqmimmi M Stair | 3ih]
(d) Dcparinient of (he TV.ttury
_ J23ft|
(e) Department of Dcfenie [21B|
(I) Barfir Reie.irch and Dcvcl. !,.,!..•.. i Admii.i.-
"»"°" —- [2S*|
(g) Federal Durrau of Invcitigaiion |239)
S. RmthiCtion* ON iNTF.LI.inrNrF. Activitif.* [210]
S. OVFUAIOMT OF I NTri.LIOF.NPr f )«CANir«T.ON« |2 II |
8. Enailino Data |2I-J
Sf.ction !. fwrpete. The purpose of this Older i* to
cstaNish policies to improve the quality ..f intr-Hit-iii. r
needed for national M-r.inily, in clarify llw auihntity and
rrsponsihilitics of die inicllin,cucc departments and agen-
cies, and to cstaNish effective oversight lo assure com-
pliance witli law in the management and dim linn of in-
telligent c aROH-ira and departments nf ihr national
government.
Sf.c. 2. Definitions. For the purpose of this Order, un-
less otherwise indicated, the following icnns Khali have
these meaning1;:
(a) IntrUiynie infant:
(1) Ferritin intcltif-rnie tvhirli mratH information,
"trier lhan foreign rnuiHninlclligrnrr. on the capabilities,
intention* and activities of foreign prtwrm, organization*
orllicir iigrnis; and
(2) Foreign countejintrlliKenie which means activities
conducted tn protect (lie Ifidled Stairs ami United Slates
citizens from foreign espionage, sal.olagc, subversion,
assassination or lei rorism.
(Ii) Intelligence Community refers to the (ntlowing
organizations:
(1
)
Central Intelligence Agency;
(2) National Security Agency;
(3) Defense Intelligence Agency
;
{4) Special offleo wiihin ilic Department nf Defense
for the collection of specialized intelligence through
reconnaissance programs;
(5) Intelligence elements of Ilic military scrvirrs;
(6) Intelligence dcmriit of the Federal Iturean of
Investigation
;
'Editor's Note: The pate numberl o( ihe ahove u\,\e of con .
lent, reflect p^c citation! in the Weekly Compilation „[ Prej.derM.al
Document!. The pa,!- numbrr. which they replace were relerencei
lo pagei in the original document.
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(7) I HirHhseme element ol the Department of State;
'(•8) Intelligence element of the Department of the
Treason ; and
('.)} Inii'lltcfiirr elftnent nf the lairrqy Research and
Development Administration.
(c) Sfteeifil nrtirilirs in Wpptirt nf national foreign
pnlii v "/';'' tirrt means activities, niher than the collet linn
ami fnntltirliiNi nl inh llir;. „ . HUl1 nhii-d supjinrt fi.nr-
Ihhh. dfvitn,<-d tn futlher nfli. i.tl United Stnln |irnt'iauts
and |»il)<ir< alunad whiili are planned and rXfnllfd so
lltal Ihe mle nf the I'nil.tl Stales Cnvn rut is not
appaiemnTpiihlitKaiUoiilid^d.
(d| l\nti»nnl FmHgn Intefliernff Prat-ram means the
pmi;iain« of ihr Cenlral InK'lliceme AffftHv and the
rntvinl nlli.es ivithin ihr IVpanmrnl nf D.fense Tor the
mill Hi .f s|M1 iali/e.l mtrlliin- lit f thtoimh remnnais-
sanre pmcrams, the Cnnsolidatcd Cryptofojfje Program,
and Ihnsc rlrmenls of the General Defense Intrllieenre
Pntf-ram ami iilbrr proqiams ..( ihr <lf|>arlmenis itml
asem-iet, nnl in< hidini; tititiial ini.ll.i:« n, r, ilr^KlltitrH
In ihe Cnmmitiee on |iiieit;n lntellir;inrr as jiart ol ihe
PhlRTHII.
Sir % Cmttol nn,l /Jirr-li.-n nf Natwnal Intfttigrue*
<h««ni:.it>,.>n.
( a ) iWitwtt/i! Senility CmnttH.
{ I ) The National Smwity C«.,n» il m-m mnMvOtcil In-
Kir Nalimiat .Sri-mjiv A« i ..I MM7 Inailviw- lite hesuteii't
with i.-pr lie innmalinn nl dniii.-ti.. Ini.ii;!!. and
tnililaiy (Nilttifs ttlalint; lo the national scnniti. Statu-
tori inrmlKTs of ihe National Security Council are the
President, the Vmt I'teMdent, ihr Serreiary of Slate, anil
llifSreietatynlDrffiisr.
(2) At l> il- ies( H.nsil.ilities. Ihe Nalinnal Seeit.il
y
Cnuniil shall pinvidf um'damr ami dire.tinn to ihr ile-
vi'lnpoii'iii and fin hit inn nf national imrlliyrmr
aetiiilies
H) Ihr Nalinnal Se.mitv Coiim il shall tondmt a
semi-anmtal tevieiv of mlrUir^eil. r |Nilieirs and or on-
Koiiii; vpeii:i| nttivilies in «u|M«iH nf nalinnal I'nnir.it
|N>li< y nlij.-i (ins. 1 Ium it-tints shall . onsitltr the neetls of
users nf iitirllicenre ami ihe timeliness and qualilv of
init-lligt-iM-r ptodmis ami ihe mnlinnrd appropiiatenrs>i
t>f lUVIMl ;::!:vili.s in suppnit of nalloual \ r -to, pnli.y
ol)].. lives. The Nalional Sr.urily Coun.il shall ratnull
with lite Sri iriary of ihe Treasury ami soeli other users ol
inifllii;ent e as ihsicnalcd l>> llw President as part nf these
(h) Cimnmtlrf on Fntfign IntelHgrnif.
( 1 ) There Is r.stahlished the CtMlindtlex on Forritru
lnirllh»enre (hrrrmafier referred m as ihr CFI), which
shall In- eoinpnsr-.l ..{ ihr Dlle. I.if o( ( :.„... 1 1 Intr-lli,;, ore,
hfiriuallrr iffemd to ;ts ihr DCI, who shall Ik the
Chairman; ihe Deputy Secretary of Defense (or Intelli-
gence; and the Deputy Assistant lo the President for Na-
tional Security AfTairs. Hie CFI shall report directly to
the National Security Council.
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(2) The CF1 shall (!) control budget fffltfomikm and
resource allocation [or the National Foreign Intelligence
Program,
(A) The CFI shall, prior lo suhmtssinn to the Office of
Management nnd Budget, review, and amend as it drrins
appropriate, the budget for (he National Foreign Intelli-
gence Program.
(R) The CFI shall also adopt rules governing the re-
prngrainming of fundi wiihin tills budget. Such rule*
may require that re progra minings of certain types or
amounts lie civen prior approval liv the CFI.
(ii) Establish policy priorities for the collection and
production of national intelligence.
(iii) F.stablish pnliry for the management of ihe Na-
tional Foreign Intelligence Program.
(iv) Provide guidance on the relationship between lar-
tical and national intelligence; however, neither the
DCI nor the CFI shall have responsibility for tactical
intelligence.
(v) Provide continuing guidance in the Intelligence
Community in order to ensure compliance with polirv
directions of the NSC.
(3) Tlic CFI shall lw supported by lite Intelligence
O*" ilv «tn« headed l.y lite Deputy to the IbWmr of
Ccnintl Intelligence for (he Intelligence Community.
(4) The CFI shall establish such subcommittee*: as it
deems appropriate In ensure consultation with nictnbers
of the Intelligence Community on policies and guidance
issued by the CFI.
(5) Decisions of the CFI may be reviewed by the Na-
tional Security Council upon appeal by thr Director of
Central Intelligence or any member of the National
Security Council.
(e) The Optralimtt Adriiory Group.
( 1 ) There is established the Operations Advisory Group
(hereinafter referred to as the Operations Croup], which
shall be ramjHKcd of the Assistant to the President Tor
National Security Affairs; i|lr Serrrlarint of Stale ami
Defense; the Chairman of the Joint ChHs of Stuff; ami
the Director of Central iniclligrnce. The Chairman shall
be designated by the President. The Attorney General
and Ihe Director of Ihe Oilier of Management and Budget
or their representatives, and others win. man lie des-
ignated by tlic President, shall attend all Hirelings as
observers.
(2) The Operation* Group shall (i) consider and de-
velop » [N.li.y ,r,o
-minium, Including any ihWnit,
for the ['resident prior to his decisis on each spei ial ac-
tivity in support of national foreign policy objectives.
(H) Conduct periodic reviews of programs prcvinuslv
considered by ihe 0|>erntions Group.
(iii) Give approval for specific sensitive intelligence
collection operations as designated by the Operations
Group.
fiv) C-ndun r,imli. icv i.-ws of oimuingseusilive in-
telligence i nllcction operations.
(3) The Operations Croup shall discharge the rcspon-
sihilhies assigned by subparagraphs fr)(2)(i) and (r)
(2) fiii)oflbi<s,-( ttr,nnnlvaftcr.onsidr,aliu.,inafoi.nal
lnrrting attended Iw all nirmheis :„„l nl**ervcrx; or. in
unusual i inuuistaiires uhru any mrml.r. iw iilmrvrr is
unavailable, when a dewnatrd rrpn-senlalbe of the imii).
iK-roenUnv.ra.l.mk
H) The staff of lb.- National Security Coimrll shall
provide s„|.|khI loihe()| M1 :,ii.>us(;
,,.
(.1) tXtertmmfCtmltdlntrlHgriirr.
(1) The Dire- tor of Central Intelligence, pursuant tn
Ihr Nali.mat Security An ,.f 1917. shall U- rrsimtruhfe
dirrctlv n, the National Settirity Co il and ihe Presi-
dent. He shall:
(it Chair the CFI.
(ii) A< I as executive bead of ihe CIA »nd Intelligence
Cnmmmulvsla'f.
fni) Ensure thr [|ru-l..,miritl ami shIhuMuii of a
budge! for thr National Foreign Intelligence Program to
the CFI.
fiv) Act as Ihr P.rsidrm-s prima. v twlvfeci n„ f()IfiRn
iuicllw-rii, . and pi**** bin, t.ml ...I,,, nffirmh in the
Kxceulive bramh wiib foicign iniclligcm e, in, hiding Na-
tional Intelligence Fsiimatcs; develop national intelligence
iroil iircinenKandpiio|itirs; ;m<|si.pct,isept.HlucliMnaml
tlissrn.inalion of national iiur-lligrun-.
(v) Kiisinr appnipiialc iniplmx •Mintkm r.f special
activities in support of national foreign polii v objectives.
(vi) F.slablis|] prnrcd.nes in ensure ihe propriety of
rrcprsij, ami irs, srs the.clo. fnnn ihe While Mouse
Sl.llf or nlher Kxn ..live drpa.imrnts and ntrmin In the
Iniellinen.e Cmimnu.ily.
fvil) Ensure that appmp.iaie prnflrcmis are developed
winch properly protect intelligent r snun rv, methods and
nnalytieal promlnm. Hi* resprmsiliility wiihin the United
Slates s|KI |l be limited to:
(A) I'M.ie.ii..,, |» lawful means i.gumsl di, !.,.„, e Irv
present or former employee* of ihr ( :« hk.iI Intelligence
Agency or priNniw, or employers of petM.ns o. mgantza.
lious. presently oi Intiwilv nmlri run with Ihe
Ai'emv;
( Ii) pnuidin,: k .ide.vl.ip. ;,,„ , j, ,,, .,,,.;..,.
aucc lo other government departments and agencies per-
forming foreign intclligcnee activities; and
violations, le.uuiiuciKline. lo (he Allo.ney Ceneral that
the ease lie referred to Ihr ledeial bureau of Investiga-
tion for further investigation.
(viii) Kslablisl. a vigorous pmg,ain lo downgiade ami
declassify foreign iittctllgrm i- infitrmatimi as appropriate
and ronsisicut with Kxccutivc Order No. 11G52.
(ix) Ensure the existence of strong Inspector General
capabilities in all elements of the Intelligence Community
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and that each Inspector General submits quarterly to the
Intelligence Oversight Board a report which sets forth
any questionable activities in whirl) that intelligence orga-
nization has engaged or is engaged.
(x) Ensure the establishment, by the Intelligence Com-
munity, of common security standards fur managing and
handling foreign intelligence systems, information and
products, and for granting access thereto.
(xi) Act as the principal spokesman to the Congress
for the Intelligence Community and facilitate the use of
foreign intelligence products by Congicss.
(xii) Promote the develop...mi I and mainlerianer by
the Central Iniclliurnre Agency of services of common
concern to ilir Intelligence Community organizations, in-
cluding multi-discipline analysis, national level intelligence
products, and a national level current intelligence
publication.
(xiii) Establish uniform criteria for the identification,
selection, and designation of relative prinritirs for the
transmission of critical intelligence, and provide the Sec-
retary of Defense with continuing guidance as to the
communications requirements of the Intelligence Com-
munity fnr the transmission of such intelligence.
(x.v) KslaMivh mnH •uiMiuilti-r* irf .olic.lnr*. pro-
ducers and users of intelligence to assist in bis conduct
of his responsibilities as he deems appropriate.
(xv) Consult with users and producers of intclliECnce,
including the Departments of Stale, Treasury, and De-
fense, the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, the Energy Research and Development
Administration, and the Council of Economic Advisors,
to ensure the timeliness, relevancy and quality of the in-
telligence product.
(2) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in
the supervision and direction of the Intelligence Com-
munity, the posiiion nf Deputy !o the Director of Central
Intelligence for the Intelligence Community is hereby es-
tablished (Commilteenn Foreign Intelligence)
,
(3) 111 assist tbe Dire. tor of (Vuli.l Intelligence in
the sujxrvision and diieriinn of tbe Central Intelligence
Agency, tbe Director of Central Intelligence shall, to the
extent consistent with bis statutnrv responsibilities, dele-
gate the dav-lo-day Opcrntiofl of the Central lnicllii>inrc
Agency to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (50
U.S.C. 403(a)).
(4) To assist the DCI in the fulfillment of bis respnn-
sibiliiies, [tie nrail)) of all ilepailmcnls and a,>cu. ies shall
give hint access lo all iufonnatlou iclevanl to the loicign
intelligence needs of tbe United States. Relevant informa-
tion requested by the DCI shall he provided, ami the
DCI shall take appropriate steps lo maintain ils
con fidrutia lily,
Sf.o. 4. lieiponabilitm tint! Duties of the Intrlligrnre
Community. Purpose. The rules of operation prescribed
by this section of the Order relate to the activities of our
foreign intelligence agencies. In some instances, detailed
implementation of this Executive order will he contained
in classified documents because of tbe sensitivity of tbe
infonualion and its relation to national security. All such
classified iiishurlinns will be consistent with this Order.
Unless otherwise specified within ibis section, ils provi-
sions apply in -m liviti.-s both inside and oulsidr I he United
Slates, and all icfcrences to law arc to applicable laws
of the United States. Nothing in ihis section of this Order
shall be construed lo interfere with any law-enforcement
responsibility of anv dcparlmenl nraeency.
(a) Senior ()(T<>i>ih of thr Intrttigenrr Community,
The sen i,,. olb.hU of ihe CIA, Dcpadmcnls of Slate,
Ticasmy and Defense, F.KDA and the FBI stall ensure
thai, in discharging "be duties anil responsibilities enu-
merated for (heir organi/alinus which telale lo loicign in-
telligence, they arc ies|xinsivc to the needs of ilic 1'rcsi-
deni, Ihe National Security Council and other elements
of the Government. In carrying out their duties and re-
sponsibilities, senior otlicials sball ensure that all policies
and directives relating lo intelligence activities are carried
out in accordance with law and this Order, including Sec-
tion 5, and shall:
(1) Make appropriale use- of the capabilities of tbe
ollin elrniruls of I be lnl.lli|;.n< r Community in older
In achieve maximum efficiency.
(2) Contribute in areas of his responsibility lo the na-
tional inlclligcncc product* produced under auspices of
Ihe Director of Cenlral Intelligence.
(3) Establish internal |«ilicies and guidelines govern-
ing employee conduct and ensuring thai such are made
known lo, and acknowledged by, each employee.
(•1) Provide for a strong and indc|>cndcnt organiza-
tion for idi-nti!ii alinn and inspection of, and reporting on,
unaulhoiiml activity.
(5) Report to the Attorney General that information
which rclaics to detection or prevention of possible vio-
lations of law hv any person, including an employee of the
senior olfirbl's department or agency,
(li) I uiuisl he Diin'oi or Cnli.il Inlclligcncc,
tbe CI I, the OiH.alious (.'...up. the President's Foieigu
Intelligence Advisory Board, and ibe Intelligence Ovcr-
sighl Board all of the infonualion required for the pcr-
fniinanic of their iisjwi live duties.
(7) Part it ipale, as appropriate, in the provision of
services of common concern as directed hv the Director
of Cenlralhilell^enie ami provide ni her depaitmenlsand
..i
:
c... ir. hill, mi, I. mutual ;i-.-;...|i.ii. c :,-. may lr within
his ( apabilllics and as may In- irquircd in ll.r interests or
tbe Inlclligcncc Conununiiv for reasons of economy,
clle. tiveness, or operational necessity.
Ml) Protect intelligence anil intelligence sources and
meibocls within his drpar Ill or ar-nry, consistent wilh
polii its and guidance of the Director of Central
Intelligence.
(°-) Conduct a continuing review of all classified ma-
terial originating within his organization and promptly
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declassifying such malcri.il consistent with Executive
Order No, 1 1652, as amended.
( 10) Provide administrative and support functions re-
quired by his department or agency.
(b) Thf Central IntAl^eurf A^ncy. Al! duties and
responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency thai]
lie related to the foreign intelligence functions outlined
In-low. As authorized by the National .Security Art of
11*47, :ts amended, the CIA Art of t'M9, as amended, »ih1
other taws, regulations, and directives, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency shall
:
(1) Produce and disseminate foreign innlli.'in.t re-
laiing in the national Mrttrity, including fmciim polities],
economic, scientific, lerlinir.il, mililaiy, socinlocieal. and
Rcngraphir intclliccnce, to meet the nrrds of the President,
the National Security Council, and other elements of the
United Stairs Government.
(2) Develop and conducl programs Id collect political,
economic, srietitilii:, technical, military, ideographic, and
sociological infnnnation, not otherwise obtainable, relat-
ing to foreign intelligence, in accordance with directives
of the National Security Council.
(3) Cnllrrl anil produce intelligence on foreign aspects
of inicnialional terrorist activities and traffic in narrotir«.
(4) Conduct foreign counterintelligence activities out-
side the United States and when in the United Stales in
coordination with the Kill subject to the approval of the
Attorney General.
(
"i ) Carry out such other special activities in support of
national foreign policy objectives 08 may l>e directed hy the
President or the National Security Counril and which are
wilhinlhe limits of applicable law.
(6) Conduct, for the Intrlligrtiir Connnunilv. vrvltv*
of common concern as directed by the National Sccurilv
Council, such as monitoring of foreign public radio and
lelrvision broadcasts and fouii;li press services, rollcrtinu
man es in the United Slates, acquisition and translation of
foreign publications and photographic interpretation
(7) Carry out or ronlracl for research, development
and procurement of technical svstems and devices Haling
to the MUirtionsauihnri/rd in ibis subse. lion.
fll) l'mlc<t the vnirity of its \ irtnl la i ions, a.tivities.
information and prntmuKi, In older to maintain I his mi u-
rity, the CIA shall conduct such investigations of appli-
cants, employers, ami other persons with similar associa-
tions with the CIA asaiencrrssary.
(9) Conduct administrative, trchniral and support
activities in the United States or abroad as may be neces-
sary lo perform the functions described in paragraphs ( 1 )
through (fl) above, including piocurctncnt, maiuicnamc
and transport; communications and data processing; re-
cruitment and training; the provision of personnel, finan-
cial and medical services; development of essential rover
and proprietary arrangements ; entering into contracts and
arrangements with appropriate private companies and
insiimtions to provide classified or unclassified research,
analytical and developmental services and spr< i.ili/cd ex-
pertise; and entering into similar arrangements with aca-
demic institutions, provided CIA sponsorship '* known to
the appiopiiate senior nllii i.ils of the academic institutions
and in senior ptojret officials
(c) Thf DitfHtrtmmt "/ Sl.itr. I hi- Sri letaiy i»f Stale
shall:
(I) Collect, oM-rllv, fniriim jw.lilifal. |i.dtiif .iP-inili-
lary. MM'infngirat. ci onomi. . wirtitiRr, lechuirat and ygm>
V>) VwAwt and di-seminai. {onim. im. Hi.-. ... . re-
lating to United Stales (ott-iitn poli. y as ie.pihe.1 for the
execution of bis responsibilities and in support of polity.
makcrs involvrd iii foreign relations vtiihin the United
States Cnvcrnincnt.
(It) Disseminate within the 1 biileil Stales f b.veinmrnl,
as appropriate, ii ports m rived I United Stairs dip-
lomatic missions aluoad.
(4) Coordinate with the Director of Central Intelli-
gence to ensure lltat United Slates iniclligetirr aelivilics
Stales foreign |wilir\
.
(5) Transmit reporting requirement* of ihe luiclli-
genre Cntiinnuiilv to our Chiefs of Mission* abroad and
piuvidrioiid.MiM- 'r.n ih.it intlnliofirtitMl,
(Ii) Conllibule lo Ihe li.lellii;eiuc Cr Ilih guid-
ance for its rollcriiou of intelligence ha«<d on the needs
of those responsible for foreign polirv tlei i*ions.
(7) Support Chiefs of Mission, in dis. barging llieir
r.-, H .nsibiliii,s i.e.t ao.l I ..ordinate I lie nelivilies ol
all del units oflhcii missions
fd) Thf Drfiaitmcnt of the 7>e«nrrr. The Sea t clary d
the Treasury *hall:
f|) C.lle.i. ovetib. ("Mii'i. lin.uxial tutd monetary
iuloimaliou.
(2) l'ailhipalt- with Ihe Drui rut of Man- in ihe
overt collection of genital foieign eion.iiuie iulouiiaiiori.
(3) Produce thai inlrllitiemr ie.pii.eil for llir execu-
tion o( the Seireiarv's inieiilep.irliucnl.d t.-spnmibililics
and the nnvwii of ihe IVpiiHUMiil or ihe Tinmuv
III Contribute inlelli-e,„e mm! e-lidao, e .e.p.iie.i for
the development of national infelliin in e.
(5) Disvemiuatc wilhinlhe United Stales Cove.nuneiil,
as appropriate, foreign inlellii^cnre iiifnimatiun aupiired.
(r)/V/lrt.r»MWf«//lr,l-BTr.
(1 ) The Set rctaryof Defense shall:
(i) Colin t foreign military inlclligencc iufonnation as
«ell as miiitarv-rclaied fnicirm iulrlligem r information,
iru hiding seiintilii. lechni. al. [Hiliiieal and ei ouomie in-
fmmalinn as ii-quired fin the execution of his responsi-
bilities.
(ii) Produce and disseminate, as appropriate, intelli-
gence emphasising foreign military capabilities and in-
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tentions and scientific, technical and economic develop-
ments pertinent to his responsibilities.
(iii) Conduct such programs and missions necessary
to fulfill national intelligence requirements its determined
bythcCFI.
(iv) Direct, fund and operate the Nalinn.il Security
Agency, and national, defense and military intelligence
and reconnaissance entities as rrquircd.
(v) Conduct, as the. execulive agent of the Unileil
States Government, signals intelligence activities and
communications security, except as otherwise approved
bythcCFI.
(vi) Provide for the timely transmission of critical
intelligence, » defined by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, within the United States Government.
(2) In carrying nut these assigned rcs|>oiisihiliiics, the
Secretary of Defense is authorized to utilize (he following:
(i) The Defense Jnlclligenrc Agency (whose func-
tions, authorities and responsibilities arc currently pub-
liclv assigned by Department of Defense Directive No.
5105.21) to:
(A) Produce or provide military intelligence for the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Dr-
fensc coni|Kjncnts, and, as appropriate, non-Defense
agencies.
(B) Coordinate all Department of Defense intelli-
gence collection requirements and manage the Defense
Attache system.
(C) Establish substantive intelligence priority goals
and objectives for the Department of Defense and provide
guidance on substantive intelligence matters to all major
Defense intelligence activities.
(D) Review and maintain cognizance over all plans,
policies and procedures for noneryptologic intelligence
functions of the Department of Defense.
(E) Prnvidc intelligence staff support as directed by
the Jnint Chiefs of Stair.
(ii) The National Security Agency, whose functions,
authorities and responsibilities shall include:
(A) Establishment and 0|>cration of an clfcr live unified
organization for the signals intelligence activities of the
United Stales Government, except for certain operations
which are normally exercised through appropriate ele-
ments of the military command structure, or by the CIA.
(B) Exercise control over signals intelligence collection
and processing activities of the Government, delegating
to an appropriate agent specified resound for such periods
and tasks as required for the direct support of military
commanders.
(C) Collection, processing and dissemination of signals
intelligence in a< rnulau. e with objectives, lequinmrnls,
and priorities established by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
(D) Dissemination of signals intelligence to all author-
ized elements of the Government, including the Armed
Services, as requested.
(E) Serving under the Srcrctary of Defense as the
central communications security authority of the United
Stales Government.
(F) Conduct of research and development to meet
the needs nf ilm United States for signals Intelligence and
cntnmuiiirations security.
(iii) Sjiecial offices for the collerlion of specialized
intelligence I )trough rcronuai«anrc programs, whose
(millions, :inlhnrilies, and responsibilities shall include:
(A) Carrying out consolidated programs for
rcronnni«anrc.
( II) As.sigr.inr: responsibility In the various departments
and agenc ies of the < iovcrninent, in cording to their capa-
bilities, for the res.an U, development, procurement, oper-
ation* ami control of designated means of collerlion.
(iv) Such other nlli.es wirhin (he Department of IV-
fetise as shall be deenierl appropriate for conduct of the
iulclligrti'c missions and lesguirisibililies assigned lo the
Sccrelary of Defense.
(f) Energy Reir/trrk ana" Development Administra-
tion. The Administrator of the Energy Research and
Development Administration shall:
(1) Prmhiie intelligence required for the excrntion
of his rcspousibi lilies and the mission of the Energy
Research and Development Administration, hereinafter
referred to as ERDA, including the area of nuclear and
alomir energy.
C) ItfwmhMlr «nrit inlclligenrc and ptnvi.lr l.-.h-
niral and analytical cx|)crnV Hi other Intelligence Com-
munity organizations and he responsive to the guidance of
the Director of Centra! Intelligence and the C.nmmiltee
on Foieign Intelligence.
O) Participate with oilier lulelligcn. e Community
agencies and departments in formulating collection re-
quirements where its special technical expertise can con-
tribute to such rolled ion requirements,
(g) 77re !'r,le,al BKr«TH of fmirstigittin*. Under the
siiprrvisi if the Attorney General anil pursuant to such
regulations as the A ry Crucial may rstaldish, the
Diidni of the ITU shall:
(1) Deter l and pievent espionage, sabotage, subver-
sion, and other unlawful ;u liviihs by or on behalf of for-
eign [rowers through wirll lawful toiuilerintelli C < rrce
operations within lire United Staler imluding dec-
ironic surveillance, as arc necessary or useful for such
purposes.
(2) Condurt within the United Slates and it* terri-
tories when requested by ollirials of the Inlcllh-cncc
Community designated by the President, those lawful
ailivities. including electronic surveillance, authorized
by the lV-.id.-nl and s|,e, iii. ally appi.oril by the At-
torney Ikwiol, I" I"' undertaken in WHJlirl -f h-cign
iniclligcncc collection requirements of other intelligence
agencies.
(1) Collect foreign intelligence by lawful means
within the United Stales and its icrriiorics when requested
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by officials of the intelligence Community designated by
the President to make such requests.
(4) Disseminate, as appropriate, foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence information which it acquires to
appropriate Federal agencies, Slate and local law enforce-
ment agencies and cooperating foreign governments
(5) Carry out or contract lor research, development
and procurement of technical system* and devices relating
to the functions authorized almvc.
Sec. 5. Restrictions on Intelligence Activities. Informa-
tion about the capabilities, intentions and activities of other
governments is essential to informed decision-making in
the field of national defense and foreign relations. The
measures employed to acquire such inform.U ton should
be responsive to the legitimate needs of our Government
and must be conducted in a manner which preserves and
respects our established concepts of privacy and our civil
liberties.
Recent events have clearly indicated the desirability of
government-wide direction which will ensure a proper
balancing of these interests. This section of this Order
does not authorize any activity not previously authorized
and docs not provide exemption from any restrictions
otherwise applicable. Unless otherwise specified, [lie pro-
visions of this section apply to activities both inside and
outside the United States. References to law arc to appli-
cable laws of the United States.
(a) Definition!. As used in this section of this Order,
the following terms shall have the meanings ascribed to
them below:
( I ) "Collection" means any one or more of the gath-
ering, analysis, dissemination or storage of nmi-puhlii ly
available information without the informed express con-
sent of the subject of the information.
(2) "Counterintelligence" means information concern-
ing the protection of foreign intelligence or of national
security information and its collection from detection or
disclosure.
(3) "Electronic surveillance" means acquisition of a
non-public communication by electronic means, without
the consent of a person who is a party to, or, in the case
of a non-electronic communication, visibly present at, the
communication.
(4) "Employee" means a person cm ployed by, assigned
or detailed to, or acting for a United States foreign intel-
ligence agency.
(fi) "Foreign intelligence" means information con-
cerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of any
foreign power, nr of any non-United States person,
whether within or outside the United States, or concern-
ing areas outside the United States.
(6) "Foreign intelligence agency" means the Central
Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and De-
fense Intelligence Agency; and further includes any other
department or agency of the United States Government
or component thereof while it is engaged in the collection
of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, but shall not
include any such department, agency or component
thereof to the extent that it is cngagrd in its authorized
civil or criminal law enfnri ciiiml functions; nor shall it
include in any ca.se the federal Hiirean of Investigation.
(7) "National security infnmiaiinu" has the meaning
ascruVd toil hi Kxcrulivr Order No. I 1 652. W amended.
(II) "Physical Hirwilianre" means miuimiing visual
oliscrvation by any means; or acquisition of a non-public
communication by a prrsnu not a parly thereto nr visibly
present thcretlt ihiough any uii-.ms whi< h dots not involve
rlr.i,, ill.m.
(
u
) "Unin-d Mates prison" mentis Unhid Suites cit-
izens, aliens admitted to the United Stales for |xnnancnt
residence and corporations or other organizations incor-
porated or organized in the United Stales.
(b) Restrictions on Collection. Foreign intelligence
agencies shall not engage in any of the following activities:
( 1 ) Physical surveillance directed against a United
States person, unless it is a lawful surveillance conducted
pursuant to procedures approved by the head of the for-
eign intelligence agency and directed against any of the
following
:
(i) A present or former employee of such agency, its
present or former contractors or their present or former
employees, for the pui|x«r of prolei ling foreign intelli-
gence or couiilrriiilclligrnrr sources or methods or na-
tional security information from unauthorized disclosure;
or
(ii) a linked Slat™ |«rsn.i, who is in rnntart with
cither sue h a present or former contractor or employee or
with a non-United States |xrst>n who is the subject of a
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence inquiry, but
only to the extent necessary to identify such United States
person; or
(iii) a United Stairs |iermn outside the United States
who is reasonably Ixrljcvcd lo Ikt acting on l>chalf of a
foreign power or engaging in international tirrorist ot
narrotits activities or activities threatening the national
security.
(2) Electronic surveillance to intern-pi a communi-
cation which is made from, or is intended by the snider
to be received in, the United Slates, or directed against
United Stales persons abroad, except lawful electronic
surveillance under prim-dines approved by the Attorney
General; provide,!, that the C.nlial lntillig<n.c Agrmy
shall not perform electronic surveillance within the United
Stales, exrrpt for the purpose of Irsiing equipment under
pirn r< lures approved by the Attorney General consistent
with law.
(3) Unconsented physical searches within the United
States; or unconsented physical searches directed against
United States persons abroad, except lawful scarchej
under procedures approved by the Attorney General.
Velum. 1J—Nvmfa.r •
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(4) Opening nf mail or examination of cwrfopM ol
mail in United Stales postal channels except in accord-
ance with applicable statutes ;md rcgnlalhittt.
(5) Kxaminalion of Federal lax ifturm nr las infuiina-
ir.ii! except in ac< ncdam. c witli appli. able statutes and
regulations.
(6) Inhilialion or undis. losed parli. ipalion within ihc
Uniird Rtalw in any organization f«»r Ihe ntirptsr of ir-
portiug on or hilhirtning ils acliviliis or iih'iiiIkts; ex-
cept such infiltration or participation witli ropCft lo mi
organization rnmpfwcd primarily of uon-l'micd Slnlrfl
persons whii li is ir.iw.ii.il.ly ln-lirvrd If) I* hi ting on hr-
h.ilf of a foreign power.
(7) Collection of informal inn, however a. quired, con-
cerning; the domestic activities of United Stale* persons
except
:
(i) Information concerning rornorntiriiw or other
commercial nrfjanizalinns which const ilulis loicign
intelligence or counterintelligence.
(ii) Information concerning present or former em-
ployees, present or former contractors or thrir present
or former employers, or applicants for any such employ-
ment or cntiltaclini;, necessary to protect fnirign
intelligence or cnunlci intelligence WHOMV* at methods or
national security information from unauthorized dis-
closure; and the identity of persons in contact with the
foregoing or with a non-United States person who is the
subject of a r>irt-ii>n intelligence or r.mnlcriniclligriH c
inquiry.
(iii) Information ennrcrnine persons nhn are icasnti-
nbly Ixlirvrd In Ik- pntnitiitl sources or rmilai Is, Ih.I only
for the purpose of determining the suitability or credibility
of such ixtsoiw.
(iv) Foreign intelligence or counicriniclligcncc gath-
tred abroad or from electronic surveillance conducted
in compliance with Section 5(h)(2); or foreign ititelli-
gence acquired bom roo|tcraliiig sources in the United
States.
(v) Information about a United States person who
is reasonably lielievcd to lie acting on Iwh.ilf of a foirign
power or engaging in international terrorist <ir (nicotics
activities.
(vi) Information concerning persons or activities that
pose a clear threat to foreign inU'JItgClHT agency
facilitics or |>ersiiimel, /itofiiieil. that such inhirinalmn
is retained only hy the foreign imelliunue agency
llirealened and that piopcr cn.iidinali.rn with the Frdcial
Bureau of hiVcstigalHNi is accomplished.
(e) Dititniinntiim ami Slora^r. Nothing ill tins section
nf this Order shall pinhihil:
(1) Lawful disvcminatinu to the approp.iale law
enforcement agencies of incidentally gathered informa-
tion indicating involvement in activities which may he
in violation of law.
(2) Storage of information required by law to lie
retained.
(i) nixsi'iinuatinu to foreign intelligence anemic* III
informal ion of ihe subject matter tvpes lisied in Section
5(b)(7).
(d) ltr\UietitW an li\l>rihnrnt<ilu>n. Foreign intelli-
gence agrrnirs shall not engage in rvprrimenlall.in with
drugs on human subjects, except with the inhumed . nn-
KHH, in iMiliug ami wilmwtl by a dlsi tested thinl
p.. My. ol mi h mh h hum.in subje. I ami in ! HUUli e wtlli
the guidelines issuer,) by I he National Cimmi^iou f»r I he
Protcdion ol Human Subjn Is for Biomedical and Be-
havioral Reseat, h.
(e) .UiiilHMflti !.«•> Knf.niriu.-nl AnHnnitir\.
(I) No fouigri iutelligenie ageniy shall, except as
expressly aulhoii/rd by law (i) mnvidr scTvi.rs. cprip-
ment, personnel or facilities tti the Law l.nfon enicnl As-
*i*tan. c Adniinisir.itioir iir to Slate or local iH.licc orga-
nizations nf ihr L'niled Slate: ur (ii) paid, ipale in or bind
any law eufoirrmcni activity within the Uniird Stales.
'
(2) These prohibitions shall DM, however, preclude:
(i) rnojjctalion be!ween a foreign Intelligence agency and
appropriate law enlniiemeni agencies for the purpisc tti
protecting Ihe personnel and fa. ilities of the h.>cign nil. Ili-
aetivily lelatcd lo hiieign inlelligru. r or muni, .intelli-
gence ur (ii) provision ol specialized equipment or tech-
nical knnwlcdgc for use by any oilier Federal department
or agrni v.
(I) ,\\un»wr,t t »} Pnumnrl ,\n cnpiWr of a mini;..
iuU'Migcme ajpllty detailed cKewhcie wiihin the Federal
Covermnent shall be res|Hiu>ible lo the host agenev and
^l-'ll »"l
"I' ' I
<• H"-'< !';"<«' >"<»>) "'• '""•
:i(faiis of (he hosi agrn, y. rn rjM ;.s may !« dir.rlnl by ihe
laller. Flic head of the host mpiH-y, ar.rl any siK.cs.-or,
shall In- infoimcd of ihe detail.e's association with the par-
ent agency.
(g) Ptahibition »/ /ks«stin«twn. No employee of ihe
Unilnl Slates Covenumril shall engage in. or ci.nspiic to
engage in, polili. al assassinati.in.
(h) Implementation.
(I) Ibis snlmu of Ibis Older shall lie elfe.five on
M.ir.h 1. I'l7f.. Farhdcpa.tm.r.r and agen. y alfc. ted by
III is sci lion of this ( Mrr shall piompily ksue intenia I di-
reclivrsin implemenl (hissri tion wilh res|M-el 1. 1 its foreign
iiilelligem e and 1
1
(ciinlrlnu. m r o|»t,.lions.
( 2 1 The .\lt.uiH-v (hi.rial shall, wiihin ninety rtiys of
Ihe ellc< live dale of lliis s,-. li. I this ( )rdei, ks.ie Uuide-
liues irlalln.; I.. ... livilirs ..I lh. F. .,),- al Ito.c; f |itv.-sli-
galion in ihe areas of lo.cgn J..I. Iligni. c and
cnunicriniflligrncc.
Sir li. Orriuxht t>f hlrflirsntr <h,-n,i-n1><>m,
(a) Iheie is bneby e-lablishc.l an lnlellig,li.r Ovri-
sjgbl Uo.ud,heieiua(ierielericdlo as the Oversight U..ard.
( 1 ) 1 he Oversight Hoard shall have llirce members
who shall lie aprxiinird by Ihr I'ci-sidrnt and who shall
lie from outside tire Government and lie qualilicd on the
basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of background and
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experience. The mcmlicrs o( the Oversight Board may
also serve on ihc Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advi-
sory Board (Executive Order No. I14G0 or March 20,
1969). No member of the Oversight Board shall have
any personal contractual relationship with any agency or
department of the Intelligence Community.
(2) Oncmcmkrol the Oversight Board shall be desig-
nated by the President as its Chairman.
(3) 'Ihc Oversight Board shall:
(i) Receive and consider reports by Inspectors Gen-
eral and Getter.*] ( lounscls of the Intelligence Community
concerning activities that raise questions of legality or
propriety.
{ii) Review periodically the practices and procedures
of Hie lns|icrlnrs General and Gcnrral Counsels of the
Intelligence Cunnnuniiy deigned to discover and report
to the Oversight Hoard activities that raise questions of
legality or propriety.
(iii) Review periodically with each member of the
Intelligence t Inmmiiiiily llifir internal guidelines to ensure
their adequacy.
(iv) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the
Attorney General and the President on its findings.
(v) Report in a liuiHy manner In ihc Attorney General
and to the President any activities Ihnl raise serious
questions alwmi legality.
(vi) Report ill it limrly manner In the President any
activities that raise serious questions about propriety.
(h) Inspectors General and General Counsels within
the Intelligence Community shall:
(1) Transmit In the Oversight Board reports nf any
activities that come in their alletuiou that miw questions
of legality or propriety.
(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly. In the Over-
sight Board on its findings concerning questionable activ-
ities, if any.
(3) Provide to the Oversight Board all information
requested about activities within Ihcir respective depart-
ments or agencies.
(4) Report to ihc Oversight Board any occasion on
which they were directed not to report any activity to the
Oversight Board by their agency or department heads.
(5) Formulate practices and procedures designed lo
discover and reprirl III (he ( Knwlil Board aclivilics licit
raise questions of legality or propriety.
(c) Heads of intelligence agencies or departments
Khali:
( 1 ) Report periodically In the OwwtRhl Board on any
arlivittm of their organization* that raise questions of
legality or propriety.
(2) Instruct ihcir employees to cooperate fully with
the Oversight Board.
(3) Ensure that Insperiors General and General
Counsels of their agencies have access lo any information
necessary to perform their duties assigned by paragraph
(4) of this section.
(tl) The Attorney Ccncial shall:
( 1 ) Receive and consider reports from the Oversight
Board,
(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the
President with respect to activities of the Intelligence
Community, if anv, which raise quest ions of legality.
(e) The Oveisight Board shall .r.eive Mall s.ip|K.rl.
No petaotl who serves on the staff nf ihe ( )versighl Board
shall have any contractual or employment relationship
wilh any department or agency in the Intelligence
Co.nnuu.ily.
(f) The President's loirigu hilcllrgen, e Advisory
Board established by Executive Order No. I I4WJ of
March 2(1, 1969, remains in effect.
Sit. 7.Srr,rrxPi«lrrtitm.
(a) 111 mder ... imvr Ibe p-""' ikm "' «««" and
melhods of intelligenic, all nrmhrfa of the Kxeeniivc
branch and its conlracUirs given acre-* lo information
conlainiug sources or method* of iiilelligei.ee shall, as a
condition ol obtaining a,. ess, sie,n an ag.ecmc.ll Dial they
will not disitr.se I hat iiiloimalioii to i>crsous nol author-
ized lo receive it.
(bj In Ihc event of any nnaulhnriml disclosure of
iiiroim.ilinu cnnreining Rturrirsor methods of iulelligenee,
Ihe names of anv persons Found hi h»Vf made n.iauihnr-
iml .lis. los.lie shall he fo.vvarded M) lo ihe head of :,p-
pli.ablc departments m in-ftwirs h«r iqipioprial. divi-
pliuary ar-tJtst; and (2) lo ihc Aliomey General for ap-
propriate legal aclion.
(i ) In Ihe event of any line-aimed unaiiilmtized dis-
inlelligen.e by a person who ha* a.o.rd not like Mill)
dis. losme, Ihe details ol ihe threatened diselnsuic shall I*
transtnilled to ihe Allornev General fur appropriate legal
action, Jin hiding the seeking of a jtttiii ial ntdrr In prevent
such dis, l.-sure.
(d) In further pursuit of llic need In provide protec-
tion for other significant areas o! iulelligenee, the Direc-
tor of Central Intcltigen.e is authorized In pr.i Igale
rules ami regulations tu expand ihe si ope of agiccincftU
secured from Ihosc persons who, as an aspect of their rcla-
lionship with ihe United Stales Government, have access
to elassified inlellit-em e male? ial.
Si-,:. II. Hn„hlin,>lhit.i.
(ll) the Ciim.uillee HI I o.eirn lulellifen, e and the
Director of Central lnielluyn. e shall p.ovide lor delailcd
implemeniali, f lilts ( hde, by issuing appropriate di-
rcelives-.
(b) All enisling National Seeuiity ( Iiniiu tl and Ui-
rertor of Central Iulelligenee diie. lives shall lie amended
(o lie eonsisicnl wilh this Order within ninety days of iu
effective date.
(c) This Order shall supersede the Presidential Mem-
nnuidum of November T>. 1971. on the "Organization
and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Com-
munity."
56
PMSIDENIIAL DOCUMENTS- CEtALD I EORD. 1*76
(d) Head* of departments and agenda within ihc In-
telligence Community shall Same supplementary directives
to ilieir organizations consilient with this Order within
ninety days of in effective date,
(c) This Order will l»c implemented within rarrrni
manning authorizations of the Intelligent r ('nninnmitv
To this end, the Director of die Office nf Management
and Budget will facilitate the required realignment of per-
sonnel positions. The Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget will aha assist in the all-nation of ap-
propriate [atililics.
ilium R. piimi
The White House,
February 111, I97G.
(Filet) wiih tlie Oil..- ..I ili<- I'.-.l-inl Rnttair, l2iHi |i.m-,
Jfl.m.-iry in, I07i.|
Horr: For llic rVrtWml'l rrmarU ai li» nr«' entili-trwr rif IVli.
roatr 17, 197fi. nnnouririne plan! l.-r a rr..tt;:ini?.-int>n of ihr inicl-
li|rncc community, «t< |»age 211 o( lliu tunc.
United Stales Foreign
Intelligence Activities
The Pretiiletit'i Menace In ihc Cniujrcj* PruposinR
Lrciilaiive Reforms. February 18, 1976
To tkt Congest .«/ the United Sinter;
By virtue of the authority vested in trie by Article II,
Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution, and other provisions
of law, I haw today issued an Kxmiiivr Older primming
in the nigini/alinii ami rot Itml of I lie Unilnl Stain for-
eign intelligence conununily, This oulcr rsublishes clear
lines of acrouuiabiliH for the Nation's foreign intelligence
agencies. It sets forth strict guidelines to rouirol the activi-
ties of these agcniirs anil Sicilies as well thine activities
in which they shall not engage.
In carrying Mil my Constitutional responsibilities to
manage and conduct foreign policy and provide for the
Nation's defense, I bdfevc it essential to have the l»est
passible intelligence aliout the capaliililies. intentions and
activities of governments and other entities and individ-
uals abroad. To this end, the foreign intelligence agencies
of the United States play a vital role in collecting and
analysing inhumation related to the national defense ami
foreign polity.
It is equally as importiUlt lliat the methods these agen-
cies employ to collect such information for the legitimate
needs of the government conform to the standards set out
in the Constitution to preserve and respect the privacy and
civil liberties of American citizens.
The Executive Order I have issued today will insure a
proper balancing of these interests. It establishes govern-
ment-wide direction for the foreign intelligence agencies
and places responsibility and accountability on individ-
1 Itrlievr it will eliminate abuses and questionable ac-
tivities nil the |iart "f the fmrtgu iiiHligi-iiit' agencies
while at the "ante tin* |«rmitt"mg llintl to get on with
Ihcii » Hal wnrlt of inhering ami ww«4m| information. Il
is also „n hope tbal these stqx wltl help If) ll-Hn* public
confidence in these agencies and MMoutage our i iliwns to
appreciate the valuable lonttilmtiim they make to our
national si. mitv.
Un.m.l lb. tl.-px 1 Inn- hduii in ih. Kvi lithe t hiln,
I aknl-licw Hhi. isa .leal n..<l lo. wanr »\w*H* Irfih-
lalive at lions. I am today submitting In the Congress nf
the United States proposals which will cn far Inward
euham im; ll» p.ole.ti. f line itilchWm e witK as
well as H-i-uLui/iiii: piixcihtics loi inlt-tligeiirc rnllfilMHI
in (be I'niled Stall's.
My f'u^t pmntwil deals with the piote.tion of iulclli-
Rrm r si. s anil mcl hods. The Diiei toi of ( Initial Inlrl-
lignire is ehatued, under ihr National Security Ait o(
I'M 7, as amended, with pmtfi ting intelligence sources
anil methods. The Act, however, gives the Director no
authoiiii.-sM.iiMiicrisiiiaii- uiih Itut n-ipmraltiltly.
The.eFoM. I am MirtK«mi{ k"Ci\lirtliill In Mil|*»* trim-
inalan.lcivils. ions on t.W who ate .m-I .-<! an ess
to intelligence sc< rets and who willfully and wrongful
reveal ibis inhumation. This ligMatiou is no] an "< )lfi< ial
Sends AH", viu.e il would allci l ihiK ll.osr »!•• till-
pn.peiK dt«tW seurK n..l those lo whom WITH ire
dis.lo.,-,1 Moieoui.thislegisl.-lioii roiilil not he us., I lo
rom lip abuses ami impiopnelii-s. Il wo.dil in no way
prevent people Irnm repotliuc qm-siioiiiibli- activities lo
appmp- ,,,llu, ,[!-. io the I • ive anil N Eislalivr
blr anil tint
Ihan.hrsorihe goVlimil. lit
.
It is essential, however, thai ihc ii
gcrotrs e\|HWiue of our Nation's intellig' ncc secrets he
stopped. The American people have long accepted the
primiples of onlideniialily ami sicieiy in manv deal-
ing su.b ,,s will, d.-ims. hmyrn an. rrffly. It
makes nltsohilcl) IHt -use to ileuv this same piotc. lion Ki
our intelligence sceicts. (Jpcimes,s is a hallmark of our
democratic society, but the Atti-ri.an people have never
Itelieveil Ihat it was iieiiNs.iy In ,eveal ihe semi war
plans of the Mepaitmeut of DrlrtWC, and I di> not think
thev wish lo have true intelligence secrets revealed either.
I urge Ihe adoption of this legisbition with all possible
it
S<i ouil. 1 sup^.H |m>mi«lN thai woulrl , larify and s.-t
slat y limils, where nenssaiy. on the aitivilies of the
fonign intelligence agencies. In partii ulai, I will support
legisialioii makiui; it a crime lo assassinate or attempt or
eonspiie to assassinate a forrUtfl official in peacetime.
Since it defines a crime, legislation is necessary.
Third, I will meet with the appropriate leaders of
Conercss to irv to develop sound legislation to deal with
a critical problem invohine personal privacy—electronic
V«lum* 11—Numb., i
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surveillance. Working with Congressional leaders and llic
Justice Department and other Executive agencies, wc will
seek to develop a procedure for undertaking electronic
surveillance lor foreign intelligence purposes. It should
create a special procedure for seeking a judicial warrant
authorizing the use of electronic surveillance in the United
States for foreign intelligence purposes.
1 will also seek. Congressional support [or sound leg-
islation to expand judicial supervision 'if mail openings.
The law now permits the opening of United States mail,
under proper judicial safeguards, in the conduct of crim-
inal investigations. Wc need Authority to open mail under
the limitations and safeguards (hat now apply in order to
obtain vitally needed foreign intelligence information.
This would require a showing thai there is probable
cause to believe thai the sender or recipient is an agent
of a foreign power who is engaged in spying, sabotage or
terrorism. As is now the case the criminal investigations,
those seeking .authority to examine mail for foreign intel-
ligence purposes will have to convince a federal judqc of
the necessity to do so and accept the limitations upon their
authorization to examine the mail provided in the order
of the court.
Fourth, 1 would like lo share tny views regarding itp»
propriate Congressional oversight of the foreign intelli-
gence agencies. Il is clearly the business of the Congress m
organize itself to deal wilh these matters. Certain princi-
ples, however, should be recognized by both the Execu-
tive and Legislative Branches if this oversight is to be
effective. 1 believe good Congressional oversight is essen-
tial so that the Congress and the American people whom
you represent can be assured that the foreign intelligence
agencies arc adhering to the law In all of their activities.
Congress should seek to centralize the responsibility (or
oversight of the foreign intelligence community. The more
committees and subcommittees dealing with highly sen-
sitive secrets, the greater the risks of disclosure. I recom-
mend that Congress establish a Joint Foreign Intelligence
Oversight Committee. Consolidating Congressional over-
sight in one committee will facilitate the elforts of the
Administration lo keep the Congress fully informed of
foreign intelligence activities.
It is essential that both the flousc and the Senate estab-
lish firm rules in insure that foreign intelligence sri ids
will not he improperly disclosed. There must lx- estab-
lished a clear process to safeguard these sccrcis and elec-
tive measures to deal with unauthorized disclosures.
Any foreign intelligence information transmitted by the
Executive Branch to the Oversight Committee, under an
injunction of secrecy, should not be unilaterally disclosed
without my agreement. Respect [or the integrity of the
Constitution requires adherence to the principle that no
individual member nor committee, nor single House of
Congress can overrule an an of the Incentive. Unilateral
publication of classified information over the objection
of the President, by one committee or one House of Con-
gress, not only violates the doctrine of separation of
powers, but also effectively overrules the actions of the
other House of Congress, and jicihaps even the majority
of IkiiIi Houses.
Finally, successful and effective Congressional o\rr-
sight of the foreign intelligence agencies tiepends on mu-
tual (rust bclwreu I lie Congress and F.xer utive. I'.ai!)
branch must irrogni/c and respect (he rights: and prerog-
atives of the other if anything is to Ik achieved.
In this context, a Concessional requirement lo keep
the Oversight Committee "folly" informed ht iimhi* desir-
able and workable as a practical matter than formal re-
quirements for notification of inieHfir m tivities in a large
number of committees. Specifically, Section <ib'2 of the
Foreign Assistance Act, which has resulted in n\cr six
separate committee briefings, should 1>c modified as icc-
onimcndcd by the Commission on llic Organization of
the Covcrnmcnl for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, and
reporting should lie limited lo the new Oversight
Committee.
Both the Congress and ihe Kxmitlvc Branch recognize
the importance to this Nation of a strong intelligence
service, I believe il urgent thai wc lake the steps f have
outlined above to insure that America not only has the
best foreign imcfligcitcr scrvtrc in the world, but also the
ino-,1 unique -one which operates in a manner [idly con-
sisicnt with the Constitutional rights of our citizens.
Gerald R. Ford
The White Ifonsc,
February Ifi, M)7o\
National Poison Prevention
Week, 1976
Proclamation 4416. February IB, 1976
By the President of the United Statet of America
a Proclamation
The life of a child is precious The loss of even one
child is Iragic. Vet each year accidental poisonings muse
ton many of our Nation's children lo suffer illness and
injury from which they may never recover.
As every parent knows, children are by nature inquisi-
tive. They arc explorers and experin renters. It is our
responsibility not only lo leach ibcni ihe dangers that
poisonous sulMaiitcs picseni, but lo provide Ihcni with a
safe enviiomuent. Spreiiil pac.kar.ing required under ihe
provisions of the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of
J970 plays a major role in achieving this aim. Data re-
rcntly tr leased by the National Center lor Health Statis-
tics indicate that in the year since aspirin products were
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helps us to meet the demands of the fu-
ture. In recent yean the Congress has
taken important steps—through t lie* estab-
lishment of the congressional budget proc-
ess—to improve its own means of estab-
lishing priorities. This administration lias
worked closely with the congressional ap-
propriations ami budget committees and
has found them invaluable sources of ad-
vice. We will continue in this spirit of
cooperation, and 1 look forward lo work-
ing with the Congress ;uul its leadership
lo obtain adoption of my budget for fis-
cal year 1979.
Jimmy Carter
January 20. 1978.
note: The text of the message was released on
January 23.
Secretary of State Vance's
Trip to the Middle East
While House Stau-mrnt on the President's
Meeting With Secretary Vance.
January 23, 1978
Secretary Vance reported this evening
to the President on his trip last week to
the Middle East to attend the opening ses-
sions of the Political Committee of the
Cairo Conference in Jerusalem and on his
visits to Greece and Turkey this past
weekend.
On the Middle East, Secretary Vance
described for the President the work on
a declaration of principles which would
govern the negotiation of a comprehen-
sive peace settlement in the Middle East
that had begun in the Political Commit-
tee before the Egyptian delegation was
withdrawn.
The Secretary expressed his judgment
that, while the work of the Political Com-
mittee is temporarily suspended, the ih-jjii-
tiating process can continue. Both the
President and the Secretary have urged
that discussions between Egypt ant! Israel
in the Security Committee of the Cairo
Conference continue. The} 1 hope that
these talks may resume soon. The Presi-
dent stressed that we are prepared to con-
tinue the exchanges with Prime Minister
Begin and President Sadat that the Secre-
tary began last week on a declaration of
principles. Assistant Secretary Atherton
is staying in the Middle East to be helpful
in tliiselioil.
The President and the Secretary ex-
pressed the hope that the public ex-
changes of recent days are now behind us
and that every effort will be made to re-
capture the spirit that followed recent
meetings between Prime Minister Begin
and President Sadat and to turn full at-
tention through cjuiet diplomacy to the
substance of the negotiations.
Secretary Vance also reported on his
brief visits to Ankara and Athens. In each
place, he had extended discussions with
the respective leaders on matters of bi-
lateral cooperation and on regional and
global issues of concern to us as allies. No
decisions were taken in these conversa-
tions. Our ties with both countries remain
strong and vital.
United States Foreign
Intelligence Activities
Remarks on Signing Executive Order 12036,
January 24, 1978
The President. This morning, we've
gathered to sign an Executive order which
makes a major stride forward in better
coordination within the Intelligence Com-
munity.
One of tin- pleasant experiences that
I've had as President is to see the profes-
189
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sionalistn and the competence of the
collection and analysis and distribution of
intelligence information to ine and to
other consumers in the Federal Govern-
ment. Under Admiral Turner, this coordi-
nation has been superb. And I'm very
pleased this morning, after months of work
with the NSC—the National Security
Council—with the Department of De-
fense, with Admiral Turner, the CIA, the
Congress committees, particularly the
Senate Intelligence Committee, to have
evolved an Executive order which estab-
lishes in clear terms the responsibilities and
limitations of the collection of intelligence,
of counterintelligence, and also the dis-
tribution of material that hasn't been
analyzed.
The Director of Central Intelligence.
Admiral Turner, will be responsible for
tasking or assigning tasks to all those
who collect intelligence. He will also have
full control of the intelligence budget and
will also be responsible for the analysis of
information that dues come in from all
sources in the foreign intelligence field
This order also gives a great deal of
additional responsibility to the Attorney
General to make sure that the civil liber-
ties and the privacy of American citizens
is adequately protected and that the con-
stitutional provisions and the laws of our
Nation are carried out precisely. There's
a clear description of the duties and re-
sponsibilities of all those that are involved
in the collection and distribution of intel-
ligence information.
I'm very proud of this Executive order.
It will be a basis for congressional action
on a charier to be written for the Intelli-
gence Community and. I think later on.
we'll have one for the FBI, as well.
Under this order, though, under
i ountciinlclliiicnee. the duties of the V\\\
are also spelled out. So, this is a fairly
concise, clear delineation of how the In-
telligence Community will he operating
in the months ahead.
I want to express my thanks to all those
that have been involved in the process.
And after I sign the Executive order this
morning, there will be a complete briefinc
for the press by the members of the NSC,
the Department of Defense, the Attorney
General's office, and Admiral Turner
representing the Intelligence Community.
So, I want to thank all of you standing
behind me, and I will now sign the Exec-
utive order which, I think, is a major
stride forward. Thank you very much.
[At this point (he Prfrid+nt rignrd 'l<r Hxecu-
live order. \
Fritz, if you would come over and say
a word?
Vicf PRr.sinKNi Moniwi.k. I have
some notes.
The Prf.sidi.nt. Very good. [Laughter]
Vice President Monimlf. Mr. Presi-
dent, member* of the S<nn1r nnd flnw
intelligent e tamntiW't :
When I served in the Senate, it was our
task for some time to explore and in-
vestigate abuses by mil intelligence agen-
cies. It was not a hap|»\ i"1>. and it dis-
closed not only many abuses of the civil
liberties of our people but. in many \va\s,
derisions and actions thai were counter-
productive to the interests of our count!)
.
In my opinion, the most important
principle that this Executive order stands
for is that it demonstrates that we can
fully protect our Nation and do so within
the law. and not only do it within the
law but do it better than under a cir-
cumstance which permits us to resort to
illegality.
Underlying the abuses that we uncov-
ered was an unexpressed but clearly evi-
dent conclusion on the pari of some that
we could not defend our < ounlrv agaimt
her real enemies except tin ouch illegal-
ity. Once you examine that, it's true that
ion
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the onlv way you can effectively protect
against our enemies is through lesfal
process.
And that's what ihi* Executive imlei
stands for. It's a historic document. It's
the first time, I think, any major nation
has tried to rationalise in writing, through
legislative charters, the protection of then
nation from enemies, and to do so within
the law.
We Will ihe t'.'M liitrlliKttirr Cmnniu-
nity in the world, and we have it. And
under this Executive order, it will he even
better. I think what it really stands for is
that the framers of our Constitution were
pretty wise men after all.
The President. Thank you. The
chairman of the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee this past year has been Senator
Danny Inouye. who had worked very
closely with us. He has done a superb
job. One of the facets of this Executive
order is it directs those who arc involved
in the Intelligence Community to share
information, sometimes of a highly confi-
dential or secret nature, with the Mem-
bers of the Congress, so that there can be
a joint sharing of responsibility for thr
collection and dissemination of intelli-
gence information in a legal way.
Danny, I'd like to call on you to say a
word.
Senator Inouye. Mr. President, on be-
half of the committee. I wish to thank you
and commend you for giving us an oppor-
tunity to participate in the drafting of
this extraordinary Executive order. We
concur with you that statutory charters
are important and, accordingly, I'm
pleased to advise you that next week, a
draft charter brought about by ihe work
of Senators Huddleslon and Mathias will
be introduced in the Senate, and we look
forward to working with you, sir. Thank
you.
The Prksiijknt. Very line. The new
chairman of the Intelligence Committee
and one who's served long and well on the
rommittce is Senator Birch Bayh. Birch,
would you like to say just a word?
SlCNATQR BaYH. Mr. President, I'm
looking forward to having a chance to
continue the strong leadership that Sena-
tor Inouye has provided for the commit-
tee. I would like to add my commenda-
tion. This is the first time in history that
the Congress has had this kind of coopera-
tion with the executive biamh. Ami this
is the second step— I would like to remind
those who are here—in which you, as
President, have undertaken a landmark
initiative. We met in the Rose Garden in
the spring, where for the liist lime in His-
tory you were willing to waive your in-
herent authority to get involved in elec-
tronic surveillance.
So, as we move forward with the char-
ters. I think it is important to understand
that this is critical. Presidents and Con-
gresses are mortal. We have been re-
minded of that rather tragically in the
last few days. And it's important to put
these basic protections in the bedrock law
of our land.
Tup. President. Thank you. A new
ruinniiUce that's just been formed in the
Congress this past year, certainly with my
strong approval and support, has been the
House Intelligence Committee. Eddie
Uoland is the chairman. Eddie, perhaps
you'd like to say a word.
Representative Boland. Mr. Presi-
dent, first of all I want to express, on hc-
lialf of all my colleagues on the House
side, our appreciation at the invitation
that brings us to this very significant and
very meaningful occasion, I only have a
couple of observations. I'm delighted to
tome, first of all, to find out whether or
not the signatures on the letters that I get
from you are genuine. [Laughter] I've seen
yon sign here; I know they are. \Laugh it r\
Then I'm delighted to sec that behind
us—and I think the press will recognize
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this—there is no dispute within the Intel-
ligence Community over what we're
doing, cither what Admiral Turner is
doing or what the President is doing. Ev-
erybody is here, and' everybody is happy
with it.
I'm also conscious of the fact that the
Senators are way ahead of us in this area
and have been for some time. It's the only
area in which the Senate is ahead of us,
incidentally. [Laughter] We hope to catch
up. It's going to be a difficult job. Hut
frankly, diey have led the way and, I
think, perhaps, they have taken the Con-
gress through the thickest of what this par-
ticular activity within the Congress means
and its significance.
And as the Vice President has so well
said and you have so well said, this Execu-
tive order is historical. It does indicate
that we can operate an Intelligence Com-
munity within the framework of our Con-
stitution, to protect the rights and ensure
the rights of the people of our Nation. And
that's exactly why we arc in business.
So, Mr. President, with this Executive
order, with the charter legislation that is
coming out of the Senate, with the for-
eign surveillance intelligence legislation
that has been considered by the House, is
being considered by Chairman Murphy of
our committee, why, we can assure you
that you will find the House in coopera-
tion with you, with the administration,
and with the Senate committee.
Thank you very much for inviting us.
The President. Thank you vervmurh,
Eddie. Dee Huddleston has been the
chairman of the subcommittee responsible
for the drafting of legislation precedent
to the actual evolution of the charter
which will be part of our Nation's laws.
Senator Huddleston has worked very
closely with me and others in the basic
premises included in the Executive order.
This is a good basis. We all recognized
that the Intelligence Community has to
have some degree of fiexibilitv. And there
are a few directives that will not lie in-
cluded in this Executive order because of
their highly confidential nature, but all
those are being shared and will be shared
with the Senate and the House commit-
tees. We are very proud of the relationship
that we have.
Senator Huddleston. Well, thank
ynu, Mr. President. I rrrtaiulv ^^-,-^^^t to
express my appreciation mid thai of our
subcommittee to you and your entire staff
for the cooperation and help you've
given. I doubt if there has been an Execu-
tive order in recent years, maybe never,
that has had as much congressional input
as this particular one.
And I have to say that Bill Miller and
Elliott Maxwell on our committee staff
have done a tremendous job in providing
us with the input that we've been able to
make. I think this, certainly, is an appro-
priate interim step between where we
have been in our intelligence operations
and the control and accountability and
authority that's been exercised there and
where we all know that wc want to go;
and that is. with legislative, statutory
charters setting out the missions, the ac-
countability, the authorities of all of our
intelligence agencies.
Uppermost in our mind. Mi. Presi-
dent—and I, too, along with Vice Presi-
dent Mondale, went through the so-called
Church committee's investigative pe-
riod— in spite of the abuses (hat we saw
revealed, I think our major objective
still, as we protect the rights and priv-
ileges of our citizens, is to provide the
machinery under which the United States
of America can have the best, most effi-
cient, most effective intelligence appa-
ratus in the world. That's what we are
going to work toward. As our chairman
has indicated, we're prepared now, and
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certainly will be by the end of next week,
to introduce legislation, our first piece of
legislation relating to the charters. Wc
see that as a starting point.
The long period of time it took to bring
this into being, I think, demonstrates the
very complex and difficult problems that
we are faced with. So, I'm sure we're
going to have the same kind of coopera-
tion between llic Iiilclligt'iirc Cotnunmily
and the executive that we've had pre-
viously. And I believe that we can develop
the kind of charters that will bring about
the assurances that all of us want.
Thank you, sir, very much.
The President. Thank you. Senator
Huddleston said that never before in
history has an Executive order by the
President had so much congressional
input. I doubt if ever before m history
an Executive order has had so much input
from the President. [Laughter] I have
sent it back three or four times in In-
redrafted so I could understand it.
[Laughter] I think now it's in very good
shape.
I'd like lo call on Unn;M*«in;m
Murphy. lie has the same responsibility
in the House as Dee Huddleston does in
the Senate, the drafting of a new charter.
Representative MrnrHY. Thank
you, Mr. President. On behalf of the com-
mittee, I'd like to congratulate you, Mr.
President, on keeping your promise that
you made during your campaign that you
would bring the intelligence agencies into
some meaningful order under this Execu-
tive order. I'd also like to thank Attorney
General Bell and his staff.
We have already begun our work on
the national surveillance act. And as mv
chairman, Mr. Boland, has reminded us,
we are behind. I think that's an admon-
ishment to me. Wc will catch up.
Thank you, sir.
Tim; President. Thank you. I wanted
to call on, also, Senator Mathjas, who's
been a great help to us. Senator Gold-
water has been the vice chairman of the
committee for a long time. He's not here
today.
Senator Mathias. Mr. President, as I
stood here this morning, I thought a little
bit about the advice of Speaker Reed, who
defined the duties of (In- minority as lo
draw your pay and help make a quorum.
[Laughter] I want to assure you that the
minority in this case is going to do more
than that, that we're going to work very
hard on this statutory charter and to try
to develop in the spirit in which you have
started us out this morning.
I think it needs to be said that wc want
it to be not only an effective instrument
which provides us with the best intelli-
gence and that we want it to provide the
kind of restraints which ensure the rule
of law in ntir rotmtry, but we also want
it to be a shield for the men and women
who devote their lives to the intelligence
services and to give them the kind of guid-
ance within which they ran develop their
own careers.
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Representative Wilson. I'm again
the minority on our side, but wc are very
much interested in this Executive order.
I commend you for having taken all of
the different intelligence responsibilities
from various agencies and putting them
under one executive head, which has been
one of the problems we have seen in the
past. And I predict that we'll come along
and support you continuously in the fu-
ture.
Thank you very much.
Tin: President, I want to say I won't
call anyone else from the executive
branch, because you will be getting a
briefing in detail from the National Secu-
rity Council, Department of Defense, the
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DCI, which is the Director of Central In-
telligence, and also the Attorney General.
But in closing, let me remind the group
once again of what I said at the begin-
ning: One of the most professional and
competent organizations with which I
have ever dealt has been the Intelligence
Community. It consists of several thou-
sand highly professional, dedicated Amer-
ican people whose knowledge and expe-
rience stands as a bulwark in protecting
the security of our Nation.
And although there have been prob-
lems in the past, probably because of an
absence of a clear directive about de-
lineations of responsibility, I think that
this has quite often obscured the sacri-
ficial work that these good men and
women have done.
Again, I want to express my complete
appreciation and confidence in Admiral
Stan Turner, whose responsibilities under
this Executive order will be greatly mag-
nified. He's worked very closely with the
Attorney General and with the Secretary
of Defense. During normal peacetime,
which I hope will prevail throughout all
of our lifetime, he will have the respon-
sibilities that I outlined.
In case of a conflict or extreme national
emergency, under the Executive order,
the President has the authority to shift
part of that responsibility to the Secre-
tary of Defense to defend our Nation in
time of war. But that will be done in a
very careful, preplanned way. And the
present interrelationship that exists today,
to be enhanced by the Executive order,
between Defense, Justice, and intelli-
gence, is very clearly defined and is a
harmonious working relationship.
This could not have been possible
without a great deal of consultation and a
close cooperation and, I think, a mutual
purpose that was recognized by everyone.
I think this is a major step forward. I'm
very deeply grateful to all of you.
Thank you very much.
note: The President spoke at 11:45 a.m. in
the Cabinet Room at the White House.
United States Foreign
Intelligence Activities
Executive Order 12036. January 24, 1978
United States Intelligence
Activities
By virtue of the authority vested in me
by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States of America including the
National Security Act of 1947, as
amended, and as President of the United
States of America, in order to provide
for the organization and control of United
States foreign intelligence activities, it is
hereby ordered as follows
:
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tional Intelligence
Effort [|95],
1-1 Naliona! Security Council
. [195]
1-2 NSC Policy Review Com-
mittee [|95]
1-3 NSC Special Coordination
Committee [196]
1-* National Foreign Intelli-
gence Board [197]
1-5 National Intelligence Task-
ing Center [197]
1-6 The Director of Central
Intelligence [19(1]
1-7 Senior Officials of the In-
telligence Community
.. . [200]
1 Editor's Note: The page numbers of the
above tabic of contents reflect page citaiions in
this publication. The page numbers which thoy
replace were reference* in payes in the original
document.
191
(M
Administration of Ji
1-8 The Central Intelligence
Agency [201]
1-9 The Department of State. . [202]
1 — 10 The Department of the
Treasury [202]
1-11 The Department of Defense [202 ]
1-12 Intelligence Component!
Utilized by the Secretary
ofDefense [203]
1-13 The Department of Energy. 1 205]
1-14 The Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation [205 ]
1-15 The Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration [205 ]
section 2 Restrictions on Intelli-
gence Activities [206]
2-1 Adherence to Law [206]
2-2 Restrictions on Certain Col-
lection Techniques [206]
2-201 General Provisions [200 ]
2-202 Electronic Surveillance .... [206 j
2-203 Television Cameras and
Other Monitoring [207]
2-204 Physical Searches [207]
2-205 Mail Surveillance [207 ]
2-206 Physical Surveillance [207]
2-207 Undisclosed Participation in
Domestic Organizations. . [207 ]
2-208 Collection of Nonpublicly
Available Information . . [20»]
2-3 Additional Restrictions and
Limitations [209]
2-301 Tax Information [209 ]
2-302 Restrictions on Experimen-
tation [20!1]
2-Mi'S Restrkiions on ContracliiiR [209 J
2-304 Restrictions on Personnel
Assigned to Other Agen-
cies [209]
2-305 Prohibition nn Assassi-
nation [209 J
2-306 Restrictions on Special Ac-
tivities [209]
2-307 Restrictions on Indirect Par-
ticipation in Prohibited
Activities [209]
2-308 Restrictions on Assistance to
Law Enforcement Au-
thorities [209]
2-309 Permissible Assistance to
Law Enforcement Au-
thorities [209]
2-310 Permissible Dissemination
and Storage of Informa-
tion [210]
mmy Carter, 1978 Jan. 24
Section 3 Oversicht of Intelli-
gence Organizations. . . [210]
3-1 Intelligence Oversight
Board [210]
3-2 Inspectors General and
General Counsel [210]
3-3 Attorney General [211]
3-4 Congressional Intelligence
Committees [211]
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Implementation [212]
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Section 1
direction, duties and responsibilities
with respect to the national in-
telligence effort*
1-1. National Security Council.
1-101. Purpose. The National Security
Council (NSC) was established by the
National Security Act of 1947 to advise
the President with respect to the integra-
tion of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to the national security.
The NSC shall act as the highest Kxecu-
tive Branch entity that provides review
of, guidance for, and direction to the con-
duct of all national foreign intelligence
and ( ounlei intelligence activities.
1-102. Committees. The NSC Policy
Review Committee and Special Coordi-
nation Committer, in ;if (ordancc with
procedures established by the Assistant to
the President for National Security Af-
fairs, shall assist in carrying out the NSC's
responsibilities in the foreign intelligence
field.
1-2. NSC Policy Review Committee.
1-201. Membership. The NSC Policy
Review Conuiiiit'.-e (PRC), when carry-
•Certain technical terms are defined in Sec-
tion 4-2.
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ing out responsibilities assigned in this
Order, shall be chaired by the Director
of Central Intelligence and composed of
the Vice President, the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secre-
tary of Defense, the Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs, and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
or their designees, and other senior offi-
cials, as appropriate.
1-202. Duties. The PRC shall:
(a) Establish requirements and prior-
ities for national foreign intelligence;
(b) Review the National Foreign In-
telligence Program and budget proposals
and report to the President as to whether
the resource allocations for intelligence
capabilities are responsive to the intelli-
gence requirements of the members of the
NSC.
(c) Conduct periodic reviews of na-
tional foreign intelligence products, eval-
uate the quality of the intelligence prod-
uct, develop policy guidance to ensure
quality intelligence and to meet changing
intelligence requirements; and
(d) Submit an annual report on its ac-
tivities to the NSC.
1-203. Appeals. Recommendations of
the PRC on intelligence matters may be
appealed to the President or the NSC by
any member of the PRC.
1-3. NSC Special Coordination Commit-
tee.
1-301. Membership. The NSC Special
Coordination Committee (SCC ) is
chaired by the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs and its
membership includes the statutory mem-
bers of the NSC and other senior officials,
as appropriate.
1-302. Special Activities. The SCC
shall consider and submit to the President
a policy recommendation, including all
dissents, on each special activity. When
meeting for this purpose, the members of
the SCC shall include the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, the At-
torney General, the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, the Assist-
ant to the President for National Secu-
rity Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence.
1-303. Sensitive Foreign Intelligence
Collection Operations. Under standards
established by the President, proposals for
sensitive foreign intelligence collection
operations shall be reported to the Chair-
man by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence for appropriate review and ap-
proval. When meeting for the purpose of
reviewing proposals for sensitive foreign
intelligence collection operations, the
members of the SCC shall include the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
fense, the Attorney General, the Assistant
to the President for National Security Af-
fairs, the Director of Central Intelligence,
and such other members designated by
the Chairman to ensure proper considera-
tion of these operations.
1-304. Counteriittrlligrnrr. The SCC
shall develop policy with respect to the
conduct of counterintelligence activities.
When meeting for this purpose the mem-
bers of the SCC shall include the Secre-
tary of Stale, the Secretary of Defease,
the Attorney General, the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, the
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, and the Director of the
FBI. The SCC's counterintelligence func-
tions shall include:
(a) Developing standards and doctrine
for the counterintelligence activities of
the United States;
(b) Resolving interagency differences
concerning implementation of counter-
intelligence policy;
196
66
Administration of Jimmy Carter, 1978 24
(c) Developing and monitoring Guide-
lines consistent with this Order for the
maintenance of rential records of coun-
terintelligence information;
(d) Submitting to the President an
overall annual assessment of the relative
threat to United States interests from in-
telligence and security services of foreign
powers and from international terrorist
activities, including an assessment of the
effectiveness of the United States counter-
intelligence activities; and
(e) Approving counterintelligence ac-
tivities which, under such standards as
may be established by the President, re-
quire SCC approval.
1-305. Required Membership. The
SCC shall discharge the responsibilities
assigned by sections 1-302 through 1-304
only after consideration in a meeting at
which all designated members are pres-
ent or, in unusual circumstances when
any such member is unavailable, when
a designated representative of the mem-
ber attends.
1-306. Additional Duties. The SCC
shall also:
(a) Conduct an annual review of on-
going special activities and sensitive na-
tional foreign intelligence collection oper-
ations and report thereon to the NSC;
and
(b) Cany out sucli other coordination
and review activities as the President may
direct.
1-307. Appeals. Any member of the
SCC may appeal any decision to the Pres-
ident or the NSC.
1-4. National Foreign Intelligence Board.
1-401. Establishment and Duties. There
is established a National Foreign Intelli-
gence Board (NFIB) to advise the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence concern-
ing:
(a) Production, review, and coordina-
tion of national foreign intelligence;
(b) The National Foreign Intelligence
Program budget;
(c) Interagency exchanges of foreign
intelligence information;
(d) Arrangements with foreign gov-
ernments on intelligence matters;
(r) The protection erf intelligence
sources and methods;
(f) Activities of common concern; and
(g) Other matters referred to it by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
1-402. Membership. The NFIB shall
be chaired by the Director of Central In-
telligence and shall include other ap-
propriate officers of the CIA, the Office
of the Director of Central Intelligence,
the Department of State, the Department
of Defense, the Department of Justice,
the Department of the Treasury, the De-
partment of Energy, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the offices within the De-
partment of Defense for reconnaissance
programs, the National Security Agency
and the FBI. A representative of the As-
sistant to the President for National Se-
curity Affairs may attend meetings of the
NFIB as an observer.
1-403. Restricted Membership and
Observers. Winn lhe Nl'lli meets for the
purpose of section 1-401 (a), it shall be
composed solely of the senior intelligence
officers of the designated agencies. The
senior intelligence officers of the Army,
Navy and Air Force may attend all meet-
ings of the NFIB as observers.
1-5. National Intelligence Tasking Cen-
ter.
1-501. Establishment. There is estab-
lished a National Intelligence Tasking
Center f NITC) under the direction, con-
trol and management of the Director of
Centra] Intelligence for coordinating and
tasking national foreign intelligence col-
lection activities. The NITC shall be
staffed jointly by civilian and military per-
sonnel including designated reprcsenta-
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tives of the chiefs of each of the Depart-
ment of Defense intelligence organizations
engaged in national foreign intelligence
activities. Other agencies within the In-
telligence Community may also designate
representatives.
1-502. Responsibilities. The NITC
shall be the central mechanism by which
the Director of Central Intelligence
:
(a) Translates national foreign intelli-
gence requirements and priorities de-
veloped by the PRC into s|)ecilic collec-
tion objectives and targets for the Intelli-
gence Community;
(b) Assigns targets and objectives to
national foreign intelligence collection
organizations and systems;
(c) Ensures the timely dissemination
and exploitation of data for national for-
eign intelligence purposes gathered by na-
tional foreign intelligence collection
means, and ensures the resulting intel-
ligence flow is routed immediately to rele-
vant components and commands;
(d) Provides advisory tasking concern-
ing collection of national foreign intelli-
gence to departments and agencies hav-
ing information collection capabilities or
intelligence assets that are not a part of the
National Foreign Intelligence Program.
Particular emphasis shall be placed on in-
creasing the contribution of departments
or agencies to the collection of informa-
tion through overt means.
1-503. Resolution of Conflicts. The
NITC shall have the authority to re-
solve conflicts of priority. Any PRC mem-
ber may appeal such a resolution to the
PRC; pending the PRC's decision, the
tasking remains in effect.
1-504. Transfer of Authority. All re-
sponsibilities and authorities of the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence concerning the
NITC shall be transferred to the Secre-
tary of Defense upon the express direction
of the President. To maintain readiness
for such transfer, the Secretary of De-
fense shall, with advance agreement of
the Director of Central Intelligence, as-
sume temporarily during regular practice
exercises all responsibilities and author-
ities of the Director of Central Intelligence
concerning the NITC.
1-6 The Director of Central Intelligence.
1-601. Duties. The Director of Central
Intelligence shall be responsible directly to
the NSC mid, in addition to the duties
specified elsewhere in this Order, shall
:
(a) Act as the primary adviser to the
President and the NSC on national for-
eign intelligence and provide the President
and other officials in the Executive Branch
with national foreign intelligence
;
(b) Be the head of the CIA and of such
staff elements as may be required for dis-
charge of the Director's Intelligence Com-
munity responsibilities
:
(c) Act, in appropriate consultation
with the departments and agencies, as
the Intelligence Community's principal
spokesperson to the Congress, the news
media and the public, and facilitate the
use of national foreign intelligence prod-
ucts by the Congress in a secure manner;
(d) Develop, consistent with the re-
quirements and priorities established by
the PRC, such objectives and guidance
for the Intelligence Community as will en-
hance capabilities for responding to ex-
pected future needs for national foreign
intelligence;
( e ) Promote the development and
maintenance of services of common con-
cern by designated foreign intelligence or-
ganizations on behalf of the Intelligence
Community;
(f) Ensure implementation of special
activities;
(g) Formulate policies concerning in-
telligence arrangements with foreign gov-
ernments, and coordinate intelligence re-
lationships between agencies of the Intel-
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ligence Community and the intelligence or
internal security services of foreign gov-
emments
;
(h) Conduct a program to protect
against overclassification of foreign intel-
ligence information
;
(i) Ensure the establishment by the
Intelligence Community of common se-
curity and access standards for managing
and handling foreign intelligence systems,
information and products
;
(j) Participate in the development of
procedures required to be approved by
the Attorney General governing the con-
duct of intelligence activities;
(k) Establish uniform criteria for the
determination of relative priorities for the
transmission of critical national foreign
intelligence, and advise the Secretary of
Defense concerning the communications
requirements of the Intelligence Commu-
nity for the transmission of such intelli-
gence;
(I) Provide appropriate intelligence to
departments and agencies not within the
Intelligence Community; and
(m) Establish appropriate commit-
tees or other advisory groups to assist in
the execution of the foregoing responsi-
bilities,
1-602. National Foreign Intelligence
Program Budget. The Director of Central
Intelligence shall, to the extent consistent
with applicable law, have full and exclu-
sive authority for approval of the Na-
tional Foreign Intelligence Program
budget submitted to the President. Pursu-
ant to this authority
:
(a) The Director of Central Intelli-
gence shall provide guidance for program
and budget development to program
managers and heads of component activ-
ities and to department and agency
heads
;
(b) The heads of departments and
agencies involved in the National Foreign
Intelligence Program shall ensure timely
development and submission to the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence of proposed
national programs and budgets in the for-
mat designated by the Director of Central
Intelligence, by the program managers
and heads of component activities, and
shall also ensure that the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence is provided, in a timely
and responsive manner, all information
necessary to perform the Director's pro-
gram and budget responsibilities;
(c) The Director of Central Intelli-
gence shall review and evaluate the na-
tional program and budget submissions
and, with the advice of the NFIB and the
departments and agencies concerned, de-
velop the consolidated National Foreign
Intelligence Program budget and present
it to the President through the Office of
Management and Budget;
(d) The Director of Central Intelli-
gence shall present and justify the Na-
tional Foreign Intelligence Program
budget to the Congress
;
(e) The heads of the departments and
agencies shall, in consultation with the
Director of Central Intelligence, establish
rales of obligation for appropriated
funds
;
(f) The Director of Central Intelli-
gence shall have full and exclusive au-
thority for ^-programming National For-
eign Intelligence Program funds, in ac-
cord with guidelines established by the
Office of Management and Budget, but
shall do so only after consultation with
the head of the department affected and
appropriate consultation with the Con-
gress;
(g) The departments and agencies
may appeal to the President decisions by
the Director of Central Intelligence on
budget or reprogramming matters of the
National Foreign Intelligence Program.
(h) The Director of Central Intelli-
gence shall monitor National Foreign In-
1 'J'J
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telligence Program implementation and
may conduct program and performance
audits and evaluations.
1-603. Responsibility For National For-
eign Intelligence. The Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence shall have full respon-
sibility for production and dissemination
of national foreign intelligence and have
authority to levy analytic tasks on de-
partmental intelligence production orga-
nizations, in consultation with those
organizations. In doing so, the Director
of Central Intelligence shall ensure that
diverse points of view are considered fully
and that differences of judgment within
the Intelligence Community are brought
to the attention of national policymakers.
1-604. Protection of Sources, Methods
and Procedures. The Director of Central
Intelligence shall ensure that programs
are developed which protect intelligence
sources, methods and analytical proce-
dures, provided that this responsibility
shall be limited within the United States
to:
(a) Using lawful means to protect
against disclosure by present or former
employees of the CIA or the Office of the
Director of Central Intelligence, or by-
persons or organizations presently or for-
merly under contract with such entities •
and
(b) Providing policy, guidance and
technical assistance to departments and
agencies regarding protection of intelli-
gence information, including information
that may reveal intelligence sources and
methods.
1-605. Responsibility of Executive
Branch Agencies. The heads of all Ex-
ecutive Branch departments and agen-
cies shall, in accordance with law and
relevant Attorney General procedures
give the Director of Central Intelligence
access to all information relevant to the
national intelligence needs of the United
200
States and shall give due consideration
to requests from the Director of Central
Intelligence for appropriate support for
CIA activities.
1-606. Access to CIA Intelligence. The
Director of Central Intelligence, shall, in
accordance with law and relevant Attor-
ney General procedures, give the heads
of the departments and agencies access
to all intelligence, developed by the CIA
or the stafT elements of the office of the
Director of Central Intelligence, relevant
to the national intelligence needs of the
departments and agencies.
1-7. .Wor Officials of the Intelligence
Community. The senior officials of each
of the agencies within the Intelligence
Community shall
:
1-701. Ensure that all activities of their
agencies are carried out in accordance
with applicable law;
1-702. Make use of the capabilities of
other agencies within the Intelligence
Community in order to achieve efficiency
and mutual assistance;
1-703. Contribute in their areas of re-
sponsibility to the national foreign intelli-
gence products
;
1-704. Establish internal policies and
guidelines governing employee conduct
and ensure that such are made known to
each employee;
1-705. Provide for strong, independent,
internal means to identify, inspect, and
report on unlawful or improper activity;
1-706. Report to the Attorney General
evidence of possible violations of federal
criminal law by an employee of their de-
partment or agency, and report to the
Attorney General evidence of possible
violations by any other person of those
federal criminal laws specified in guide-
lines adopted by the Attorney General;
1-707. In any case involving serious or
continuing breaches of security, recom-
mend to the Attorney General that the
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case be referred to the FBI for further
investigation
;
1-708. Furnish the Director of Central
Intelligence, the PRC and the SCO, in
accordance with applicable law and At-
torney General procedures, the informa-
tion required for the performance of their
respective duties;
1-709. Report to the Intelligence Over-
sight Board, and keep the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence appropriately informed,
concerning any intelligence activities of
their organizations which raise questions
of legality or propriety;
1-710. Protect intelligence and intelli-
gence sources and methods consistent with
guidance from the Director of Central
Intelligence and the NSC
;
1-711. Disseminate intelligence to co-
operating foreign governments under ar-
rangements established or agreed to by
the Director of Central Intelligence:
1-712. Execute programs to protect
against over-classification of foreign intel-
ligence
;
1-713. Instruct their employees to co-
operate fully with the Intelligence Over-
sight Board; and
1-714. Ensure that the Inspectors Gen-
eral and General Counsel of their agen-
cies have access to any information neces-
sary to perform their duties assigned by
this Order.
1-8. The Central Intelligence Agency.
All duties and responsibilities of the CIA
shall be related to the intelligence func-
tions set out below. As authorized by the
National Security Act of 1947, as
amended, the CIA Act of 1949, as
amended, and other laws, regulations and
directives, the CIA, under the direction
of the NSC, shall:
1-801. Collect foreign intelligence, in-
cluding hiformation not otherwise ob-
tainable, and develop, conduct, or provide
support for technical and other programs
which collect national foreign intelli-
gence. 'J 'he collection of information with-
in the United States shall be coordinated
with the FBI as required by procedures
agreed upon by the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Attorney General;
1-802. Produce and disseminate foreign
intelligence relating to the national secu-
rity, including foreign political, economic,
scientific, technical, military, geographic
and sociological intelligence to meet the
needs of the President, the NSC, and
other elements of the United States Gov-
ernment;
1-803. Collect, produce and dissemi-
nate intelligence on foreign aspects of
narcotics production and trafficking;
1-804. Conduct counterintelligence ac-
tivities outside the United States and co-
ordinate counterintelligence activities
conducted outside the United States by
other agencies within the Intelligence
Community:
1-803. Without assuming or perform-
ing any internal security functions,
conduct counterintelligence activities
within the United States, but only in
coordination with llie FBI and subject to
the approval of the Attorney General;
1-806. Produce and disseminate coun-
terintelligence studies and reports;
1-807. Coordinate the collection out-
side the United States of intelligence in-
formation not otherwise obtainable;
1-808. Conduct sj>ecial activities ap-
proved by the President and carry out
such activities consistent with applicable
law;
1-809. Conduct services of common
concern for the Intelligence Community
as directed by the NSC
;
1-810. Carry out or contract for re-
search, development and procurement of
technical systems and devices relating to
authori/rd fuiirtioris;
1-811. Protect the security of its in-
stallations, activities, information and
201
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personnel by appropriate means, includ-
ing such investigations of applicants, em-
ployees, contractors, and other persons
with similar associations with the CIA as
are necessary;
1-812. Conduct such administrative
and technical support activities within
and outside the United States as are nec-
essary to perform the functions described
in sections 1-801 through 1-811 above, in
eluding procurement and n!«cciiU.il cover
and proprietary arrangements;
1-813. Provide legal and legislative
services and other administrative sup-
port to the Office of the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence.
1-9. The Department of State. The Sec-
retary of State shall
:
1-901. Overtly collect foreign political,
sociological, economic, scientific, techni-
cal, political-military and associated bio-
graphic information;
1-902. Produce and disseminate for-
eign intelligence relating to United States
foreign policy as required for the execu-
tion of the Secretary's responsibilities:
1-903. Disseminate, as appropriate, re-
ports received from United States diplo-
matic and consular posts abroad;
1-904. Coordinate with the Director
of Central Intelligence to ensure that na-
tional foreign intelligence activities are
useful to and consistent with United
States foreign policy;
1-905. Transmit reporting require-
ments of the Intelligence Community to
the Chiefs of United States Missions
abroad; and
1-906. Support Chiefs of Mission in
discharging their statutory responsibilities
for direction and coordination of mission
activities.
1-10. The Department of the Treasury.
The Secretary of the Treasury shall
:
1—1001. Overtly collect foreign finan-
cial and monetary information
;
1-1002. Participate with the Depart-
ment of State in the overt collection of
general foreign economic Information;
1-1003. Produce and disseminate for-
eign intelligence relating to United States
economic policy as required for the execu-
tion of the Secretary's responsibilities;
and
1-1004. Conduct, through the United
States Secret Service, activities to deter-
mine the existeiue and capability <>f sur-
veillance equipment being used ;iguiusl
the President of the United States, the
Executive Office of the President, and, as
authorized by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury or the President, other Secret Serv-
ice protectees and United States offi-
cials. No information shall be acquired
intentionally through such activities ex-
cept to protect acrainst such surveillance,
and those activities shall be conducted
pursuant to procedures agreed upon by
the Secretary of the Treasury and the At-
torney General.
1-11. The Department of Defense. The
Secretary of Defense shall
:
1-1101. Collect national foreign intel-
ligence and be rcsnonsive to collection
tasking by the NITC ;
1-1102. Collect, produce and dissemi-
nate foreign military and military.reinted
intelligence information, including scien-
tific, technical, political, geographic and
economic information as required for
execution of the Secretary's responsibili-
ties :
1-1103. Conduct programs and mis-
sions necessary to fulfill national and tac-
tical foreign intelligence requirements;
1-1 104. Conduct counterintelligence
activities in support of Department of De-
fense components outside the United
States in coordination with the CIA. and
within the United States in coordination
with the FBI pursuant to procedures
agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense
202
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and the Attorney General, and produce
and disseminate counterintelligence stud-
ies and reports;
1-1105. Direct, operate, control and
provide fiscal management for the Na-
tional Security Agency and fnr defense
and militaiy intelligence ami national re-
connaissance entities;
1-1 106. Conduct, as the executive
agent of the United States ( Invet iinicnl,
signals intelligence and communications
security activities, except as othenvise di-
rected by the NSC;
1-1107. Provide for the timely trans-
mission of critieal intelligence, as defined
by the Director of Central Intelligence,
within the United States Government;
1-1108. Review budget data and in-
formation on Departmen t of Defense
programs within the National Foreign
Intelligence Program and review budgets
submitted by program managers to the
Director of Central Intelligence to ensure
the appropriate relationship of the Na-
tional Foreign Intelligence Program ele-
ments to the other elements of the
Defense program
;
1-1 109. Monitor, evaluate and conduct
performance audits of Department of
Defense intelligence programs;
1-1110. Cam' out or contract for re-
search, development and procurement of
technical systems and devices relating to
authorized intelligence functions;
1
— 1 111- Together with the Director of
Central Intelligence, ensure that there is
no unnecessary overlap between national
foreign intelligence programs and De-
partment of Drfen.se intelligence pro-
grams and provide the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence all information necessary
for this purpose
;
1-1 112. Protert the security of Depart-
ment of Defense installations, activities,
information and personnel by appro-
priate means including such investiga-
tions of applicants, employees, contrac-
tors and other persons with similar
associations with the Department of
1 )efense as are necessary ; and
1-1113. Conduct such administrative
and technical support activities within
and outside the United States as are neces-
sary to perforin the functions described in
sections 1-1 101 through 11112 above-.
1-12. Intelligence Components Utilized
by the Secretary of Defense. In carrying
out the responsibilities assigned in sections
1-1101 through 1-1113, the Secretary of
Defense is authorized to utilize the
following:
1-1201. Defense Intelligence Agency,
whose responsibilities shall include:
(a) Production or, through tasking and
coordination, provision of military and
military-related intelligence for the Sec-
retary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
other Defense components, and, as appro-
priate, non-Defense agencies
;
(b) Provision of military intelligence
for- national foreign intelligence products;
(c) Coordination of all Department of
Defense intelligence collection require-
ments for departmental needs;
(d) Management of the Defense
Attache system ; and
(e) Provision of foreign intelligence
and counter-intelligence staff support as
directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
1-1202. National Security Agency
(NSA) , whose responsibilities shall
include:
(a) Kstahltshineiit and operation of an
effective unified organization for signals
intelligence activities, except for the
delegation of operational control over
certain operations that arc conducted
through other elements of the Intelligence
Community. No other department or
203
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agency may engage in signals intelligence
activities except pursuant to a delegation
by the Secretary of Defense
;
( b ) Control of signals intelligence
collection and processing activities, in-
cluding assignment of resources to an
appropriate agent for such periods and
tasks as required for the direct support of
military commanders
;
(c) Collection of signa's intelligence
information for national foreign intel-
ligence purposes in accordance with task-
ing by the NITC;
(d) Processing of signals intelligence
data for national foreign intelligence pur-
poses consistent with standards for time-
liness established by the Director of
Central Intelligence;
(e) Dissemination of signals intel-
ligence information for national foreign
intelligence purposes to authorized ele-
ments of the Government, including the
military services, in accordance with
guidance from the NITC
;
(f) Collection, processing, and dis-
semination of signals intelligence in-
formation for counterintelligence pur-
poses;
(gl Provision of signals intelligence
support for the conduct of military
operations in accordance with tasking,
priorities and standards of timeliness
assigned bv the Secretary of Defense. If
provision of such support requires use of
national collection svstems, these svstems
will be tasked within existing guidance
from the Director of Central Intelligence
;
(h) Executing the responsibilities of
the Secretary of Defense as executive
agent for the communications security of
the United States Government;
fi) Conduct of research and develop-
ment to meet needs of the United States
for signals intelligence and communica-
tions security;
(j) Protection of the security of its
installations, activities, information and
personnel by appropriate means includ-
ing such investigations of applicants, em-
ployees, contractors and other persons
with similar associations with the NSA as
are necessary; and
(k) Prescribing, within its lield <>f
authorized operations, security regula-
tions covering operating practices, includ-
ing the transmission, handling and
distribution of signals intelligence and
communications security material within
and among the elements under control of
the Director of the NSA. and exercising
t 'c necessary supervisory control to
ensure compliance with the regulations.
1-1203. Offices for the collection of
specialized intelligence through recon-
naissance programs, whose responsibilities
shall include:
fa) Carrying out consolidated recon-
naissance programs for specialized intelli-
gence
;
fb) Responding to tasking tlnough the
NITC; and
(c) Delegating authority to the vari-
ous deportments and agencies for re-
search, development, procurement, and
operation of designated means of collec-
tion.
1-1204. The foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence elements of the mili-
tary services, whose responsibilities shall
include:
fa) Collection, production and dis-
semination of militarv-related foreign in-
telligence, including information on indi-
cations and warnings, foreign capabilities,
plans and weapons systems, scientific and
technical developments and narcotics
production and trafficking. When collec-
tion is conducted in response to national
20!
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foreign intelligence requirements, it will
be tasked by the NITC. Collection of na-
tional foreign intelligence, not otherwise
obtainable, outside the United States shall
be coordinated with the CIA, and such
collection within the United States shall
be coordinated with the I'll I
;
(b) Conduct of counterintelligence ac-
tivities outside the United States in co-
ordination with the CIA, and within the
United States in coordination with the
FBI, and production and dissemination
of counterintelligence studies or reports;
and
(c) Monitoring of the development,
procurement and management of tacti-
cal intelligence systems and equipment
nnd conducting related research, develop-
ment, and test and evaluation activities.
1-1205. Other offices within the De-
partment of Defense appropriate for con-
duct of the intelligence missions and re-
sponsibilities assigned to the Secretary- of
Defense. If such other ofhrcs arc used for
intelligence pur|x>ses, the provisions of
Sections 2-101 through 2-309 of this
Order shall apply to those offices when
used for those purposes,
1-13. The Department of Energy. The
Secretary of Energy shall
:
1-1301. Participate with the Depart-
ment of Stale in overtly collecting politi-
cal, economic and technical information
with respect to foreign energy matters;
1-1302. Produce and disseminate for-
eign intelligence necessary for the Secre-
tary's responsibilities
;
1-1303. Participate in formulating in-
telligence collection and analysis re-
quirements where the special expert ca-
pability of the Department can contrib-
ute
; and
1-1304. Provide expert technical, ana-
lytical and research capability to other
agencies within the Intelligence Com-
munity.
1-14. The Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, Under the supervision of the Attor-
ney General and pursuant to such regula-
tions as the Attorney General may estab-
lish, the Director of the FBI shall
:
1-1401. Within the United States con-
duct counterintelligence and coordinate
counterintelligence activities of other
agencies within the Intelligence Commu-
nity. When a counterintelligence activity
of the FBI invokes military or civilian
personnel of the Department of Defense,
the FBI shall coordinate with the De-
partment of Defense
;
1-1402. Conduct counterintelligence
activities outside the United States in co-
ordination with the CIA, subject to the
approval of the Director of Central In-
telligence;
1-1403. Conduct within the United
States, when requested by officials of the
Intelligence Community designated by
the President, lawful activities undertaken
to collect foreign intelligence: or support
foreign intelligence collection require-
ments of other agencies within the Intel-
ligence Community;
1—1404, Produce and disseminate for-
eign intelligence, counterintelligence and
counterintelligence studies and reports
;
and
1 1405. Carry out or contract for re-
search, development and procurement of
technical systems and devices relating to
the functions authorized above.
1-15. The Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion. Under the supervision of the Attor-
ney General and pursuant to such regula-
tions as the Attorney General may estab-
lish, the Administrator of DEA shall:
1-1501. Collect, produce and dissemi-
nate intelligence on the foreign and
domestic aspects of narcotics production
and trafficking in coordination with other
agencies with responsibilities in these
areas
;
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1-1502. Participate with the Depart-
ment of State in the overt collection of
general foreign political, economic and
agricultural information relating to nar-
cotics production and trafficking; and
1-1503. Coordinate with the Director of
Central Intelligence to ensure that the
foreign narcotics intelligence activities of
DEA are consistent with other foreign in-
telligence programs.
Sf.ction 2
restrictions on intelligence
activities
2- 1
. Adherence to Law.
2-101. Purpose. Information about the
capabilities, intentions and activities of
foreign powers, organizations, or per-
sons and their agents is essential to in-
formed decision-making in the areas of
national defense and foreign relations.
The measures employed to acquire such
information should be responsive to
legitimate governmental needs and must
be conducted in a manner that preserves
and respects established concepts of pri-
vacy and civil liberties.
2-102. Principles of Interpretation.
Sections 2-201 through 2-309 set forth
limitations which, in addition to other
applicable laws, are intended to achieve
the proper balance between protection of
individual rights and acquisition of essen-
tial information. Those sections do not
authorize any activity not authorized by
sections 1-101 through 1-1503 and do
not provide any exemption from any other
law.
2-2. Restrictions on Certain Collection
Techniques.
2-201. General Provisions.
(a) The activities described in Sections
2-202 through 2-208 shall be undertaken
only as permitted by this Order and by
procedures established by the head of the
agency concerned and approved by the
Attorney General. Those procedures shall
protect constitutional rights and privacy,
ensure that information is gathered by
the least intrusive means possible, and
M-nit use of such information to lawful
governmental purposes.
fb) Activities described in sections
2-202 through 2-205 for which a warrant
would be required if undertaken for law-
enforcement rather than intelligence pur-
poses shall not lw* undertaken a<j;iinsl a
United States person without a judicial
warrant, unless the President has author-
ized the type of activity involved and the
Attorney General has both approved the
particular activity and determined that
there is probable cause to believe that the
United States person is an agent of a
foreign power.
2-202. Electronic Surveillance. The
CIA may not engage in any electronic
surveillance within the United States. No
agency within the Intelligence Commu-
nity shall engage in any electronic sur-
veillance directed against a United States
person abroad or designed to intercept a
communication sent from, or intended for
receipt within, the United States except
as permitted by the procedures estab-
lished pursuant to section 2-201. Train-
ing of personnel by agencies in the Intelli-
gence Community in the use of electronic
communications equipment, testing by-
such agencies of such equipment, and the
use of measures to determine the exist-
ence and capability of electronic surveil-
lance equipment being used unlawfully
shall not be prohibited and shall also be
governed bv such procedures. Such ac-
tivities shall be limited in scope and dura-
tion to those necessary to carry out the
training, testing or countermeasures pur-
pose. No information derived from com-
munications intercepted in the course of
such training, testing or use of countcr-
206
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measures may be retained or used for any
other purpose.
2-203. Television Cameras and Other
Monitoring. No agency within the Intelli-
gence Community shall use any electronic
or mechanical device surreptitiously and
continuously to monitor any person with-
in the United States, or any United States
person abroad, except as permitted by the
procedures established pursuant to Sec-
tion 2-201.
2-204. Physical Searches, No agency
within the Intelligence Community except
the FBI may conduct any unconsented
physical searches within the United
States. All such searches conducted by die
FBI, as well as all such searches con-
ducted by any agency within the Intelli-
gence Community outside the United
States and directed against United States
persons, shall be undertaken only as per-
mitted by procedures established pursuant
to Section 2-201.
2-205 Mail Surveillance. No agency
within the Intelligence Community shall
open mail or examine envelopes in
United States postal channels, except in
accordance with applicable staiutrs and
regulations. No agency within the Intelli-
gence Community shall open mail of a
United States person abroad except as
permitted by procedures established pur-
suant to Section 2-201.
2-206. Physical Surveillance. The FBI
may conduct physical surveillance di-
rected against United States persons or
others only in the course of a lawful in-
vestigation. Other agencies within the In-
telligence Community may not undertake
any physical surveillance directed against
a United States person unless:
(a) The surveillance is conducted out-
side the United States and the person be-
ing surveilled is reasonably believed to be
acting on behalf of a foreign power, en-
gaging in international terrorist activities,
or engaging in narcotics production or
trafficking;
(b) The surveillance is conducted solely
for the purpose of identifying a person
who is in contact with someone who is
the subject of a foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence investigation; or
(c) That person is being surveilled for
the purpose of protecting foreign intelli-
gence and rounlei irilellifM'rire sources and
methods Iioiii iin;iiitli(iii/ctl disclosure or
is the subject of a lawful counterintelli-
gence, personnel, physical or communica-
tions security investigation.
(d) No surveillance under paragraph
(c) of this section may be conducted
within the United States unless the per-
son being surveilled is a present employee,
intelligence agency contractor or em-
ployee of such a contractor, or is a mili-
tary person employed by a non-intel-
ligence element of a military service. Out-
side the United States such surveillance
may also be conducted against a former
employee, intelligence agency contractor
or employee of a contractor or a civilian
person employed by a non-intelligence ele-
ment of an agency within the Intelligence
Community. A person who is in contact
with such a present or former employee
or contractor may also be surveilled, but
only to the extent necessary to identify that
person.
2-207. Undisclosed Participation in
Domestic Organizations. No employees
may join, or otherwise participate in, any
organization within the United States on
behalf of any agency within the Intelli-
gence Community without disclosing their
intelligence affiliation to appropriate of-
ficials of the organization, except as per-
mitted by procedures established pur-
suant to Section 2-201. Such prorcdures
shall provide for disclosure of such affilia-
tion in all cases unless the agency head or
207
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a designee approved by the Attorney Gen-
eral finds that non-disclosure is essential
to achieving lawful purposes, and that
finding is subject to review by the At-
torney General. Those procedures shall
further limit undisclosed participation to
cases where:
(a) The participation is undertaken on
behalf of the FBI in the course of a lawful
investigation;
{ b ) The organization concerned is com-
posed primarily of individuals who are not
United States persons and is reasonably
believed to be acting on behalf of a
foreign power; or
(c) The participation is strictly limited
in its nature, scope and duration to that
necessary for other lawful purposes re-
lating to foreign intelligence and is a type
of participation approved by the Attorney
General and set forth in a public docu-
ment. No such participation may be un-
dertaken for the purpose of influencing
the activity of the organization or its
members.
2-208. Collection of Nonpublicly Avail-
able Information. No agency within the
Intelligence Community may collect, dis-
seminate or store information concerning
the activities of United States persons that
is not available publicly, unless it does so
with their consent or as permitted by pro-
cedures established pursuant to Section
2-201. Those procedures shall limit col-
lection, storage or dissemination to the
following types of information
:
fa) Information concerning corpora-
tions or other commercial organizations
or activities that constitutes foreign in-
telligence or counterintelligence
;
fb) Information arising out of a law-
ful counterintelligence or personnel,
physical or communications security in-
vestigation;
(c) Information concerning present or
former employees, present or former intel-
ligence agency contractors or their pres-
ent or former employees, or applicants for
any such employment or contracting.
which is needed to protect foreign intel-
ligence or counterintelligence sources or
methods from unauthorized disclosure ;
(d) Information needed snlclv to iden-
tify individuals in contact with those per-
sons described in paragraph (c) of this
section or with someone who is the subject
of a lawful foreign intelligence or counter-
intelligence investigation
;
(e) Information concerning persons
who are reasonably believed to be poten-
tial sources or contacts, but only for the
purpose of determining the suitability or
credibility of such persons;
(f ) Information constituting foreign in-
telligence or counterintelligence gathered
abroad or from electronic surveillance
conducted in compliance with Section
2-202 or from cooperating sources in the
United States;
(g) Information about a person who is
reasonably believed to be acting on behalf
of a foreign power, engaging in interna-
tional terrorist activities or narcotics pro-
duction or trafficking, or endangering the
safety of a person protected by the United
States Secret Service or the Department
of State
;
(h) Information acquired by overhead
reconnaissance not directed at specific
United States persons;
(i) Information concerning United
States persons abroad that is obtained in
response to requests from the Department
of State for support of its consular re-
sponsibilities relating to the welfare of
those persons;
( j } Information collected, received, dis-
seminated or stored by the FBI and neces-
sary to fulfill its lawful investigative re-
sponsibilities; or
( k) Information concerning persons
or activities that pose a clear threat to any
facility or personnel of an agency within
'.vi-;
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the Intelligence Community. Such in-
formation may be retained only by the
agency threatened and, if appropriate,
by the United States Secret Service and
the FBI.
2-3. Additional Restrictions and Limita-
tions.
2-301. Tax Information. No agency
within the Intelligence Community shall
examine tax returns or tax information
except as permitted by applicable law.
2-302. Restrictions on Experimenta-
tion. No agency within the Intelligence
Community shall sponsor, contract for,
or conduct research on human subjects
except in accordance with guidelines is-
sued by the Department of Health. Edu-
cation and Welfare. The subject's in-
formed consent shall be documented as
required by those guidelines.
2-303. Restrictions on Contracting. No
agency within the Intelligence Commu-
nity shall enter into a contract or arrange-
ment for the provision of goods or serv-
ices with private companies or institutions
in the United States unless the agency
sponsorship is known to the appropriate
officials of the company or institution. In
the case of any company or institution
other than an academic institution, intel-
ligence agency sponsorship may be con-
cealed where it is determined, pursuant to
procedures approved by the Attorney
General, that such concealment is neces-
sary to maintain essential cover or pro-
prietary arrangements for authorized in-
telligence purposes.
2-304. Restrictions on Personnel As-
signed to Other Agencies. An employee
detailed to anotiier agency within the
federal government shall be responsible to
the host agency and shall not report to
the parent agency on the affairs of the
host agency unless so directed by the host
agency. The head of the host agency, and
any successor, shall be informed of the
employee's relationship with the parent
agency.
2-305. Prohibition on Assassination.
No person employed by or acting on be-
half of the United States Government
shall engage in, or conspire to engage in,
assassination.
2-306. Restrictions on Special Activi-
ties. No component of the United States
Government except an agency within the
Intelligence Community may conduct
any special activity. No such agency ex-
cept the CIA (or the military services in
wartime) rmy conduct any special ac-
tivit" unless the President determines, with
the SCC's advice, that another agency is
more likely to achieve a particular ob-
jective.
2-307. Restrictions on Indirect Partic-
ipation in Prohibited Activities. No agency
of the Intelligence Community shall re-
quest or otherwise encourage, directly or
indirectly, any person, organization, or
government agency to undertake activi-
ties forbidden by this Order or by appli-
cable law.
2-308. Restrictions on Assistance to
Law Enforcement Authorities. Agencies
within the Intelligence Community other
than the FBI shall not, except as ex-
pressly authorized by law:
(a) Provide services, equipment, per-
sonnel or facilities to the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration (or its
successor agencies) or to state or local
police organizations of the United States;
or
(b) Participate in or fund any law en-
forcement activity within the United
States.
2-309. Permissible Assistance to Law
Enforcement Authorities. The restric-
tions in Section 2-308 shall not preclude:
(a) Cooperation with appropriate law
enforcement agencies for the purpose of
protecting the jjcrsonnel and facilities of
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any agency within the Intelligence Com-
munity;
(b) Participation in law enforcement
activities, in accordance with law and this
Order, to investigate or prevent clandes-
tine intelligence activities by foreign
powers, international narcotics produc-
tion and trafficking, or international ter-
rorist activities; or
(c) Provision of specialized equipment,
technical knowledge, or assistance of ex-
pert personnel for use by any department
or agency or, when lives are endangered,
to support local law enforcement agencies.
Provision of assistance by expert person-
nel shall be governed by procedures ap-
proved by the Attorney General.
2-310. Permissible Dissemination and
Storage of Information. Nothing in Sec-
tions 2-201 through 2-309 of this Order
shall prohibit:
(a) Dissemination to appropriate law
enforcement agencies of information
which indicates involvement in activities
that may violate federal, stale, local or
foreign laws;
(b) Storage of information required by
law to be retained;
(c) Dissemination of information cov-
ered by Section 2-208 fa)-(j) to agencies
within the Intelligence Community or en-
tities of cooperating foreign governments;
or
(d) Lawful storage or dissemination of
information solely for administrative pur-
poses not related to intelligence or secu-
rity.
Section 3
oversight of intelligence
organizations
3-1. Intelligence Oversight Board.
3-101. Membership. The President's
Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) shall
function within the White House. The
IOB shall have three members who shall
be appointed by the President and who
shall be from outside the government and
be qualified on the basis of ability, knowl-
edge, diversity of background ami experi-
ence. No member shall have any personal
interest in any contractual relationship
with any agency within the Intelligence
Community. One member shall Ih- desig-
nated by the President as chairman.
3-102. Duties. The IOB shall
:
(a) Review periodically the practices
and procedures of the Imprrton; General
and General Counsel with responsibilities
for agencies within the Intelligence Com-
munity for discovering and reporting to
the IOB intelligence activities that raise
questions of legality or propriety, and con-
sider written and oral reports referred
under Section 3-201;
(b) Review periodically for adequacy
the internal guidelines of each agency
within the Intelligence Community con-
cerning the legality or propriety of intelli-
gence activities;
(c) Report periodically, at least quar-
terly, to the President on its findings; and
report in a timely manner to the Presi-
dent any intelligence activities that raise
serious questions of legality or propriety;
(d) Forward to the Attorney General,
in a timely manner, reports received con-
cerning intelligence activities in which a
question of legality has been raised or
which the IOB believes to involve ques-
tions of legality; and
(e) Conduct such investigations of the
intelligence activities of agencies within
the Intelligence Community as the Board
deems necessary to carry out its functions
under this Order.
3-103. Restriction on Staff. No person
who serves on the staff of the IOB shall
have any contractual or employment rela-
tionship with any agency within the In-
telligence Community.
3-2. Inspectors General and General
Counsel. Inspectors General and General
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Counsel with responsibility for agencies
within tiie Intelligence Community shall:
3-201. Transmit timely reports to the
10B concerning any intelligence activi-
ties that come to their attention and that
raise questions of legality or propriety;
3-202. I'rompiK rr|H>rt to the lOll ac-
tions taken concerning the Hoard's find-
ings on intelligence activities that raise
questions of legality or propriety;
3-203. Provide to the IOB information
requested concerning the legality or pro-
priety of intelligence activities within their
respective agencies;
3-204. Formulate practices and pro-
cedures for discovering and reporting to
the IOB intelligence activities that raise
questions of legality or propriety; and
3-205. Report to the IOB any occasion
on which the Inspectors General or Gen-
eral Counsel were directed not to report
any intelligence activity to the IOB which
they believed raised questions of legality
or propriety.
3-3. Attorney General. The Attorney
General shall:
3-301. Receive and consider reports
from agencies within the Intelligence
Community forwarded by the IOB;
3-302. Report to the President in a
timely fashion any intelligence activities
which raise questions of legality;
3-303. Report to the IOB and to the
President in a timely fashion decisions
made or actions taken in response to re-
ports from agencies within the Intelli-
gence Community forwarded to the At-
torney General by the IOB;
3-304. Inform the IOB of legal opin-
ions affecting the operations of the In-
telligence Community; and
3-305. Establish or approve procedures,
as required by this Order, for the con-
duct of intelligence activities. Such pro-
cedures shall ensure compliance with law,
protect constitutional rights and privacy,
and ensure that any intelligence activity
within the United States or directed
against any United States person is con-
ducted by the least intrusive means pos-
sible. The procedures shall also ensure
that any use, dissemination and storage of
information about United Stales persons
acquired through intelligence activities is
limited to that necessary to achieve lawful
governmental purposes.
3-4. Congressional Intelligence Commit-
tees. Under such procedures as the Presi-
dent may establish and consistent with
applicable authorities and duties, includ-
ing those conferred by the Constitution
upon the Executive and Legislative
Branches and by law to protect sources
and methods, the Director of Central In-
telligence and heads of departments and
agencies of the United States involved in
intelligence activities shall:
3-401. Keep the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the Senate fully
and currently informed concerning intel-
ligence activities, including any signifi-
cant anticipated activities which are the
responsibility of, or engaged in. by such
department or agency. This requirement
does not constitute a condition precedent
to the implementation of such intelligence
activities;
3-402. Provide any information or
document in the possession, custody, or
control of the department or agency or
person paid by such department or agency,
within the jurisdiction of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives or the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate,
upon the request of such committee; and
3 403. Report in a timely fashion to
tin* IVniianrnl Select < lommilU-e on In-
telligence of the 1 louse of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence
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of the Senate information relating to in-
telligence activities that arc illegal or im-
proper and corrective actions that are
taken or planned.
Section 4
ceneral provisions
4-1. Implementation
4-101. Except as provided in section
4-105 of this section, this Order shall
su|>crsede Executive Order 1 1905,
"United States Foreign Intelligence Ac-
tivities," dated February 18, 1976; Execu-
tive Order 11985, same subject, dated
May 13, 1977; and Executive Order
1 1994, same subject, dated June 1 1977.
4-102. The NSC, the Secretary of De-
fense, the Attorney General and the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence shall issue
such appropriate directives and proce-
dures as are necessary to implement this
Order.
4-103. Heads of agencies within the
Intelligence Community shall issue ap-
propriate supplementary directives and
procedures consistent with this Order.
4-104. The Attorney General shall have
sole authority to issue and revise pro-
cedures required by section 2-201 for the
activities of the FBI relating to foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence.
4- 1 05. Where intelligence activities
under "this Order are to be conducted pur-
suant to procedures approved or agreed to
by the Attorney General, those activities
may be conducted under terms and condi-
tions of Executive Order 11905 and any
procedures promulgated thereunder until
such Attorney General procedures are es-
tablished. Such Attorney General proce-
dures shall be established as expeditiously
as possible after the issuance of this Order.
4-106. In some instances, the docu-
ments that implement this Order will be
classified because of the sensitivity of the
information and its relation to national
security. All instructions contained in
classified documents will be consistent
with this Order. All procedures promul-
gated pursuant to this Order will be made
available to the Congressional intelligence
committees in accordance with Section
3-402.
4—107. Unless otherwise specified, the
provisions of this Order shall apply to ac-
tivities both within and outside the
United States, and all references to law
arc to applicable laws of the United
States, including the Constitution and this
Order. Nothing in this Order shall be
construed to apply to or interfere with
any authorized civil or criminal law en-
forcement responsibility of any depart-
ment or agency.
4-2. Definitions. For the purposes of this
Order, the following terms shall have
these meanings:
4-201. Communications security means
protective measures taken to deny unau-
thorized persons information derived
from telecommunications of the United
States Government related to national se-
curity and to ensure the authenticity of
such telecommunications.
4-202. Counterintelligence means in-
formation gathered and activities con-
ducted to protect against espionage and
other clandestine intelligence activities,
sabotage, international terrorist activities
or assassinations conducted for or on be-
half of foreign powers, organizations or
persons, but not including personnel, phy-
sical, document, or communications se-
curity programs.
4-203. Electronic Surveillance means
acquisition of a nonpublic communica-
tion by electronic means without the ron-
sent of a person who is a party to an elec-
tronic communication or, in the case of a
nonelectronic communication, without
the consent of a person who is visibly
present at the place of communication,
but not including the use of radio direc-
tion finding equipment solely to deter-
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mine the location of a transmitter.
4-204. Employee means a person cm-
ployed by, assigned to, or acting for an
agency within the Intelligence Commu-
nity.
4-205. Foreign Intelligence means in-
formation relating to the capabilities, in-
tentions and activities of foreign powers,
organizations or persons, but not includ-
ing counterintelligence except for infor-
mation on international terrorist activities.
4-206. Intelligence means foreign in-
telligence and counterintelligence.
4-207. Intelligence Community and
agency or agencies within the Intelligence
Community refer to the following organi-
zations :
(a) The Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA);
(b) The National Security Agency
(NSA)
;
(c) The Defense Intelligence Agency;
(d) The Offices within the Depart-
ment of Defense for the collcrtion of
specialized national foreign intelligence
through reconnaissance programs;
(e) The Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State;
(f) The intelligence elements of the
military services, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Department of
the Treasury, the Department of Energy,
and the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) ; and
(g) The staff elements of the Office of
the Director of Central Intelligence.
4-208. Intelligence product means the
estimates, memoranda and other reports
produced from the analysis of available
information.
4-209. International terrorist activities
means any activity or activities which :
(a) involves killing, causing serious
bodily harm, kidnapping, or violent de-
struction of property, or an attempt or
credible threat to commit such acts; and
(b) appears intended to endanger a
protectee of the Secret Service or the
Department of State or to further politi-
cal, social or economic goals by intimidat-
ing or coercing a civilian population or
any segment thereof, influencing the
policy of a government or international
organization by intimidation or coercion,
or obtaining widespread publicity for a
group or its cause ; and
(c) transcends national boundaries in
terms of the means by which it is accom-
plished, the civilian population, govern-
ment, or international organization it ap-
pears intended to coerce or intimidate, or
the locale in which its perpetrators oper-
ate or seek asylum.
4-210. The National Foreign Intelli-
gence Program includes the programs
listed below, but its composition shall be
subject to review by the National Security
Council and modification by the Presi-
dent.
(a) The programs of the CIA;
(b) The Consolidated Cryptologir
Program, the General Defense Intelli-
gence Program, and the programs of the
offices within the Department of Defense
for the collection of specialized national
foreign intelligence through reconnais-
sance except such elements as the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence and the Sec-
retary of Defense agree should be
excluded
;
(c) Other programs of agencies within
the Intelligence Community designated
jointly by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and the head of the department or
by the President as national foreign in-
telligence or counterintelligence activi-
ties;
(d) Activities of the stafT elements of
the Office of the Director of Central In-
telligence.
(e) Activities to acquire the intelli-
gence required for the planning and con-
duct of tactical operations by the United
States military forces are not included in
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the National Foreign Intelligence Pro-
gram.
4-211. Physical surveillance means an
unconsented, systematic and deliberate
observation of a person by any means on
a continuing basis, or unconsented ac-
quisition of a nonpublic communication
by a person not a party thereto or visibly
present thereat through any means not in-
volving electronic surveillance. This defi-
nition does not include overhead recon-
naissance not directed at specific United
States persons.
4-212. Special activities means activi-
ties conducted abroad in support of na-
tional foreign policy objectives which are
designed to further official United States
programs and policies abroad and which
are planned and executed so that the role
of the United States Government is not
apparent or acknowledged publicly, and
functions in support of such activities,
but not including diplomatic activity or
the collection and production of intelli-
gence or related support functions.
4-213. United States, when used to
describe a place, includes the territories of
the United States.
4-214. United States person means a
citizen or the United States, an alien law-
fully admitted for permanent residence,
an unincorporated association organized
in the United States or substantially com-
posed of United States citizens or aliens
admitted for permanent residence, or a
corporation incorporated in the United
States.
Jimmy Carter
The White House,
January 24, 1978.
[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register
11:12 a.m., January 25, 1978]
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United States Foreign
Intelligence Activities
Statement on Executive Order 12036.
January 24, 1978
I have issued today an Kxcriilivc order
concerning the organization and control
of United States foreign intelligence ac-
tivities. It is the product of the most ex-
tensive and highest level review ever con-
ducted through the National Security
Council system of our Nation's foreign in-
telligence activities and of an unprece-
dented dialog with the congressional over-
sight committees.
The new order, which builds on the ex-
perience under President Ford's Executive
Order 11905. is intended to provide a
foundation for the drafting of statutory
charters, and I intend to work closely
with congressional leaders to enact such
legislation. Until then, however, the new
order will:
—ensure that foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence activities are con-
ducted in full compliance with the
laws of the United States and are
consistent with broader national se-
curity policies:
—establish effective oversight of the
direction, innnngeuicnt. and conduct
of the foreign intelligence activities
of the Federal Government:
—clarify the authority and responsi-
bilities of the Director of Central In-
telligence (DCI1 and the depart-
ments and agencies that have foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence
responsibilities.
The most important features of the new
Executive order are as follows:
1. The National Security Council and
its two standing committees—the Special
Coordination Committee (SCC! and the
Policy Review Committee fPRC)—will,
short of the President, provide the high-
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est level review of and guidance for the
policies and practices of the Intelligence
Community.
—The PRC, when acting on intelli-
gence matters, will be chaired by the DCI
and is charged with defining and estab-
lishing priorities for consumer require-
ments for intelligence, making sure these
are reflected in budget decisions, and
evaluation of analytical products. This
ensures that the needs of the most im-
portant users of intelligence will guide the
entire intelligence process.
—The SCC, chaired by the Assistant to
the President for National Security Af-
fairs, will review and make recommenda-
tions to the President on the most sensitive
intelligence operations and, as appropri-
ate, on collection activities. This commit-
tee will also, for the first time, assume
responsibility for developing policy for
and coordination of all counterintelligence
activities.
2. The authorities and responsibilities of
all departments, agencies, and senior of-
ficials engaged in foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence activities arc being
made public. Those implementing direc-
tives which must remain classified for se-
curity reasons will be made available to
the appropriate congressional oversight
committees. The new order implements
my earlier decision to centralize under
the DCI the most important national in-
telligence management functions—collec-
tion requirements, budget control, and
analysis—while operational and support
activities are left unchanged and decen-
tralized.
The specific operational responsibilities
of each of the elements of the Intelligence
Community, as well as their most impor-
tant community relationships, are spelled
out. Two important organizational mech-
anisms are established to facilitate these
functions
:
—The National Intelligence Tasking
Center, operating in peacetime under the
control of the DCI or under the Secretary
of Defense when the President so directs,
will be responsible for coordinating and
tasking national foreign intelligence col-
lection programs.
—The National Foreign Intelligence
Board, which includes the members of the
Intelligence Community, is an advisory
lx»dy to the DCI on all national intelli-
gence activities and the budget.
3. Our intelligence agencies have a crit-
ical role to play in collecting and analyz-
ing information important to our national
security interests and, on occasion, acting
in direct support of major foreign policy
objectives. It is equally important, how-
ever, that the methods employed by these
agencies meet constitutional standards
protecting the privacy and civil liberties
of U.S. persons and are in full compliance
with the law.
To accomplish (his objective a major
section of the Executive order is devoted
entirely to setting forth detailed restric-
tions on intelligence collection, covert
activities in support of foreign policy
objectives, experimentation, contracting,
assistance to law enforcement authorities,
personnel assigned to other agencies, indi-
rect participation in prohibited activities,
dissemination and storage of information,
and a prohibition on assassinations. The
FBI's intelligence activities no longer have
a blanket exception to these restrictions.
At the heart of the restriction process
is a greatly enhanced role for the Attorney-
General, as the Nation's top legaJ officer,
to establish and approve procedures to
regulate the conduct of the most sensi-
tive intelligence activities. These detailed
procedures, which will be made available
to the congressional oversight committees,
will ensure compliance with the law, pro-
tect constitutional rights and privacy, and
ensure that any intelligence activity with-
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in the United States or directed against
Americans will employ the least intrusive
means possible and that the use, dissemi-
nation, and storage of such information
is limited to that necessary to achieve
lawful governmental purposes.
4. As an added protection against
abuses and to help ensure effective per-
formance, the intelligence oversight proc-
ess is strengthened.
—The Intelligence Oversight Board is
retained, and its responsibilities for review
of foreign intelligence activities that may
be illegal or improper is extended to the
counterintelligence area, and it is given
new authority to conduct investigations.
—The DCI and senior officers of the
Intelligence Community are instructed to
report to the congressional intelligence
committees in a complete and prompt
manner.
I believe that this Executive order rep-
resents an important step forward in as-
suring the American people that their
intelligence agencies will be working
effectively for them and not infringing on
their legal rights. The next step will be
to establish these authorities and restric-
tions in legislation binding on this and
future administrations.
President's Committee on
Employment of the Handicapped
Appointment of Charles H. Pillard as Vice
Chairman. January 24, 1978
The President today announced the ap-
pointment of Charles H. Pillard as Vice
Chairman of the President's Committee
on Employment of the Handicapped.
Pillard, 59, has been international
president of the International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers since 1968.
From 1952 to 1968, he was business man-
ager of Local Union 41.
International North Pacific
Fisheries Commission
Appointment of Dennis A. Grotting as
Commissioner of the United States Section.
January 24, 1978
The President todav announced the re-
appointment of Dennis A. Grotting as
Commissioner of the United States Sec-
tion of the International North Pacific
Fisheries Commission.
Grotting, 36, has served on the Com-
mission since 1975. He is secretary-man-
ager of the Fisherman's Marketing Asso-
ciation in Eureka, Calif.
Federal Prevailing Rate Advisory
Committee
Message to the Congress Transmitting the
Annual Report. January 24, 1978
To the Congress of the United States:
In accordance with section 5347(e) of
title 5 of the United States Code, I hereby
transmit to you the 1976 Annual Report
of the Federal Prevailing Rate Advisory
Committee.
While not specifically addressed in the
attached report, I want to express my con-
cern that little progress appears to have
been made in reforming the prevailing
rate system for adjusting wages of Federal
blue collar employees. In my February 22,
1977 message to the Congress, I strongly
recommended early enactment of legisla-
tion to correct those provisions of current
law that cause significant departures from
the local prevailing rate principle, and
result in an unfair competitive advantage
for the Federal Government and unjusti-
fiable payroll costs. A draft bill which
would achieve these objectives was sub-
mitted to the Congress early last year. I
am convinced that this bill will correct the
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Slates Marino tiir|H in WtVOJu and :ill:nnr,i
Ihe rank of captain. Mr. Ilorchcrdt graduated
from Stanford University (A.B., 19"i3; M.H.A
.
1957) lie is married, has two children, and
ri-:irl."! in l.ns Aiiei-Ios. Calll lie >« Imrn lnK
12. 19)11. iii Mulli'. Mont.
Bernard & Smith, Jr., is it partner wit 1 1 the linn
of Lawrence O'Donnell & Co of New York,
NT Previously, lie was a partner with the firm
Laskor. Stone and Stern in 1967-78 mid a part-
ner with l.aMorlo Mnliinci c< ( :,, in |"|r,(| Ii7
lie served ill the United Slales Navy .mil N.onl
Hescrve as assistant navigator and aide In e\.
cctllive officer. U.S.S Midway, lie graduated
from the United States Naval Academy (U.S.,
E.E., 1946) lie is married, has 1 1 children, and
resides in New York. N Y lie was horn Decem-
ber 20, 1924. in New York City.
United States Air Force Academy
Appointment of Ttvo Mem/iers of the Hoard
of Visitors. iferTinhrr I. IDS I
The President today [miitninectl his inten-
tion to appoint the following individuals to
be members of the Board of Visitors, United
States Air Force Academy:
Terrence O'Donnell is an attorney with the linn
of Williams & Connolly. Washington. DC. lie
was staff assistant anil inter Special Assistant to
the President in 1972-77 and was a commis-
sioned officer in the United Stales Air Tone in
1966-72. lie was a lend oirieer. Ollice of tile
Judge Advocate General, in 1971-72. lie was a
counter-intelligence ollicer in South Vietnam
in 1969-70 and assigned to Headquarters
USA!*, Washington, DC, in 1966-69. lie at-
tained Hie rank of Captain Mr (JDonnell
graduated from the United Slates Air Force
Academy (IIS. 1966) and Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center (J D. 1971) lie is married has
three children, and resides in llelliesrla, M,l
lie was born March 1. 1911. In New Yuik. N 1
Henry U. Smjler is chairman ol ll,e llepuhlieau
Party of Florida. He was a member of the Flor-
ida State Senate in I966-7N and is director ol
Ihe Community Bank of Pinellas. Ih- seised in
the United Slales Air l-'oicc in Uflil-.Ti as a
fighter pilot in the Sth Air force, lie was
awarded the Distinguished Thing Cross and
the Air Medal with 7 Clusters, lie graduated
I'riiin the United Slates Milium Academy Ills
I'M't) s m; ,1. has -|„| „. ,„„|'
resides in .SI Petersburg, Ma. Me was born Jan-
uary 16. 1921, in Savannah. Ga.
United Slales Intelligence Activities
Statement htj the President,
thrrmher I. I<IHI
Today I am issuing two Executive orders,
one to govern the activities of our intelli-
gence agencies and one to reestablish the
IlllcllilBtiCc Oveisiglll Hoard, which works
In ensure Ihal inn tiilellip.i-iiei- activities un-
law lul Those orders an- designed lo pro-
vide America's intelligence community with
clearer, more positive guidance and to
remove the aura of suspicion and mistrust
that can hobble our Nation's intelligence ef-
lorts.
This action is consistent with my promise
in the campaign to revitalize America's in-
telligence system. The American people are
well aware that Ihe security ol their coun-
try—and in an age of terrorism, their per-
sonal safety as well—is tied to the strength
and ellieieney of our inlelligonco-galhering
Ol iMIli/ulHillS
These orders have I ll eilleltlH} diall-
ed—in consultation with the intelligence
committees of both Houses of the Con-
gress
—|o maintain Ihe legal protection of
all American cili/ous, I hey also give our
intelligence professionals clear guidelines
within which to do their difficult and essen-
tial job. Contrary to a distorted image that
emerged during Ihe last decade, Ihere is no
inhcrenl conllict between the intelligence
community and Ihe rights of our citizens.
Indeed, the purpose of the intelligence
community is the protection of our people.
This is nul lo say mistakes were never
made and thai vigilance against abuse is
unnecessary. But an approach that empha-
sizes suspicion and mistrust of our own in-
telligence efforts eao undermine Ibis
Nation's ability lo eonlionl il„- increasing
challenge ol espionage and terrorism This
is particularly (rue in a world in which our
adversaries pay no heed lo the concerns for
individual lighls mid Inedoms lhal are so
Important lo Americans anil their Covern-
inent. As we move into Ihe HMD's, we need
to Irce ourselves from the negative atti-
tudes ol Ihe pasl and look lo nicotine Ihe
needs,, I ||„- , v
I" ll.ose who slew llus change ol direc-
lion uilh suspicion, lei me assure you that
8?
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Most Americans realize that intelligence
OVCIM '' ls
""<' l0 ll ''-' 1 "ilh certain foreign
is a good and necessary profession to which ft',."?,' "
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high Caliber men and women chllk-ille th.ir hlkl
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ical advances, the gathering of information sct
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ism of those who serve us in the intelli- among the CIA. the PHI, and other alien-gonoe community, cies of the intelligenee oomtnuuilv as theLet us never lorget that good intelligence seek In deal uilli luud ,.„tal challenges tosaves American lives and protects our free- our natiunal seem itv—t lull, ners thai ,,.
Horn. | he loyalty and selflessness of our in- sped neither natiunal boundaries nor oil,"telligence community during hard times are leiuhip
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These orders charge our intelligence
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timely information—information essential " , ruslt,t
'm
'
•'"-' proloundly grateful
for the conduct of our foreign police and "" lhe} do
crucial to our national safely. The ooimtrv
needs this service and is willing to allocate
the resources necessary to do the job right
It is not enough, of course, simply to col- United Stales Intelligenee Activitiesled information. Thoughtful analysis is vital __
to sound decisionmaking. The goal of our Kxevulire Uulr, 12333 Dn,,„hrr J IWIintelligence analysts can be nothing short of
the truth, even when that truth is unpleas-
ant or unpopular. I have asked for honest
, , , ,
objective analysis, and I shall expect imth-
'»We«fC tents
nig less. When there is disagreement, as
there often Is, on the dlflicult questions of „ ''"'"'
our tune, I expect those honest differences |>„, , ""," ,', ''«"
of view to be fully expressed. ",' »"'<'"" ««"<, «ml hit
These orders stipulate that special at.eu- tTtT/flr'Z, "V', , '/,"
I «" he given |„ denoting and countering JZVhZ,
the espionage and other threats that are I I Coals
directed by hostile intelligence services
against us at home and abroad. These hos- ' /„/,„„,„/ „„„,. rhr ,„„.,. ,„,
and ri^hts'ofK Ii:r;he'e"order:'p;o- I^^Z.lZ' """" ""'""*'"' "' " '"
;jjr
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'"" nil' by Hie diminution awl statutes nl the
1.2 'riu- National Security Council ... 1 117 United Stales of America, including the Na-
1.3 National Kim'ian Intelligence 133,1 tiunnl Security Act of IB47. as amended.
Advisors Croups anil as President of Ihe United Slalrs nl
1.1 I'll.' tnl.-lliivii.T Cxi. Iv MIS'
.\iii.-i i.-ii. ill mile, vide In- i-ll.i-
1.5 Miicctoi ..I Cciilnil lull III- I.I.IS live moduli nl United Sillies intelligence
Ei'iicc. activities ami the protection of constltllliotl-
1.6 Dunes and Itcspnmiliililics nl 13411
,,| rights, ii is hereby ordered as follows:
the Heads III KlRldhr
branch l)c|,ailu,enls and hl,l I Cnh. DmctifU. lhttil-. Hlltl
1.7 ScmiirTl'luViiiN ,,l ,he In.elli. 1.1-1,1
''"< ''?<"" »"'< 'W-' '" "«
ut. llc( . ;;„ lB,||, Nalitmul hlMlmrmr liffnrl
1.8 The Central intelligence 134,1 |.| C,mls The United Slates intelligence
Agency r|nr | 5|,„|] .,rm j,|( , |)„. President and the
1.9 The Department ul Stale I III NllU„„a| Slturll} Ulllllcil with tile neees-
l.llj 1 lie Department of the 1 reas- 1341 . . . ' . . . , . . . .
saiy mini malum on which tn base decisions
111 The lienor nt of Defense 1311 concerning the conduct and development
1.12 Inlclliiicmr Components t'li- In; "I foreign, defense and itonoinic policy,
lizoil hy die s, ( ii'i.ni nl IV- and the protection nl Untied Stairs national
feme. interests limn foreign wciirity threats. All
1.13 The Department of Ijutrv 111! departments and agencies shall cooperate
1.14 The Federal bureau of Invest!- 1343 | u |j v to fulfill tills goal.
ealinn
I',irl2. C„„,l„rl„l lul,ll„:r,„,.\,l„,- I II I l; " Mmilllimi einpllasis si Id lie Riven In
,„, l"-.li ling aualv Ileal t petition mil! tip.
2 1 Need I 111 pi npi mte elements nl the Intelligence ( ami-
2.2 Purixrse I 111 munily.
2:5 Gnllcc i of Information lilt flu All moans, consislenl vv ilh applicable
24 '' clinii l.-cli„„|,i.-s in, itnii,.,! states law mid tliii (hiler. and nitli
2 5 Attorney Cclli-tal Appuivit 1111
, n . ... - ., . . . ., .
._..,' ,
i 1-, ,,,.- I"ll cmisideralimi nl the | mills nl United2.6 Assist.mi.- 111 I.an I'lllnrce- I 11.1 ...
, i n i i . i i
III .»„||inrnj.. s Males persnns. shall be used tn rlevelnp 111-
27 Centraitiim /;/'. lellieenee information Im lite I'residenl and
25 t:.,i,Msi,.|„-s Will, III avw III,, I he N. ill S.-1'lliilv t: il \ tinlniieid
2.1) Undisclosed I'.iilii ip.ilmn in I lilt appionell between technical colled inn el
Organizationi; Within the huts and other means should be maintained
United States and encouraged.
2ln Unman Kxix-rimenlalinn 1 1 ir, c . . , . . ...
2.11 IT hilinu Us.-mini.tloi, / JVn .
< P1 ^l"*"*1 l
1
-
'"" 1
"
'
,
"' " ",'
2.12 Indirect Pa, licipal,.,., Ill', '•"•K'eti'lU •""! emmleiing |-i Iltl«c and
Pnrt.1. r.'.„c™//',,„„i,„iv 13,6 oilier llirouls Wld Ittlivillos directed hy lor-
3.1 Congressional Ovcrsichl 13m eign intelligence services acainsl the United
3.2 Implementation 1346 States Government, or United States corpo-
3 3 Prneednrcs / 116 rations, establishments, or persons
3 1 Definitions 1117
3.5 Purpose ami Klleet I IIS
3.6 ".evocation 134,1
till In Ihe greatest evli'lil pnssibli- consist-
ent vvilh applicable Ullllill Stales lau and
this Order, and with lull consideration of
the rights nl Uniled Stales persons, all aeen-
"liimTs and accurate in latinll il I lies anil ilepailiueiils should seek to cosine
Ihe activities, capabilities, plans, and inlen bill and bee i-H.-lin.IIKC nl inhumation in
lions of foreign powers, organizations, and order In derive maximum benelit from Ihe
persons, and their agents, is essential to the United Slates intelligence effort.
national security of Ihe Uniled Stales All 1.2 The h'alnnial Serurilli Ciiunril
rellSl hie and lanlnl means lulls! be used nil /'l/r/UMf Ihe FsJ nl Sri-milt t Inilll
lo ensure that the Uniled Stales will iceeise
, il l\SO was established In Ihe National
Ihe best Intelligence available I 'or that pin- Seem it v Act nl lb 17 In advise i he President
pose, by virtue ol Ihe authority vested m with respect in the integration of domestic,
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foreign and military policies relating to the
national security. The NSC shall act as tlic
highest Executive Branch entity that pro-
vides review of, guidance Tor and direction
to the conduct of all national foreign intelli-
gence, counterintelligence, and special ac-
tivities, and attendant policies and pro-
grams.
(b) Committees. The NSC shall establish
such committees as may be necessary to
curry mil its [unctions and responsibilities
under this Order. The NSC, or u committee
established by it, shall consider and submit
to the President a policy recommendation,
including all dissents, on each special activi-
ty and shall review proposals for other sen-
sitive intelligence operations.
1.3 National Foreign Intelligence Adviso-
ry Croups.
(a) Establishment and Duties. The Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence shall establish
such boards, councils, or groups as required
lor the purpose of obtaining advice from
within the Intelligence Community con-
cerning:
(1) Production, review and coordination
of national foreign intelligence:
(2) Priorities for the National Foreign In-
telligence Program budget;
(3) Interagency exchanges of foreign in-
telligence information:
(4) Arrangements with foreign govern-
ments on intelligence matters;
(5) Protection of intelligence sources and
methods;
(0) Activities of common concern; and
(7) Such other matters as may be referred
by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(b) Membership. Advisory groups estab-
lished pursuant to this section shall be
chaired by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence or his designated representative and
shall consist of senior representatives from
organizations within the Intelligence Com-
munity and Irom departments or agencies
containing such organizations, as designated
by the Director of Central Intelligence
Groups for consideration of substantive in-
telligence matters will Include representa-
tives of organizations involved in the collec-
tion, processing and analysis of intelligence.
A senior representative of the Secretary of
Commerce, the Attorney General, the
Assistant to the President lor National Secu-
rity Affairs, and the Ulfice of the Secretary
of Delense shall be invited to participate in
any group which deals with other than sub-
stantive intelligence matters,
\A The Intelligence Community. The
agencies within the Intelligence Communi-
ty shall, in accordance with applicable
United States law and with the other provi-
sions of this Order, conduct intelligence ac-
tivities necessary for the conduct of foreign
relations and lb.- pioleelion nl the nnUimsil
seeuritj "I the United States, including:
(a) Collection of information needed by
the President, the National Security Coun-
cil, the Secretaries of State and Defence,
and other Kxeculive branch officials lor the
performance of their duties and responsibil-
ities;
(b) Production and dissemination of intel-
ligence;
(e) Collection of inhumation concerning,
and the conduct of activities to protect
against, intelligence activities directed
against the United States, international ter-
rorist and international nnreolics activities,
mid oih.-i hostile activities directed against
the United States by foreign powers, organi-
zations, persons, and their agents;
(d) Special activities;
(e) Administrative and support activities
within the United States and abroad neces-
sary lor the performance of authorized ac-
tivities: and
(f) Such other intelligence activities as the
President may direct bom lime to time.
1.5 Director of Central Intelligence. In
order to discharge the duties and responsi-
bilities prescribed bv law. the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be re^mnsihle tli-
recllv to the President and the NSC and
shall:
(a) Act as the priman advisor to the
President and the NSC on national foreign
j„l,. ||j, .,.,,(< and piovide the Piesid.-ril and
other ollinaU in Hie Kxceulive Uramh with
national foreign intelligence:
(b) Develop such objectives and guidance
[or the Intelligence Community as will en-
hance capabilities lot responding to expect-
ed luture needs for national loreign intelli-
gence:
Ic) Promote the development and uiainte-
iiiuiff ol services ol niiiiiniili eoneeiu by
designated intelligence organizations on
behalf of the Intelligence Community:
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(d) Ensure implementation of special ac-
tivities;
(e) Formulate policies concerning foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence ar-
rangements with foreign governments, co-
ordinate foreign intelligence and counterin-
telligence relationships between agencies nl
tlie Intelligence Community and the intelli-
gence or internal security services of for-
eign governments, and establish procedures
governing the i-nuduel "I liaison by am dc
parlmcnt or agency with isueli sen ices on
narcotics activities;
(0 Participate in the development of pro-
cedures approved Ijy the Attorney Ceneral
governing criminal narcotics intelligence
activities abroad to ensure that these activi-
ties are consistent with foreign intelligence
programs;
(g) leisure the establishment hy the Intel-
ligence Community of common security
and access standards for managing and han-
dling foreign intelligence systems, informa-
tion, and products;
(li) Kimirr that programs are de\elnped
which protect intelligence sources, meth-
ods, and analytical procedures;
(i) Establish uniform criteria for the deter-
mination of relative priorities for (he trans-
mission of critical national foreign intelli-
gence, and advise the Secretary of Defense
concerning the communications require-
ments of the Intelligenee Community for
the transmission of such intelligence;
(j) Establish appropriate stalls, commit-
tees, or other advisory groups to assist in
the execution of the Director's responsibil-
ities;
(k) Have lull responsibility lor production
and dissemination of national foreign intelli-
gence, and authority to levy analytic tasks
on departmental intelligence production or-
ganizations, in consultation with those orga-
nizations, ensuring that appropriate mecha-
nisms for competitive analysis are devel-
oped so that diverse points of view are con-
sidered fully and differences of judgment
within the Intelligence Community are
brought to the attention ol national policy-
makers;
(I) Ensure the timely exploitation and dis-
semination of dala gathered hy national for-
eign intelligence collection means, and
ensure that the resulting intelligence is dis-
seminated Immediately to appropriate gov-
ernment entities and military commands;
(m) Establish mechanisms which translate
national foreign intelligence objectives and
priorities approved by I he NSC into specific
guidance for the Intelligence Community,
resolve conflicts in tasking priority, provide
to deportments and agencies having infor-
mation collodion capabilities that are not
p:nl ol Hie National Ionic. elligeuc,-
I'loe.iain advisoiv tasking fimeel iiiin; collec
lion ol national foreign intelligence, and
provide for the development of plans and
arrangements for transfer of required col-
lection tasking authority In the Secretary of
Defense when directed by the President;
(n) Develop, with the advice of the pro-
gram managers and departments and agen-
cies concerned, the consolidated National
I'oreigu Intelligence Program budget, and
present it to the President and the Con-
gress;
(o) Hevievv and approve all requests for
topi og, at inning National Koreign Intelli-
gence Program funds, in accordance with
guidelines established by the (Jllicc of Man-
agement and Budget;
(pi Mnniloi National Koreign Intelligence
Piogiatn implementation, and. as necessary,
conduct program and pcrlormance audits
and evaluations;
(q) Together with the- Secretary of IV-
leuso, ensure thai [here is no unnecessary
overlap between national foreign intelli-
gence programs and Department of De-
fense intelligence programs consistent with
the requirement lo develop competitive
analysis, and provide to and obtain from the
Secretary of Defense all information neces-
sary for this purpose;
(r) In accordance with law and relevant
procedures appimed by I fie Attorney Cru-
cial under this Order, give the heads of the
departments and agencies access to all in-
telligence, developed by the CIA or the
staff elements of the Director ol Central
Intelligence, i.l.vanl to the national intelli-
gence needs ol the departments and agen-
cies; and
(S) Earililale Iho use of national foreign
iulelligetice pi im It lets by Congi ess in a
secure manner.
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l.fi Duties and HesfMtnsfbititics of the
Heads of Kxcculiec llrimeh Dcfiartincnts
arid Agencies.
(a) The heads of all Executive Branch de-
partments and agencies shall, in accordance
with law and relevant procedures approved
by llie Attorney General under this (Jriler,
Hive die Director of Central Intelligence
access to all information relevant to the na-
tional intelligence needs of die United
Stall's, and shall Rise doe consideration lo
requests Ik. in the Director ol Central Intel-
ligence lor appropriate support for Intelli-
gence Community activities.
lb) The heads of departments and agen-
cies Involved in the National foreign Intel-
ligence Program shall ensure timely devel-
opment and submission to the Director of
Central Intelligence by the program man-
agers and heads of component activities of
proposed national programs and budgets in
the format designated by the Director of
Central Intelligence, and shall also ensure
that the Director of Central Intelligence is
provided, in a timely and responsive
manner, all information necessary lo per-
form die Director's program and budget re-
sponsibilities.
(c) The heads of departments and agen-
cies involved in Iho National foreign Intel-
ligence Program mas appeal to lire Presi-
dent decisions by Ihe Director of Central
Intelligence on budget or reprogramrning
mailers of die National I'oreign Intelligence
Program.
1.7 Senior Officials of the Intellincnce
Gnnmunitu. The heads of departments and
agencies with organizations in the Intelli-
gence Community or Ihe heads of such or-
ganizations, as appropriate, shall:
(a) Deport lo Ihe Attorney General possi-
ble violations of federal criminal laws by
employees and of specified federal criminal
laws by any oilier person as provided in
procedures agreed upon by Ihe Attorney
General and Ihe head of the department or
agency concerned, in a manner consistent
with Ihe protection of intelligence sources
and methods, as specified in those proce-
dures;
(b) in any case involving serious or con-
tinuing breaches of security, recommend lo
Ihe Attorney General thai die ease I
lei red lo Ihe fill lor further investigation;
(el furnish ihe Direelm ol Central Intelli-
gence and die NSC. in accordance with ap-
plicable law and procedures approved by
Ihe Attorney General under this Order, the
information required for the performance
ol their respective duties;
(d) Deport lo ihe Intelligence (hcisighl
Hoard, and keep [lie Director ol Central
Intelligence appropriately informed, con-
cerning any iuh'llij'cnec aetisilies nl llieii
organization*. Ihal I In s have loasou !<• In-
tievo may be unlawful 01 coutian lo KsccU-
tive order or Presidential directive;
le) Protect intelligence and intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized dis-
closure consistent with guidance Irotn Ihe
Director of Central Intelligence:
(0 Disseminate intelligence to cooperat-
ing foreign governments under arrange-
ments established or agieed lo In Ihe Di-
rector of Central Intelligence:
(gl Participate in Ihe development of pro-
cedures approved by the Attorney General
governing production and dissemination of
intelligence resulting from eiii I iiaicnt-
ics intelligence activities abroad if their de-
partments, agencies, or organizations have
intelligence responsibilities lor foreign or
domestic narcotics production and Irallick-
lug;
(hi Instruct then r loco, to c.ioporalo
lulls with Ihe Intelligence Oversight Hoard
and
(il fiisuir Ihal lire Inspe s General and
General C isels lor thru organizations
base access to any information nccessar; lo
peril their duties assigned by Ibis Order.
1.8 '/'lie Central lnlelhueme Annul/. All
duties and responsibilities ol ihe CIA shall
be related lo the intelligence functions set
out below. As authorized by this Order; Ihe
Nalional Security Act of 19-17. as amended:
the CIA Act of 194(1. as amended; appropri-
ate directives or other applicable law, Ihe
CIA shall:
(a) Collect, produce and disseminate lor-
eign intelligence and counterintelligence,
including information not nllicrwi.se obtain-
able Ihe collection ol Inreigu intelligence
or counterintelligence within Ihe United
Slates shall be coordinated with Ihe Fill as
required by procedures :ht,,.,.,I upon In- Ihe
" I I Ceulial Intelligence and Ihe Al-
io, uev General;
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fb) Collect, produce and disseminate in-
telligence on foreign aspects of narcotics
production and trafficking;
(c) Conduct counterintelligence activities
outside Hie United Stales and, wilfiotit :is-
suming or performing any interna! security
functions, conduct counterintelligence ac-
tivities within the United States in coordina-
tion with the FBI :is required bv procedures
agreed upon by the Direct 01 ol Central In-
telligence and the Attorney General;
(d) Coordinate counterintelligence activi-
tics and the collection of information not
otherwise obtainable when conducted out-
side the United Slates by other departments
and agencies;
(e) Conduct special activities approved bv
the President No agency except the CIA
(or the Armed Forces ol' the United Slates
in lime of war declared by Congress or
during any period covered by a report from
the President to the Congress under the
War Powers Resolution {H7 Stat 855)J may
conduct any special activity unless Ihe
President determines that another agency is
more likely to achieve a particular objec-
tive;
(0 Conduct services ol common concern
for the Intelligence Community as diiecled
by the NSC;
(g) Carry out or contract for research, de-
velopment and procurement of technical
systems and devices relating |o atllhoi i/eil
functions;
(h) Protect the security of its installations,
activities, information, property, and em-
ployees by appropriate means, including
such investigations of applicants, employees,
contractors, and other persons with similar
associations with the CIA as are necessary:
and
(i) Conduct such administrative and tech-
nical support activities within and outside
the United States as are necessary to per-
form the functions described in sections (a)
through (h) above, including procurement
and essential cover and proprietary ar-
rangements
1.9 The Department of Stale. The Secre-
tary of State shall:
(a) Overtlv collect information relevant to
United States loieign pnlicv concerns;
(b) Produce and disseminate loreigu intel-
ligence relating to United Stales lureign
policy as required for the execution of the
Secretary's responsibilities;
(c) Disseminate, as appropriate, reports
received from United States diplomatic and
consular posts;
(dt Transmit reporting requirements ol
the Intelligence Community to the Chiefs
of United States Missions abroad; and
(e) Support Chirls ..I Missions in discharg-
ing tlieil stiitlltniv responsibilities flH iliHC-
lion and coordination ol mission activities
1. 10 The Department of the Treasury,
The Secretary of the Treasury shall:
(a) Overtlv collect foreign financial and
monetary information;
(b) Participate with the Department of
State in the overt collection of general for-
eign economic information;
(c) Produce and disseminate loreigu intel-
ligence relating to United States economic
policy as required lor the execution ol the
Secretary's responsibilities; and
(d) Conduct, through the United Slates
Secret Service, activities to determine tin-
existence and capability of surveillance
equipment being used against the President
of the United States, the Ivxoculivc Office
ol the President, and. as authorized by the
Secretary of the Treasury or Ihe President,
other Secret Service protectees and United
States officials. No information shall be ac-
quired intentionally through such activities
except to pinlecl ;ig:iinst such sui veillaiice,
and those activities shall be conducted pur-
suant to procedures agreed upon by the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney
General.
Ill The Department of Defense. The
Secretary of Defense shall:
fa) Collect national foreign intelligence
and be responsive to collection tasking bv
the Director of Central Intelligence;
(I.) Collect, produce and disseminate mili-
tary and inililary-rclaled foreign intelli-
gence and counterintelligence as required
lor execution of the Secretary's responsibil-
ities;
(c) Conduct programs and missions neces-
sary to fulfill national, departmental and
tactical foreign intelligence requirements;
(d) Conduct counterintelligence activities
in suppuil ..I Derailment ol Defense com-
ponents outside ihe United States in coordi-
nation with the CIA. and within the United
93
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Stiitos in coordination willi t lit* KH1 pursu-
.ijit to procedures agreed upon by the Sec-
retary of Defense and the Attorney Gener-
al;
(c) Conduct, as the executive agent of the
United States Government, signals intelli-
gence and communications security activi-
ties, except as otherwise directed by the
NSC;
if) Provide for the timely transmission nf
critical intelligence, as defined liv the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, within the
United States Government;
(2) Carry out or contract for research, de-
velopment and procurement of technical
systems and devices relating to authorized
intelligence functions;
(h) Protect the security of Department of
Defense installations, activities, property,
information, and employees by appropriate
means including such investigations of ap-
plicants, employees, contractors, and other
persons with similar associations with the
Department of Defense as are necessary;
(i) Establish and maintain military intelli-
gence* relationships and military intelligence
exchange programs with selected coopera-
tive foreign defense establishments and in-
ternational organizations, and ensure thai
such relationships and programs are in ae-
enrdance with policies formulated by the
Director of Central Intelligence;
0) Direct, operate, control and provide
fiscal management for the National Security
Agency and for defense and military intelli-
gence and national reconnaissance entities;
and
(k) Conduct such administrative and tech-
nical support activities within and outside
the United States as are necessary to per-
form the functions described in sections (a)
through (j) above.
1.12 Intelligence Components Utilized hi/
the Secretary of Defense. In carrying mil
the responsibilities assigned in section 1.11,
the Secretary of Defense is authorized to
utilize the following-
la) Defense Intelligence Agency, whose
responsibilities shall include:
(1) Collection, production, or, through
tasking and coordination, provision of mili-
tary and military-related intelligence for the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Stall, other Del. use components, and, as
appropriate, non-Defense agencies;
(2) Collection and provision <»l military in-
telligence for national loieimi intelligence
and counterintelligence products;
(3) Coordination of all Department of De-
fense intelligence collection requirements;
(1) Management of the Delense Attache
system; and
(5) Provision of foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence stall" support as direct-
ed In the Joint Chiefs of Stall.
(b) \tnitnnil s,,initi/ Ainntif. n lime re-
sponsibilities shall include:
(1) Establishment and operation of an ef-
fective unified organization lor signals intel-
ligence activities, except for the delegation
of operational control over certain oper-
ations that are conducted through other
elements of the Intelligence Community.
No other department or ageucv may
engage in signals intelligence activities
except pursuant to a delegation In the Sec-
retary ol Delense;
(2) Control of signals intelligence collec-
tion and processing activities-, including as-
signment 111 h-soiimcs to ail i|i|Hu|)l l:llr
agent lot such periods and tasks as required
lor the direct support ol military command-
ers;
(3) Collection ol signals inh-lljg.-nef Itllnr-
inaliou lor national Inreig lelligetice pur-
poses in accordance with guidance liom the
Director of Central Intelligence;
(1) Processing nf signals intelligence data
lor national loreign intelligence purposes in
accordance with guidance Irani the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence:
(5) Dissemination of signals intelligence
information for national loreign intelligence
purposes to authorized elements of the
Government, including the military serv-
ices, in accordance with guidance from the
Director of Central Intelligence;
((if Collection, pioeessing ...,<! dissemina-
tion ol signals intelligence information lor
counterintelligence purposes:
{7) Provision of signals intelligence sup-
port lor the conduct ol mililaiv operations
in accordance with tasking, piimities, ;md
standards of timeliness assigned by the Sec-
retary of Delense. If provision of such sup-
port requires use of national collection sys-
tems, these systems will he laski-il uillmi
existing guidance liom the Dneetoi o! Cen-
tral Intelligence;
*
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(«) Kxeciiting the responsibilities nl Hit- li ;i 1 1< n on the lorcign aspects ol narcul-
Seeretary of Defense us executive ;igent lor ic-s production unci trafficking. When collec-
the communications security of the United Hon is conducted in response to national
States Government: foreign intelligence requirements, it will be
(9) Conduct ol research and development conducted in accordance Willi guidance
Id meet needs ill Hie United Slates lor sit: Irillll llie Direelnr ill Central Intelligence.
nals intelligence and ci unicalions seen- Collection ol national lorcigll iulelligenee.
rily: not otherwise obtainable, outside Ibe
(Ul) Protection or Ibe security of its instal- United Stales shall be coordinated will. Ibe
lalious, activities, properly, iuloi tuahi.o. and |:| \, ,„„l mi. -Ii colleclion within Ibe United
employees by appiop Male means, im hiding Stales shall be cixildl d will, the Mil:
such investigations or applicants, employees.
( 0) Conduct ol counterintelligence uctivi-
contractors, and olher persons with similar |jr, outside the United Stales in coordina-
associations with the NSA as are necessary: ||,„, „„), ,| lc . (:|A , and within the United
(II) Prescribing, within its held of author- stales in coordination with the 1-1)1; and
Ized operations, security regulations cover- (3 , M„„i|„rinR of till- development, pro-
log operating practices including the trans-
,.,„,.„„.,„ .„„| „ianage,nent of tactical intel-
imssion, handling and distribution of signals
,,„,.„„. „,,,,„„ m] ,.,,,„,,„„.,„ .,11( | „„,.
intelligence and communications security
,|ueling related research, development, and
material within and among the ,-le, s lesl and evaluation activities.
under control of the Director ol the NSA,
((,, (Ml , r ilfjim ,„„„.„ ,A[, ,;„„,,,„
and exercising the necessarv supers isorv j n i , ,- i , i- ,i
.
, .
,. -.,.!, "1 IJtfense appropriate 1<>r enndurt of tlte
control to ensure compliance with he regu- ,,,,.//, ., / i ;,
... '
* inlrlh inm i"missions unci resiionstmh ties n\
a ions;
(l2)C:onilucl ol loieign clyptolu
relahousbips. Willi liaison lor intelligent i
/ to llir Strnltmt ../ Drfcnv II so. b
olliei nllices ate used loi iiitelligeiiee pur-
poses, Ibe provisions ol I'ail 2 ol Ibis Order
purposes conducted in accordance with ii,„n ' , ,i , ., ' ,
i.
. .-
t ,
. . ,. ....
.
, ,,
shall appb to use o ices when usee
policies formulated bv the Director ol Con- .,
tral Iulelligenee; anil ,',.,'.,
(13) Conduct ol sue Innoislrative an.l ' ' ' ','"'. '*''-"""''"' "/ '"'"-'" I 1 "' s"
technical support activities within and out-
" l '" > ,"' '-"<'i;y shall
side the United States as are necessarv to l; " ' i
"'ll^l'"'e with the Department of
perforin the functions described in sections Sli'"'' "' mi 'rtl> '"llectinK inlnrmalion with
(I) through (121 above, including pi
incut
I l.i hiii-ijui eiiei|;v in Ml
(III I'lOllnce and disseiitiuale luielgll illlel-
(c) Offices for the collection of special- l ' K ' M "x' necessary lor the Secretary's respon-
ized intelligence through reconnaissance sioilitirs:
pro/trams, whose responsibilities shall in- (t'' 1'articipate in formulating intelligence
elude: collection ami analysis requirements when-
(1) Carrying out consolidated reconnais- lhe special expert capability of the Depart-
sauce programs lor specialized intelligence: merit can contribute: and
(2) Hcspontliug to tasking in accordance (( 'l Provide expert technical, analytical
with procedures established by the Director and research capability lo olher agencies
of Central Intelligence: and within Ibe Iulelligenee Community.
(3) Delegating authority lo the various tie- III The Federal liureau of Investigation.
partinents and agencies for research, tlevel- Under the supervision of the Attorney Cen-
opmont. procurement, and operation of oral and pursuant lo such regulations as lhe
ill-signaled means ol eolleeliiiu. All v Ceueial ma) establish, llu- Diiee-
(d) The /im-i/in intelligence and counter- loi ..I lb,- fill shall
intelligence elements of the Army. Sllllj, lal Within the United Slates conduct
Air Force, and Marine Corps, whose respon- counterintelligence and coordinate counter-
sihilities shall include- intelligence activities ol other iigeneies
(I) Colleilinn. piodiielion and disve ,i will be Intelligence I , v When
lion of military and military-related Imeign u cnitnloi intelligence achviiv ol the Mil in-
iulelligence and counterintelligence, and in- solves military or civilian personnel ol the
1313
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Department of Defense, the FBI shall co-
ordinate with the Department of Defense;
fb) Conduct counterintelligence activities
outside the United States in coordination
with the CIA as required by procedures
agreed upon by the Director of Central In-
telligence and the Attorney General;
(c) Conduct within the United States,
when requested by officials of the Intelli-
gence Community designated by the Presi-
dent, activities undertaken l<> collect for-
eign intelligence or support foreign intelli-
gence collection requirements of other
agencies within the* Intelligence Communi-
ty, or, when requested by the Director of
the National Security Agency, lo support
the communications security activities of
the Untied States Government;
(d) Produce and disseminate foreign intel-
ligence and counterintelligence: and
(c) Garry out or contract lor research, de-
velopment and procurement of technical
systems and devices relating to the func-
tions authorized above.
Tart 2 Conduct of hitclfigencc Activities
2.1 Need. Accurate and timely informa-
tion about the capabilities, intentions and
activities of foreign powers, organizations.
or persons and their agents is essential In
informed decisou-makiiig in the areas of na-
tional defense and foreign relations Collec-
tion of such information is a priority objec-
tive and will be pursued In a vigorous, inno-
vative and responsible manner that is con-
sistent with the Constitution and applicable
law and respectful of the principles upon
which the United States was founded.
2.2 Purpose. This Order is intended to
enhance human and technical collection
techniques, especially those undertaken
abroad, and the acquisition of significant
foreign intelligence, as well as the detection
and countering of international terrorist ac-
tivities and espionage conducted by foreign
powers. Set forth below are certain general
principles that, in addition to and consistent
witli applicable laws, are intended to
achieve the proper balance- between the ac-
quisition of essential information and pro-
tection of individual interests- Nothing in
this Order shall be construed to apply to or
Interfere with any authorized civil or crimi-
nal law enforcement responsibility of any
department or agency.
2.3 Collection of Information Agencies
within the Intelligence Community are au-
thorized to collect, retain or disseminate in-
formation concerning United States persons
only in accordance with procedures estab-
lished by the bead of the agency concerned
and approved by the Attorney General,
consistent with the authorities provided by
Part 1 of this Order. Those procedures shall
permit collection, retention and dissemina-
tion of lhr following types of inhumation.
(a) Information that is publicly available
or collected with the consent of the person
concerned:
(b) Information constituting foreign intel-
ligence, or counterintelligence, including
such information concerning corporations
or other commercial organizations. Collec-
tion within the United Stales of foreign in-
telligence not otherwise obtainable shall be
undertaken by the FBI or. when significant
foreign intelligence is sought, by other au-
thorized agencies of the Intelligence Com-
munity, provided that no foreign intelli-
gence collection by such agencies may be
undertaken for the purpose of acquiring in-
formation concerning the domestic activi-
ties of United States persons;
(c} Informal obtained in the coiwV ol
a lawlul foreign intelligence, counterintelli-
gence, international narcotics or interna-
tional terrorism investigation;
(dl Information needed to pruteel the
safety ol any persons or organizations, in-
cluding those who are targets, victims or
hostages of international terrorists organiza-
tions;
(e) Information needed to protect foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence sources
or methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Collection within the United States shall be
undertaken by the FBI except thai other
agencies of the Intelligence Community
may also collect such information concern-
ing present or former employees, present
or former intelligence agency contractors or
their present or former employees, or appli-
cants loi any such employment or contract-
ing:
(0 Inlonnation concerning persons who
are re;istmabl> believed In he potential
sources m coni, ..is In, u„. (impose of deter-
mining then suitability or credibility;
96
Administration ofRonald Reagan. 1981 / Dec. 4
(g) Information arising nut of a lawful per-
sonnel, physical or communications security
investigation:
(h) Information acquired by overhead re-
connaissance not directed at specific United
States persons;
(i) Incidentally obtained information that
may indicate involvement in activities that
may violate federal, state, local or l..ieij;n
taws; and
(j) Information necessary lor administra-
tive purposes.
In addition, agencies within the Intelligence
Community may disseminate information,
other than information derived from signals
intelligence, to each appropriate agency
within the Intelligence Community for pur-
poses of allowing the recipient agencv to
determine whether the information is rele-
vant to its responsibilities and can be re-
tained by it.
2. 4 Collection Techniques Agencies
within the Intelligence Comnumitv shall
I'M1 II"' leas lusivo collection loolulii|Uos
feasible within the United Stales or directed
against United States persons abroad. Agen-
cies are not authorized to use such tech-
niques as electronic .surveillance, unconsent-
ed physical search, mail surveillance, physi-
cal surveillance, or monitoring devices
unless they are in accordance with proce-
dures established by the head of the agencv
concerned anil approved bv the Attorney
General. Such procedures shall protect con-
stitutional and other legal rights ami limit
use of such information to lawful govern-
mental purposes. These procedures shall
not authorize:
(a) The CIA to engage in electronic sur-
veillance within the United States except
for the purpose of training, testing, or con-
ducting countoimoasuros to hostile elec-
tronic surveillance:
(b) Unconsented physical searches in the
United States by agencies other than the
FBI, except for:
(1) Searches by counter intelligence ele-
ments of the military services directed
against military personnel within the
United States or abroad for intelligence pur-
poses, when authorized by a intlilarv enm-
maiHler empowered I,, approve physical
lor law iloicemeiil [riij|i[ih
based upon a finding of probable cause to
believe that such persons are acting as
agents of foreign powers: and
(2t Searches by CIA of personal property
of non-United States persons lawfully iu its
possession,
(cl Physical surveillance of a United States
person in the United States by agencies
other than the FBI. except for:
III I'livsieal Slrrveillauie el ,,n| ,„
Inriuei employees, present ot I -i iolelli
genie agencv contractors or their present
or former employees, or applicants lor any
such employment or contracting; and
(2> I'hysical surveillance of a mililarv
person employed by a norhnlelligence ele-
ment of a military service.
(d) Physical surveillance of a United
Slates person abroad to collect foreign intel-
ligence, except to obtain significant infor-
mation that cannot reasonably be acquired
by other means.
2,5 Attorney General Approval. The At-
torney General herein is ilelegal.d the
I'ovyer In approve lb,- ire t,,i iuti-lligoui ,
purposes, within the United Slates or
against a United States person abroad, of
any technique for which a warrant would
lie required if undertaken lor law enforce-
ment pin [loses, provided ll, al sin h t -> h-
mqin-s shall not he undertaken unless the
Attorney Ceneral has determined iu each
ease thai tberl' is probable cause to believe
Ihal the technique is directed against a lor-
eigu power or an agent of a foreign power.
Electronic surveillance, as defined in the
foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
l!)7,S. shall be conducted in accordance
Willi Ihal Act. as well as Ibis Order,
2.(1 Assistance in Lam Enforcement Au-
thorities. Agencies within the Intelligence
Community are authorized to:
fa) Cooperate with appropriate law en-
loreemeiil agencies lor Ihe purpose ol pro-
tecting the employees, inhumation, proper-
ty and facilities of any agency within the
Intelligence Community;
(hi Unless otherwise precluded by law or
this Order, participate in law enlorcemenl
activities to investigate or prevent clandes-
tine intelligence activities by foreign
powers, or international terrorist or rinreul-
ies aetiv iliev.
(< I Provide specialized equipment, techni-
cal knowlege, or assistance of expert per-
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sonncl lor use by any department or guidelines issued bv tin- Department nl
agency, or, when lives are endangered, to Health and Unman Services. The subject's
support local law enlorcement agencies, informed consent shall bo documented as
Provision of assistance by expert personnel required bv those guidelines
shall be approved ill elicit ruse by the Gen- 2.11 Prohibition on .\xMi\simili<m No
eral Counsel of the providing agency; ami person employed In or acting "it behalf of
(cl) Rentier any oilier assistance and coop- t|ie United Stales Government shall encage
oration to law enforcement authorities not
j M or conspire to engage in. assassination.
precluded by applicable law.
'
2J2 /„,/,,,.,., p„rtiri,mlion No agonev or
2./ Conliarliim Agencies within the In-
„,,. ,,„,. .„,.,, ,.„„,„ „ sh [M .j.
'•'Higenco t: muiilty are authorized to
.,,,, iM „, „ s| ||m ,„,,, , „|,.lulkl ,
enter into contracts or arrangements lor the
a( . llv|lit, rorblcklcn bv this Order.
provision ol goods or services with private
companies or institutions in the United Part 3 General Pnwisiom
States and need not reveal (he sponsorship
.,
,
<•„,,,,,,, „„„„, ,,,,,,.,„,/„ | ,„. ;,. s
nl nit'li cmitrnctji or a. .augments |,„ u„.
;|||(| u MTlslbi | llK . s „, „„. ,,„,.,,,„ „| , ;,.„.
llion/ed intelligence purpose; Contracts or ,11 . n 1 ,i 1 1 >i 1
,
-,, 1 ,.,
' trill Intelligence and the heads nl other de-
arrangemonts with academic institutions
,
1 i,i 1 .1 .1 pailimn Is, agencies, :111c entities engagedmuv w undertaken onlv with the consent
. „. ,. .,
K
.
,
r
'
.
... .
1 /,, in intelligence activities D cooperate will
ol appropriate olhcials of the institution. ., ,. .. . , ,'
_
'
_
* ill I llllllriHL' III HiM e^llO Mi' iJ I I IriLMiuii-i
2.8 Consistency With Other Lairs. Noth- the Congress in the conduct ol its responsi-
ing in this Order shall be construed to au-
.ill
ove™s
!
1
"
'» ulh « l"«; "cjivitwi
thorire anv activity in violation of the Con- |'
u
' ? V
pu' vldec
, '"-,',
'
L ""eH
stilution or statutes of the United Stales. S .1,tps
.^'.fCr""n I' 3 fhe requirements
2.9 Undisclosed Participation in Oreaui- " . T "" " " c ] " T" K" Assistance Act
znlions Within the United State, No one "' i '"' L '"! ""•'"led (22 l.SC 2122,. and
acting on behalf of agencies within the In- ,"','i""
5m ol "'<•' N"l'""«l Security Act of
telligence Community may join or other- 19
"l
1
1
'
as ""ended (5(1 U.S.C. 4 13). shall
wise participate in nliv organization in the i ' 1
'
1
-
"' ""
S
I
K'CI"' i "' ll^ l "' s '" delined in
United Stales on behalf of am «,!„, ""s °" l '' r -
within the Intelligence Community without :! 2 ''"idenicnlotioii I he NSC. the Seen-
disclosing his intelligence affiliation to ap- llllv "' Offense, the Attorney General, and
propriate officials of the organization, "><" director of Central Intelligence shall
except in accordance with procedures es- issue such appropriate dirocliv ex and piiico-
tablished by the head of the agency coo- dines as are llcci-v.ui) I" iinplelilenl this
corned and approved by the Attorney Gen- Order. I leads ol agencies within the [nielli-
eral. Such participation shall be authorized gence Community shall issue appropriate
only if it is essential to achieving lawful pur- supplementary directives and procedures
poses as determined by the agency head or consistent with this Order. The Attorney
designee. No such participation may be un- General shall provide a statement of rca-
dertaken for the purpose of Influencing the sons ,or not approving any procedures OS-
activity of the organization or its members tablished by the head of an agency ill the
except in cases where: Intelligence Community other than the
(a) The participation is undertaken un Kill Tile Naliotial Security f Jiimcil may es-
bohall of the l-Tll in the course ol a lawful lablish pioeeduies in instances when- the
investigation; or agency head and the Attorney General are
(b) The organization concerned is coin- unable to reach agreement on other than
posed primarily of individuals who are not constitutional or other legal grounds
United Stales persons and is reasonably be- II Procedure* Until the piocidilles re-
lieved to be acting on behalf of a foreign quired In this Order have been established,
power, the activities herein authorized which re-
2. It) Hitman Experimentation. No agency quire procedures shall be conducted in ac-
within the Intelligence Community shall cnrdaticc with existing ptnci-dincs m re-
sponsor, contract for or conduct research on quiiemeuls established iiudei K.xocillivc
human subjects except in accordance with Order No. I2()3(i. I'rocoduics required by
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this Order shall be established as expedi-
tiously as possible All procedures promul-
gated pursuant to this Order shall he made
available to the congressional intelligence
committees.
3.4 Definitions Km the purposes of this
Order, the following terms shall have these
meanings:
(a) CmtnlrritUrlthlt'iUT means information
gathered and iicli\Mes imitluelid to pm
tect against espionage, other intelligence
activities, sabotage, or assassinations con-
ducted for or on behalf of foreign powers,
organizations or persons, or international
terrorist activities, bill not including person-
nel, physical, document or communications
security programs.
(b) Electronic surveillance means acquisi-
tion of a nonpublic communication by elec-
tronic means without the coiwnl of a
person who is a party to an electronic com-
munication or, in the case of a nonelec-
tronic communication, without the consent
of a person who is \ isabk present at the
place ol communication, but not including
the use of radio direct ion-lmdinu equip*
merit solely to determine the location of a
transmitter.
(c) Einjilniicc means a person employed
In, assigned In oi acting lot an agencv
within the Intelligence Community.
(d) Foreign intclhuenrc means informa-
tion relating to tin 1 capabilities, intentions
and activities ol loicigu powers, nrgani/a-
lions or persons, but not including counter-
intelligence except lot information on inter-
national terrorist activities
(e) Intclliwtuc ticticities means all aelivi-
ties that agencies within Hie Intelligence
Community are authorized to conduct pur-
suant to this Order.
(0 Intclliuence Qimniunifi/ and agencies
within the intelligence Cinnini/iiiti/ refer to
the following agencies or organizations:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agencv
(CIA):
(2) The National Security Agency r*NSA>;
f3) The Defense Intelligence Agencv
(DIA);
(A) The offices within the Department of
Defense lor the collection of specialized na-
tional foreign intelligence through recon-
naissance programs;
(5) The Muteail of Intelligence and He-
search ol the Department of State:
Kii The intelligence elements ol the
Aruiv. Nttvv. Air force, and Marine Corps,
the federal Bureau ol Investigation (Kill),
the Department of the Treasury, and the
Department of Knergy: and
|7l The stall elements ol the Director ol
Central Intelligence.
(g) The Xationnl Foreign Intelligence Pro-
,"-iiii inch ides the programs listed ImImw.
hoi its eoinpoMli'm shall be sithierl to
review by the National Security Council
and modification by the ('resident:
( 1
)
The programs of the CIA;
(2) The Consolidated Crvptologie Pro-
gram, the Ceneial Delense Intelligence
Program, and tin 1 programs ol tire olliees
within the Department of Defense for the
collection of specialized national foreign in-
telligence through recoiuiaissanee, except
such elements as the Director ol Central
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense
agree should be excluded;
(3) Other programs of agencies within the
InlelliiuiM e Commit. litv di-sij'ua|ed jointly
l» Hie Dneelor ol Cenlial Intelligence and
the head of the department or by the Presi-
dent as national foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities;
I 1) Aeliv Mil's ..I || I( - stall elements ol the
Diiectoi ol Central Intelligence;
(5) Activities to acquire the intelligence
required for the planning and conduct of
laetieal operations In the United States mil-
itary hirers aie not inelodecl in the National
foreign Intelligence Program.
(h) Special activities means activities con-
ducted in support ol national foreign poliey
objectives abroad which aie planned and
executed so that the role ol the United
States Government is not apparent or ac-
knowledged publicly, and functions in sup-
pott of such activities, but which are not
intended to influence United Slates political
processes, public opinion, policies, or media
and do not include diplomatic activities or
the collection and production of intelli-
gence or related support functions,
(i) United States fieruia means a United
States citizen, an alien known by the intelli-
gence agencv concerned to be a permanent
resident alien. ;m in i incorporated associ-
ation Mili-.lantialh e p<,-.ed ol United
Males etlizeiis or peimanent resilient aliens,
or a corporation incorporated in the United
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Slulcs, except lor a corporation directed
and controlled by a foreign government or
governments.
3.5 Purpose and Effect. This Order is in-
tended to control and provide direction and
guidance to the Intelligence Community
Nothing contained herein or in any proce-
dures promulgated hereunder is intended
to confer any substantive or procedural
right or privilege on any person or organi-
zation.
3.(i Revocation. Executive Order No.
12U36 of January 24, 1978, as amended, en-
titled "United States Intelligence Activi-
ties," is revoked.
Ronald Heagan
The White House,
December 4, 1981.
[Filed with the Office of the Federal lic^is-
ter, 4:09 p.m., December 4, 1981]
President's Intelligence Oversight
Board
Executive Order 12334. December 4, 1931
By the authority vested in me as Presi-
dent by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States of America, and in order to
enhance the security of the United States
by assuring the legality of activities of the
Intelligence Community, it is hereby or-
dered as follows:
Section J. There is hereby established
within the White Mouse Office, Executive
Office of the President, the President's In-
telligence Oversight Board, which shall be
composed of three members. One member,
appointed from among the membership of
the President's Foreign Intelligence Adviso-
ry Board, shall be designated by the Presi-
dent as Chairman. Members of the Board
shall serve at the pleasure of the President
and shall be appointed by the President
from among trustworthy and distinguished
citizens outside the Government who are
qualified on the basis of achievement, expe-
rience and independence. The Board shall
utilize such full-time staff and consultants as
authorized bv the President.
Sec. 2. The Board shall:
(a) Inform the President of intelligence
activities that any member of the Board be-
lieves are in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States, Executive orders,
or Presidential directives;
(b) forward to the Attorney General re-
ports received concerning intelligence ac-
tivities that the Board believes may be un-
lawful:
(c) Heview lite Internal guidelines nl i-im-Ii
agency within the Intelligence Ct> unity
concerning the lawfulness of intelligence
activities;
(d) Review the practices and procedures
of tlte Inspectors General and General
Counsel of the Intelligence Community for
discovering and reporting intelligence activ-
ities that may be unlawful or contrary to
Executive order or Presidential directive;
and
{e) Conduct such investigations as the
Board deems necessary to carry out its
functions under this Order.
Sec. 1 The Board shall, when required by
this Order, rrpftrt directly to lite President.
The Hoard shall consider and take appropri-
ate action with respect to matters identified
by the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Central Intelligence Agency or other agen-
cies of the Intelligence Community. With
respect to matters deemed appropriate by
the President, the Board shall advise and
make appropriate recommendations In- the
Oiteelm of Central IntrHiueHee, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, and other agencies
of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 4. The heads of departments and
agencies of the Intelligence Community
shall, to the extent permitted by law, pro-
vide the Board with all information neces-
sary to carry out its responsibilities Inspec-
tors General and General Counsel of the
Intelligence Community shall, to the extent
permitted by law, report to the Board con-
cerning intelligence activities that they
have reason to believe may be unlawful or
contrary to Executive order or Presidential
directive.
Sec. 5. Information made available to the
Board shall be given all necessary security-
protection in accordance with applicable
laws and regulations K;u h member til ilu-
llcmrtl. each member nl the Ittiiud's stall.
and each of the Board's consultants shall
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execute an agreement never to reveal any
classified information obtained by virtue of
his or her service with the Board except to
the President or to such persons as the
President mav designate
.Sec. (5. Members "I t>«* Hoard *»" "'"''
without eoni|>ensation. lull mav receive
transportation, expense, and per diem al-
lowances as authorized by law. Stalf and
consultants In lilt' Hoard shall receive pn>
and allowances as authorized by the I'
dent.
Ronald Reagan
The White House,
December 4, 1981.
[Filed Willi the Office of the Federal Regis-
ter. 4:10 p.m., December 4, 1981}
Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1982
ties Protection Act. which has passed the
House ami is awaiting lloor action in the
Senate. 1 strongly support enactment of this
measure, preferably in the form in which it
was passeil by the House of Representa-
tives: we must ait now In protect our intel-
ligence poisonncl. who serve our Nation
under what arc often dillicult and danger-
ous circumstances.
Nam As enailnl. 11.11 .17.W is I'uhlir Uim
97-H9. approved December 4.
United Slates Ambassador lo Tunisia
Statement mi Sinning 1111. 3454 Into Law
December 4. 1981
I am pleased today to sign into law II It
3454. the Intelligence Authorization Act lor
Fiscal Year 19N2. This act represents a sig-
nificant first step toward achieving rcvital-
ization of oor Nation's intelligence coiiuuu-
nily The I'leviilenl nl the United Stales
must have timely, accurate, and insighlllll
foreign intelligence in order to make sound
national defense and foreign policy deci-
sions. This act helps to assure that we will
have the necessary intelligence iiilnriiinlinii
to make these dillicult decisions
The Congress has with this act authorized
appropriations sufficient to assure that ive
continue to have the world's best and most
professional intelligence service. The Con-
gress has also presided new- administrative
authorities to the heads of the Nation's
three major intelligence agencies lo assure
that thev can poiloito llieil missions more
effectively. I hope that the spirit nl conpiia-
tion between the legislative and executive
branches which resulted in this act will con-
tinue as we inose to rebuild our Nation's
jnleliiiii'nco capabilities
I would also oole ins hope thai I will
soon be able lo sign the Intelligence Monti-
Nomination .</ Waller Iron Cutler.
December 4. 1981
The President today announced his inten-
tion lo nominate Waller l.eou Cutler, of
Maryland, lo be Ambassador to lb.- Ilepub-
lic ol Tunisia He would succeed Stephen
Warren Bosworth.
Mr Culler served in Ihe United Stales
Army in 1951—r»l>, prior lo coloring the For-
eign Service lie was Consular tjllieer in
Yaounde in 1957-59. In Ihe Department,
he was Foreign Affairs Officer in Ihe Fxecu-
live Si-nolaiial 1 1 II5II-H I I and Stall Assistant
lo Ihe Seeietaiy ol Stale (IINiMISl He was
Political Ollicer in Algiers (1962-65), Princi-
pal Oflicer in Tabriz (1965-67), Political Of-
lieer in Seoul (1967-69), and in Saigon
(1969-71). In 1071-7.'!. he was International
Relations (Jllicer in Ihe Department, lie at-
tended the Senior Seminar at the Foreign
Service Institute- in 1973-74. lie svas Coun-
try Director of Central African Allairs in
Ihe Depailiuenl ill l')7 1-7.1 and served as
Ambassador to the Hepublic of Zaire in
1975-79, lie was Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Slate lor Congressional Itelalions in
1979-HI
Mr. Culler graduated Iroiii Wcslcs an L'ni-
versilv (U.A.. 19531 and Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy (M.A.. 1954). He is
maiii.d, lias II, i.-i- .hil.li.il. and r.si.l.s in
Uii-vs Chase. M.I lb- was l.oin Niivi'lllixl
25. 1931, in Boston. Mass.
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During the decades following the Second World War
the US intelligence community operated for the most part
out of the sight and mind of the American public. While
subject to periodic investigations and Congressional
inquiries, intelligence activities were conducted with
a minimum of public knowledge or accountability. The
manner in which the US intelligence community conducted
its activities would change in the early 1970 's when it
became the subject of numerous public and Congressional
exposes and investigations. The decade of the 1970
' s was
one of the most turbulent in the history of the intelli-
gence community and raised issues of governmental ethics,
responsiveness and accountability.
This paper examines 1) changes made in the
activities of the US intelligence community to 2) public
and Congressional concerns over constitutional and
administrative issues related to intelligence activities.
The paper focuses on the responsiveness to criticism
by the US intelligence community as implemented through
Presidential Executive Orders on United States Foreign
Intelligence Activities. A comparative examination is
conducted on President Ford's Executive Order 11905,
President Carter's Executive Order 12036 and President
Reagan's Executive Order 12333. These three Executive
Orders cover a period of time from February 1976 through
December 1981 and are compared with public and
Congressional criticism of intelligence activities raised
during the period in question. Such an examination
provides for an increased understanding of the responsive-
ness (or nonresponsiveness) of the intelligence community
to constitutional and administrative issues related to
intelligence activities. The Executive Order is
shown as a document which provides a framework, a public
agreement on the control and accountability of the
intelligence community. It provides the public with a rare
means for holding its elected officials responsible for
the secret and often controversial activities conducted in
its name.
